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INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001, two commercial airliners were highjacked
while in U.S. airspace and purposely flown into the Twin Towers of the
World Trade Center in New York City, killing the highjackers, all passen-
gers and crew, and several thousand people on the ground. Shortly
thereafter, another highjacked airliner slammed into the Pentagon
Building in Washington, D.C., under similar circumstances, and with
equally dire consequences. A fourth airliner crashed in a field near
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, killing all on board. This thwarted highjacking
was apparently intended to cause additional damage and deaths in the
nation's Capital. These well-coordinated and well-executed terrorist at-
tacks against the United States and its citizens were the latest and most
dramatic in a series of such actions, which have included the bombing of
the U.S. military barracks in Khobar, Saudi Arabia on January 23, 1996,
killing nineteen U.S. servicemen and wounding nearly 500 Americans
and Saudis; the dual truck-bombings at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania on August 7, 1998, killing 244 people and injuring thousands
more; and the attack upon the naval ship U.S.S. Cole in Yemen on Octo-
ber 12, 2000, killing and wounding several of the crew.2
In direct response to the September 11 incidents, President George
W. Bush, on September 14, 2001, issued Presidential Proclamation 74633
declaring that a national emergency exists by reason of the terrorist at-
tacks .
4
2 SeeJoseph Kahn, A Day of Terror The Background; A Trend Toward Attacks That Emphasize Death,
N.Y. TiNEs, Sept. 12, 2001, at A18;John F. Burns, The Warship Explosion: The Overiew; Blast i'lls Sailors
on U.S. Ship in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2000, at Al; RichardJ. Newman, Amerca Rgts Back,- Clinton
Raises the Stakes in the War Against Terorism U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 31, 1998, at 38, 40, 42, 45,
46. It is probably accurate to say that this series of events began with the first bombing of the Twin
Towers in New York on February 23, 1993, in which six people were killed and hundreds were injured.
See generaly Andrea Stone, A Major Calamit; a Lot of Fear, USA TODAY, Mar. 1, 1993, at A3; Usha Lee
McFarling, 2 Planes Hit Twin Towers at Weakest Spo4 LA. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A4; Michael Grun-
wald, Ex-Sergeant Charged in Bomb PHot WASH. Posr, Oct. 31, 1998, at A8. Several people were charged,
tried, and convicted in connection with this incident in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of NewYork. See United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.NY. 1999). The con-
victions were affirmed by the Second Circuit, 152 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1998), and the Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari, 526 U.S. 1028 (1999).
3 Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001).
4 On September 12, 2001, the Security Council of the United Nations adopted Resolution 1368
(2001) condemning the September 11 terrorist attacks and recognizing "the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter." U.N. SCOR, 4370th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). Thereafter, on September 28, 2001, the Security Council adopted a
more comprehensive resolution, which reiterated Resolution 1368 and, among other things, called
upon the member states to take various actions against international terrorism. See S.C. Res. 1373,
U.N. SCOR, 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
On September 12, 2001, at the request of the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion's North Atlantic Council resolved that the September 11 attack was considered an action covered
by Article V of the Washington Treaty, which provides that an armed attack against one or more of the
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Congress acted on September 18, 2001, by proclaiming Joint Resolu-
tion 23 JR 23)," which authorized the President "to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he de-
termine[d] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organiza-
tions or persons ....,,6  Congress also provided extensive emergency
funding7 for federal and state governments to confront this national cri-
sis, and, on October 26, 2001, at the request of the President, enacted
the so-called "USA PATRIOT Act, 8 enhancing in several significant ways
the law enforcement capabilities of the United States government.
On November 13, 2001, President Bush signed an order entitled "De-
tention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism" ("The Order"). 9 It states that it is issued pursuant to the
authority vested on President Bush "as President and as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for
Use of Military ForceJoint Resolution'° and sections 821 and 836 of Title
10, United States Code .... ,
In brief, The Order directs the Secretary of Defense to detain and try
before military commissions appointed by him, non-U.S. citizens whom
the President has "reason to believe" are members of al Qaida12 or have
Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all. See The North Atlantic
Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241,2244,34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246.
Authorization for Use of Mfilitary Force, SJ. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001) (enacted).
6 Id.§ 2.
See 2001 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Recovery from and Response to Ter-
rorist Attacks on the United States, Pub. L No. 107-38, 115 Stat. 220 (Sept. 18, 2001).
8 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272.
9 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001) [hereinafter "The Order"]. See the Appendix for the full
text of The Order. On March 22, 2002, the Secretary of Defense issued Military Commission Order
No. 1, which establishes the procedure for implementing The Order and trials held under its author-
ity. flitary Comm'n Order No. 1 (Dep't of Defense Mar. 22,2002) [hereinafter MCO No. 1].
10 S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
n The Order, supra note 9, at preamble. MCO No. 1, issued pursuant to The Order, also refer-
ences DoD 5200.2-R, 32 GF.R. 154 (1987) ("Personnel Security Program"); Exec. Order No. 12,958, 3
C.F.R. 333 (1993-1997) (1996) ("Classified National Security Information"); 10 U.S.C § 603 ("Ap-
pointments in time of war or national emergency"); DoD Directive 5025.1, (December 23, 1988)
("DoD Directives System"), as well as The Order, supra note 9, and Article 1, Section 2 of the Consti-
tution. MCO No. 1, supra note 9.
12 "Al Qaida" or "al Qaeda," means "the base" in Arabic. It is purportedly a global umbrella or-
ganization engaged in varios terrorist activities, principally targeting the United States and its citi-
zens. Se ganeraly STEVEN FMERSON, AiERJCANJIHAD: T1E TERORISTS LING AMONG Us (2002). Re-
portedly, al Qaida was formed in 1989 from a group based in Peshawar, Pakistan, called the Office of
Services for Alkaifa, which was engaged in recruitingvolunteers and raising funds for the jihad (holy
war) against the Soviets in Afghanistan. See id. Allegedly, al Qaida has cells throughout the world,
including the United States, and is reportedly led by Usamah (Osama) bin Laden, a former Saudi
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engaged in or have aided and abetted international terrorism against the
United States. The commissions may "sit at any time and any place."
13
The rules to govern these proceedings are to be established by the Secre-
tary of Defense, but the admissibility of evidence is to be determined by
the presiding judge, dependent upon the evidence having "probative
value to a reasonable person.' 4 A two-thirds majority vote of a commis-
sion is sufficient to convict and to impose sentence, which can be up to
"life imprisonment or death."'5 These commissions are to have jurisdic-
tion exclusive of all courts.
16
The present Article undertakes to examine the constitutional and le-
gal underpinnings of The Order. In doing so, this Article will first delve
into the authority upon which it purportedly stands. As part of this in-
quiry, the Article will relate the more important historical and legal
precedents in which similar presidential action was taken, particularly
those occurring during the Second World War era related to the Ger-
man saboteurs cases,17 as well as those directed at Japanese-Americans."8
This Article will then analyze the substantive provisions of The Order,
seriatim. 19 Next, it will examine the issue of the venues where these pro-
ceedings may take place and the constitutional and legal implications
that might follow from the choice of venue. Finally, this Article will dis-
cuss some of the major policy issues to be considered in the enforcement
of The Order, as well as inventory possible consequences that may result
from its implementation, assuming its validity. This discussion will also
consider some of the possible alternatives to The Order.
Arabian citizen. SeeYossEF BODANSKY, BIN I-ADEN: THE MAN WHO DECLARED WAR ON AMERICA (2001);
John F. Burns, Bin Laden Stirs Stniggle on Meaning ofJilad, N.Y. TIms,Jan. 27, 2002, at Al; Thomas L
Friedman, Run, Osama, Run, N.Y. TIMEsJan. 23, 2002, at A19;Jim Rutenberg, In Odoberlnteriew, bin
Laden Hinted at Role, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 1, 2002, at A10; Donald G. McNeil,Jr., Afterife" CanAl Qaeda Rise
If bin Laden Falls?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, § 4, at 1. In 1996 bin Laden issued a sixty page Jatwa (a
decree, issued by a religious leader or scholar to provide guidance to Islamic believers, which believers
are obliged to follow). This fatwa, commonly referred to as the "Ladenese Epistle," urged all Muslims
to take up arms against "the American enemy" to avenge its "attack on Islam." For a translation,
see Ladenese Epistle: Declaration of War Part I, at http://ivw.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn?pagename=article&node--&contentld=A4342-2001Sep21 (last visited Feb. 19, 2002). On February
22, 1998, bin Laden issued another fatua inciting Muslims to kill Americans and Jeus everywhere.
PETER L BERGEN, HOLY WAR INC.: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF OSAMA BIN L kDEN 95-96 (2001).
is The Order, supra note 9, at 57,835.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 57,834. MCO No. 1 purports to amend this provision as it pertains to the imposition of a
death sentence. See MCO No. 1, supra note 9, § 6.F.
16 Id. at 57,835.
17 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); see also Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2,
1942).
is See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944); Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942), reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 97a (1948),
and in 56 Star. 173 (1942); Proclamation No. 4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601 (Mar. 27, 1942); Civilian Restrictive
Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (May 19, 1942).
19 As amended by the provisions of MCO No. 1, supra note 9.
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In undertaking this study, I am aware that because of the dynamic
circumstances of the moment, this study is to some degree undertaking
an analysis of a moving target. Although the Secretary of Defense issued
MCO No. 1 on March 22, 2002,20 this may not be the final regulation is-
sued under The Order. Furthermore, no one has actually been charged
pursuant to The Order, although persons have been detained, presuma-
bly under color of The Order's authority. This notwithstanding, I am of
the view that academic analysis of The Order alone is of some value in
understanding this difficult area of competing national values.
I. PRESmDENTIAL AUTHORrIYTO ISSUE THE ORDER
The authority of President Bush to issue The Order, whether in his
capacity as President or as Commander in Chief,21 presents a threshold
question. The Order states various bases for its authority: the Constitu-
tion and the laws of the United States, including the Authorization for
Use of Military ForceJoint Resolution ('Joint Resolution 23"), as well as
Sections 821 and 836 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code.? Each will be ad-
dressed in turn.
A. The Constitution
The Constitution establishes a government of enumerated powers for
three separate branches, and, in addition, it further endows some of the
branches with implied or inherent powers.24 We commence our inquiry
by mapping the relevant boundaries for the executive and legislative
branches and restating the judicially developed rules that gauge the va-
lidity of legislative and executive actions.
Article II of the Constitution delineates the powers of the President.
Section 1 provides that "[t]he Executive power shall be vested in [the]
President of the United States of America. "25 Section 2 appoints the
President as "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and of the Mi-
litia of the several States ' when these are called to federal service. 26 Ad-
ditionally, Section 2 gives the President, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, the power to grant reprieves and pardons,? and the power to
20 MCO No. 1, supra note 9.
21 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, c. 1 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America."), § 2, cl. 1 ('The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of
the United States").
S.j. Res. 23,107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-40, 115 Star. 224 (2001) (enacted).
2 The Order supra note 9 at 57,833.
24 "Congress and the President, like the courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitu-
tion." QuHn, 317 U.S. at 25.
U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
2 Id.§2, cl. 1.
7 Id.
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make treaties and nominate various officers of the United States.Y2 Fi-
nally, Section 3 delegates to the President the authority to see "that all
laws be faithfully executed."29
Beyond these expressed powers, the President also enjoys certain im-
plied powers, although this has not been without controversy. Some, in-
cludingJames Madison, contended that the authority of the President is
limited to those powers specifically enumerated in Sections 2 and 3.3
However, Alexander Hamilton's more expansive views eventually pre-
vailed. It was his belief that these "enumeration [s] ... [were] intended
merely to specify the principal articles implied in the definition of execu-
tive power; leaving the rest [of the implied presidential powers] to flow
from the grant of that power, interpreted [together] with other parts of
the Constitution."3  This formulation received judicial imprimatur in
Meyers v. United States,32 in which the Court indicated that the President's
"executive power was given in [the Constitution in] general terms,
strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was regarded as appro-
priate, and was limited by direct expressions where limitation was
needed .... , Thus, under present constitutional doctrine, the Presi-
dent has all those powers that are specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution, as well as those implied powers necessary to effectuate the enu-
merated ones. The only limitation on these implied powers occurs when
there is a particularized assignment to other branches of government-34
The President, however, does not have general inherent authority to ex-
ercise power in "the public interest."5 He must ground all actions on an
act of Congress or a provision of the Constitution?
Id. § 2, cl. 2
2 Id. § 3.
30 See 6 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 138, 147-50 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910). Even some mod-
em commentators have adopted this limited view. See, e.g., Charles L BlackJr., The W*ing Balance of
the American Political Departments, 1 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 13 (1974) (claiming that the President pos-
sesses primarily the five specified powers enumerated in Article II).
1 THEWORS OFALEXANDER HAMILTON 76,80-81 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1851).
272 U.S. 52 (1926). This opinion was authored by ChiefJustice Howard Taft, who was himself
President of the United States from 1909 to 1913. He served as ChiefJustice from 1921 to 1930.
33Id. at 118.
In contrast to this doctrine of implied presidential powers, there is no such counterpart for
Congress. Congress can only exercise those powers specifically assigned to it by the Constitution. See
Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (rejecting the argument that Congress has the implied
power to strip an American of citizenship based on its foreign affairs powers, because the govern-
ment's powers are limited to those explicitly granted by the Constitution or to those that are necessary
and proper to carry out the explicit powers); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635-36 (1883)
(holding that Congress's power is limited to that which is expressly authorized or incident to an ex-
press power).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952).
6 Id- Although The Order references constitutional provisions in a general manner, MCO No. 1
specifically cites Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution (the Commander in Chief clause) as a source
of authority. MCO No. 1, supra note 9. Also, MCO No. 1 dubs The Order the "President's Military
[Vol. 4:4
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Although Congress is the principal repository of the legislative pow-
ers of the United States,37 the President does have certain limited author-
ity to create law, such power implicitly emanating from the office.ss Ad-
ditionally, except in those areas in which the Constitution specifically
requires Congress to itself take action, such as declaring war,s Congress
can make delegations of its powers to the executive or judicial branches,
subject to various constraints.4° Properly delegated congressional power
is, of course, an important source of executive activity and regulation,
e.g., the many regulatory and administrative agencies of the federal gov-
ernment.
It seems reasonable to conclude that The Order constitutes an act of
legislation by the President 4 Yet, there does not appear to be any exist-ing law specifically delegating to the President the authority to regulate
Order," although it is captioned a "Notice" in the original text. Id. § 2. As will be further discussed,
this may be an attempt to further insulate The Order fromjudicial review.
37 See U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States"); Youngstou, 343 U.S. at 587 (discussing that even in war-time, the Constitution
vests Congress, rather than the President, with the lawmaking function).
Compare United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871) (discussing the government's
power to take private property for military necessity during war), In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (up-
holding the President's power to obtain an injunction to prevent a Pullman strike, despite the absence
of any statutory warrant, to prevent interference with interstate commerce and the mails), In re Nea-
gle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the State of California was barred from prosecuting a U.S. Mar-
shal for homicide committed while protecting a Supreme ourtJustice, despite the absence of a law
authorizing the President to require the U.S. Marshal Service to undertake such duties), Meyers v.
United States, 272 US. 52 (1926) (finding that control over dismissal of subordinate executive offi-
cials is exclusively within the power of the Executive department), and United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (finding that the Executive Branch has the exclusive power to ne-
gotiate with foreign governments), with Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667 (finding that in the absence of a
statute to said effect, the President lacked authority to seize steel mills to avert a nation-wide strike,
nonvithstanding that it would affect the Korean War effort).
39 SeeU.S. CONSr. art. I., § 8, cd. 11.
40 Compare INS v. Chadha, 462 US. 919 (1983) (finding that the presentation clause, which estab-
lishes the procedure for the enactment of laws in Congress, including the presentment of bills to the
President for approval or disapproval, and the bicameral requirement, which requires bills to be con-
sidered and voted upon by both Houses of Congress, constitute limitations on the power of Congress
to delegate), with Curtiss-Wgh4 299 U.S. at 304 (in the area of foreign affairs, a relatively broad dele-
gation of congressional powers is permissible). Certain congressional powers are non-delegable by
reason of the nature of the power in question, i.e., the power to try impeachments under Article 1,
Section 3, or the power to approve or veto treaties. In those areas where Congress can delegate, the
delegation must contain intelligible standards establishing what is the "policy [of] Congress and [a]
definition of the circumstances in which its command is to be effective." Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v.
Adm'r of the Wage and Hour Div. of the Dep't of Labor, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941). The courts have
been particularly sensitive to broad delegations of congressional power involving areas of substantive
liberty. See Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (rejecting the delegation of authority, on statutory
grounds, for the Department of Defense to administer a constitutionally questionable security clear-
ance program).
41 See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 952 (finding a legislative act where the House's action "had the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons"); see also Youngstonm, 343 U.S. at
587, 588; id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("The legislative nature of the action taken by the Presi-
dent seems to me to be clear.").
May 2002)
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
the matters covered by The Order.4 The question thus becomes
whether there is anything inherent in the office of the President, or in
his capacity as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, that authorizes
by implication the issuance of The Order, absent specific congressional
delegation.43
There should be little doubt that the Constitution empowers the
President, both in that capacity and as Commander in Chief, to conduct
and direct any congressionally declared war. Implicit within that power
is the duty of the President to engage in war effectively.4 Without a con-
gressional declaration of war, however, the President's authority to
promulgate a directive like The Order is questionable. Historically, such
presidential actions have been circumscribed to conditions prevalent
during constitutionally declared wars.4 In this respect, it is appropriate
to note, that the President has neither sought a formal declaration of war
by Congress,47 nor has Congress seen fit to declare such a state in the
manner contemplated in Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 of the Constitu-
42 See infra notes 104-21 and accompanying text.
43 Cf Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
44 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (providing Congress the power to declare wvar), ci. 14 (provid-
ing Congress the power to make rules and regulations for the land and naval forces), cl. 18 (providing
power to make all laws necessary and proper to carry out the foregoing powers).
45 See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943) (discussing that "[t]he war power of the
national government is 'the power to wage war successfully'").
See Quit/n, 317 U.S. 1; Hirabayash 320 U.S. 81; Korematn 323 U.S. 214; In reYamashita, 327 U.S.
1 (1946). Cf, Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
SeeWINTHROP, MILITARYLm.WAND PRECEDENTS 831 (photo reprint 1920) (2d ed. 1896):
[I]t is those provision of the Constitution which empower Congress to "declare war" and "raise
armies," and which in authorizing the initiation of war, authorize the employment of all neces-
sary and proper agencies for its prosecution, from which this tribunal [i.e. military commis-
sions] derives its original sanction. Its authority is thus the same as the authority for making
and waging war and for the exercise of military government and martial law. The commission
is simply an instrumentality for the more efficient execution of the war powers vested in Con-
gress and the power vested in the President as Commander-in-Chief in war.
... Hence, in our military law, the distinctive name of militaiy commission has been adopted
for the exclusive war-court, which... [is] essentially a distinct tribunal from the court-martial
of the Articles of War.
Id., cited in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346-47, n.9 (1952). See also Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348:
In the absence of attempts by Congress to limit the President's power, it appears that, as
Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, he may, in time of war, estab-
lish and prescribe jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions .... in territory occupied by
Armed Forces of the United States."
M at 348 (emphasis added).
47 See Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (Sept. 14, 2001) ("A nationa emergency exists by
reason of the terrorist attacks at the World Trade Center, New York, and the Pentagon, and the con-
tinning and immediate threat of further attacks on the United States." (emphasis added)); The Order,
supra note 9, at 57,833 ("a state of armed conflict [exists] that requires the use of the United States
Armed Forces" (emphasis added)).
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tion,4 and, most assuredly, not in the manner that declarations of war
have been effectuated in the past.49
Although the President has certain inherent powers as a function of
being the Commander in Chief,5° it should be noted that it is Congress
that has the power to "make Rules for the Government and Regulation
of the land and naval Forces"51 and "to define and punish... Offences
against the Law of Nations."52 It is likely that these are non-delegable, at
least without a formal declaration of war by Congress.0 Viewed within
this framework, The Order appears to amend Congress's Joint Resolu-
tion 23.M
48 See SJ. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) ("[T]he President is
authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force.").
The declaration of war againstJapan in 1941 is typical of the others. It states:
Whereas the Imperial Government ofJapan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the
Goverment and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it Resolved by the
Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States America in Congrwss assembled, That the
state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government ofJapan which has thus
been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby
authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States
and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government ofJa-
pan; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all the resources of the country are
hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.
SJ. Res. 116,77th Cong., Pub. L No. 77-328,55 Stat. 795 (1941).
See also Act ofJune 18, 1812, 12th Cong., ch. 102, 2 Stat. 755 (declaring war between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the United States); Act of May 15, 1846, 29th Cong., ch.
16, 9 Stat. 9 (providing for prosecution of the existing war between the United States and the Repub-
lic of Mexico); Declaring that War Exists Between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain, 55th
Cong., ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364 (1898); Declaration of War with Germany, SJ. Res. 1, 65th Cong., Pub.
Res. No. 1, ch. 1, 40 Star. 1 (1917); Declaration ofWar with Austria-Hungary, 65th Cong., H.J. Res. 17,
Pub. Res. No. 17, ch. 1, 40 Stat. 429 (1917); Declaration of State of War with Germany, SJ. Res. 119,
77th Cong., Pub. L 77-331, ch. 564, 55 Stat. 796 (1941); Declaration of State of War with Italy, SJ. Res.
120,77th Cong., Pub. L 77-333 ch. 565,55 Stat. 797 (1941).
5 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 690-91 (1863) (finding that the President has the
authority as Commander in Chief to repel an invasion or rebellion without first seeking congressional
approval).
U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14. Congress's authority under this provision "may to some unknown
extent impinge upon even [the President/Commander in Chief's] command functions." Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579, 644 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). Cf Swain v. United
States, 28 Ct. a. 173 (1893), afid, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
"2 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, d. 10.
See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91-92, 102-03 (1943) (finding that subsequent
congressional action "ratified" the presidential order and that statute was not an improper delega-
tion).
Se &iWoods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948) ("[I]f the war power can be used in
days of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society, it may ... swallow up all other
powers of Congress...."); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 589, 588
(1952) ("The Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking power to the Congress alone in both
good and bad times," and "did not subject this lawmaking power of Congress to presidential or mili-
tary supervision or control."); Hirabayash, 320 U.S. at 102 (finding that a statute authorizing a presi-
dential order during time of war was not an improper delegation of Congress's legislative power).
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1. TheYoungstown Sheet case
If The Order is eventually challenged in the courts, Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sauyer could be a major hurdle for those defending the
President's authority to issue this directive. This case, decided in 1952,
at the height of the Korean War, is both a more recent counterweight to
Meyers v. United States in 1926, and more relevant to the factual and con-
stitutional scenario surrounding The Order. First, both the presidential
directive in Youngstown and in The Order involve similar claims of presi-
dential power (i.e., inherent authority as President and as Commander
in Chief). Second, both situations involve presidential orders issued in
the midst of congressionally undeclared wars. Third, neither of these
orders were specifically authorized by any statute. Finally, the subject
matter of both presidential orders had been assigned by Congress to the
jurisdiction of the federal courts by legislation predating the issuance of
the orders.
Youngstown involved Executive Order 10,340,6 whereby President
Truman, in the face of an imminent and potentially crippling nation-
wide strike in the steel industry,57 directed the Secretary of Commerce to
take possession of the principal steel mills of the country, and to keep
them running. Thereafter, the Secretary issued possessory orders requir-
ing the management of these companies to serve as operating managers
of the mills on behalf of the government. Although the President then
sent two messages to Congress reporting these actions,m no action was
taken by Congress with respect to the subject of the executive order.
The President's takeover was challenged by the mill owners, who claimed
that it was unauthorized by an any act of Congress or the Constitution.
The government responded that the President acted under his "inherent
power" to protect the "well-being and safety of the Nation."59 The Court,
in a somewhat terse opinion authored byjustice Black, rejected this con-
tention and specifically ruled that "[t]he order cannot properly be sus-
tained [either] as an exercise of the President's military power as Com-
mander in Chief of the Armed Forces... [n]or can the.., order be
sustained because of the several constitutional provisions that grant ex-
ecutive power to the President."60
343 U.S. 579 (1952).
See i1 at 583, 589; Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952) ("Directing the
Secretary of Commerce to Take Possession of and operate the Plants and Facilities of Certain Steel
Companies").
57 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 590-91 ("[A] work stoppage would immediately jeopardize and im-
peril our national defense and the defense of those joined with us in resisting aggression, and would
add to the continuing danger of our soldiers in the field.").
53 See 98 CONG. REc. 3955-62 (1952) ("Seizure of the Steel Plants"); 98 CONG. RaG. 4192-95 (1952)
("Powers of the President--Seizure of the Steel Mills").
59 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584.
0 Id. at 587.
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Most of the judges weighed in separately, filing either concurring or
dissenting o 'mons. Of these, Justice Jackson's concurrence is particu-
larly cogent. He commences his argument by commenting upon "the
infirmity of confusing the issue of a power's validity with the cause it is
invoked to promote, of confounding the permanent executive office
with its temporary occupant... [and of] [t]he [strong] tendency... to
emphasize transient results upon policies .... [while] los[ing] sight of
enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our Re-
public." Justice Jackson then proceeds to classify into three groups the
various attempts at exercising presidential power, and of the legal conse-
quences which result from each alternative.
The first is "[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or im-
plied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate."r4  As an example of presidential action falling within this
group the opinion refers to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
which suggested that in external affairs the President might be allowed
to act without congressional authority, but not contrary to an Act of
Congress.66
Second, "[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own inde-
pendent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncer-
tain .... In this area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the
imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on
abstract theories of law."67 Because of the inertia preventing congres-
sional action, there is, in effect, an invitation for the President to act. An
example of this is the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Although
the Constitution allows for the suspension of habeas corpus "when in
61 Concurring opinions were filed byJustices Frankfurter, Jackson, Clark, Douglas, and Burton. A
dissentiwas filed by ChiefJustice Vinsonjoined byJustices Reed and Mhnton. Id. at 580.
JusticeJackson's background is of some interest. In 1938, President Roosevelt appointed him to
be Solicitor General of the United States. Thereafter, in 1940, he became Attorney General, and a
year later, in 1941, aJustice on the Supreme Court. Thus, he was a member of the Court when Quiin
and the Japanese detention cases were decided. While on that Court, he was granted a leave of ab-
sence from 1945 to 1946 to become the chief prosecutor for the United States before the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, and did not participate in General Yarnashita's appeal from his
conviction by a military commission in 1946. As Attorney General, he took a more expansive view of
the President's implied powers than he did as a Justice. See 89 CoNG. REc. 3992 (1943); see also
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 695 (Vinson C.J., dissenting).
63 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson,J, concurring).
64 Id. at 635.
6 299 US. 304 (1936).
66 See a; see also Hlrabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (finding express congressional
authorization); Korematls, 323 US. 214 (same); United States v. United Mvine Workers, 330 U.S. 258
(1947) (same).
67 Youngston, 343 U.S. at 638 (JacksonJ., concurring).
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cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it,"6 the Con-
stitution makes no mention as to who is to exercise this power. Justice
Jackson pointed to the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus by Presi-
dent Lincoln during the Civil War. In the face of numerous judicial
challenges,69 Congress eventually ratified President Lincoln's action.70
Finally, "[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for
then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any con-
stitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclu-
sive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress
from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so
conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at
stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system."71 Jus-
tice Jackson referred to judicial rejection of President Roosevelt's at-
tempt to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner in the face of a congres-
sional policy to the contrary as an example of a presidential action that
falls within this third category.u
Similarly, Justice Clark determined that President Truman's directive
fell into the third group of executive actions and concluded:
that where Congress has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type
of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meet-
ing the crisis; but that in the absence of such action by Congress, the Presi-
dent's independent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situation
confronting the nation.
In agreement with Justice Black's opinion, he concluded that Congress
had in fact specifically legislated and, therefore, the President could not
override this action by decree, even in the face of a negative impact
upon to the war effort.
Justice Jackson's argument is relevant to the circumstances presently
under consideration: the distinction between congressionally unauthor-
ized presidential actions directed at extraterritorial government activity
as opposed to similar actions focused on "the internal affairs of the
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
69 See, e.g., ExparteMerryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487); Ex parte ffilligan, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
10 Habeas Corpus Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755. A similar situation occurred in the Prize
Cases, 67 U.S. 635, where there was subsequent ratification of the President's acts by congressional
legislation. See also Hirabayash4 320 U.S. at 91-92 ("[W]e conclude that it was within the constitutional
power of Congress and the executive... to prescribe this curfew order... and that its promulgation
by the military commander involved no unlawful delegation of legislative power.").
71 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637-38 (JacksonJ., concurring).
See Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (holding that when Congress
provides for the creation of a body, like the FTC, of legislative and judicial quality, and limits the
grounds upon which its appointed officers can be removed from office, the President has no constitu-
tional power to remove them for other reasons).
73 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 662 (ClarkJ., concurring).
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country/'7 is critical. He contended that "the Constitution did not con-
template that the title Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will
constitute him also Commander in Chief of the country, its industries
and its inhabitants. "73 Justice Jackson further admonished, "[t]hat [the]
military powers of the Commander in Chief were not to supersede repre-
sentative government of internal affairs," which to him "seems obvious
from the Constitution and from elementary American history."76
The principles in Youngstown Sheet were reiterated in Dames & Moore
v. Regan. In that case a prejudgment attachment was effectuated on the
assets of certain Iranian banks. These funds had been frozen by Presi-
dent Carter pursuant to authority granted to him under the Interna-
tional Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)rs in response to the tak-
ing of American hostages at the American Embassy in Iran. Pursuant to
that statute the President granted licenses allowing private parties to file
suit against the government of Iran, but these licenses did not allow
these parties to proceed to judgment. Thereafter the President entered
into a settlement with the government of Iran for the release of the hos-
tages. In exchange for their release, the United States agreed to termi-
nate all legal proceedings in the U.S. courts involving claims by U.S. na-
tionals against the government of Iran and to nullify all attachments.
Such claims would be submitted to binding arbitration in a newly cre-
ated Iran-United States Claims Tribunal. Upon the release of the hos-
tages, President Reagan issued an executive order implementing these
agreements."" A suit was filed seeking the enjoinment of the United
States and the Secretary of the Treasury from enforcing the various or-
ders, claiming that the President had acted beyond his statutory and
constitutional powers.8s
74 Id at 643 (JacksonJ., concurring) (emphasis added). He elaborated.
Nothing in our Constitution is plainer than that declaration of a war is entrusted only to Con-
gress. Of course, a state of war may in fact exist without a formal declaration. But no doctrine
that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sinister and alarming than that a
President whose conduct of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is un-
known, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affirs of the country by his own com-
mitment of the Nation's armed forces to some foreign venture.
Id. at 642.
Cf Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Pub. L No. 88.404, 73 Star. 384 (1964) (repealed 1971) (Congress
delegates to the President authority to determine use of armed forces to assist treaty ally); Act of Feb.
6, 1802, ch. 4, 2 Star. 129-30 (Congress empowering the President to take action against Tripoli).
Youngstown 343 U.S. at 643-44 (JacksonJ, concurring).
76 Id at 644 (Jackson,J., concurring).
7 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
8 International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977).
9 Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 663-66.
so Id. at 666-67.
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The Court's opinion was delivered by then-Justice Rehnquist, rely-
ing heavily on Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet,8 with a
caveat to the effect that not all cases dealing with a response to interna-
tional crisis should be expected to fall neatly into one of Jackson's pi-
geon holes.ts
The Court found that Congress had delegated sweeping powers to
the President in enacting IEEPA-
Because the President's action in nullifying the attachments and ordering the
transfer of the assets was taken pursuant to specific congressional authoriza-
tion, it is "supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude
of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion would rest heavily
upon any who might attack it.
"84
The Court, however, distinguished that authority from presidential
power to suspend claims pending in American courts, this being closer
to the issue presented by The Order. It found that such authority was
not contained in either IEEPA or the so-called Hostage Act of 18 68 ,s as
the government defendants had claimed. Nevertheless, again relying on
Justice Jackson's Youngstown Sheet analysis, the Court concluded that
congressional authorization was implied by "a [long] history of congres-
sional acquiescence in conduct of the sort engaged in by the Presi-
dent." 6 Thus, the Court found to the contrary and held that the Presi-
dent had acted under the sweeping powers delegated by IEEPA.
The Court rejected the allegation that the President, by suspending
the claims, had circumvented the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts in viola-
tion of Article III of the Constitution. Instead, following longstanding
practice, the President had provided an alternate forum capable of pro-
viding meaningful relief.87 The Court thus stated that where
the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary incident to
the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and an-
other, and where... we can conclude that Congress acquiesced in the Presi-
81 Justice Rehnquist had clerked for Justice Jackson at the time of the Youngstoum Sheet decision.
See The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://v.supremecourtus.gov/about/biographiescurrenLpdf, at
1 (last visited May 1, 2002).
82 Justice Rehnquist wrote:
The parties and the lower courts, confronted with the instant questions, have all agreed that
much relevant analysis is contained in Youngstown Sheet. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion
elaborated in a general way the consequences of different types of interaction between the two
democratic branches in assessing presidential authority to act in any given case....
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 668.
83 Id. at 669.
84 Id at 674 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring)).
85 Rev. Star. § 2001, 22 U.S.C. § 1732.
86 Dames &Moore, 453 U.S. at 678-79, 680-82.
87 Id at 684-87. Lest it be overlooked, we are dealing with alternate civil forums. There is no al-
ternate criminal forum. The closest thing to an alternate criminal forum is a criminal forum of con-
currentjurisdiction in which double jeopardy is not implicated.
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dent's action, we are not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to
settle such claims.ss
Youngstown Sheet and progeny thus stand for the principle that where
Congress has not specifically authorized executive action, but has instead
legislated on the subject matter at issue, the President is without author-
ity to proceed in a manner that is inconsistent with said legislation.
2. Has Cong-ress expressed a legislative preference?
Congress has legislated that the actions of terrorists and terrorist
groups, both in the United States and elsewhere, against our citizens and
our property, constitute violations of federal criminal statutes. These in-
clude, among others, federal criminal laws that prohibit destroying air-
craft, or harming individuals aboard aircraftto causing injury or death to
any officer or employee of the United States (including any member of
the uniformed services while engaged in or on account of performance
of official duties),go causing injury to the property of the United States,9'
contaminating or infecting national defense facilities,w attempting, con-
spiring, or performing acts of domestic and international terrorism
abroad against U.S. nationals,93 providing material support to terrorists
or to terrorist organizations,9 engaging in terrorist attacks and other acts
of violence against mass transportation systems,9 6 and committing a war
crime inside or outside the United States.
8 Id. at 688.
8 18 U.S.C. § 32; see also id. § 1201 (a) (3).
0 Id.§ 1114.
91 Id.§ 1361.
92 I& § 2155.
93Id §§ 2331 et seq.
Id. § 2339A.
% Id. § 2339B.
Id. §§ 1991-92.
97 Id- § 2441. This statute includes actions taken either "inside or outside the United States," and
where the victim "is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United
States." § 2441(a), (b). Contrary to other criminal statutes mentioned above, the legislative history of
§ 2441 contains the following statement in the House Report: "The enactment of H.R. 3680 is not
intended to affect in any way the jurisdiction of any court-martial, military commission, or other mili-
tary tribunal under the law of war or the law of nations." H.R. Rep. No. 104-698, at 12 (1996), reprinted
in 1996 U.S.C.CAN. 2166,2177.
The Militay ExtraterritorialJurisdiction Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 3261, also contains a provision to
the effect that "Nothing in this chapter may be construed to deprive a court-martial, military com-
mission, provost court, or other military tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders
or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by a court-martial, military commission,
provost court, or other military tribunal." § 3261(c). Of course, that statute deals with criminal of-
fenses committed by members of the Armed Forces and by persons employed by or accompanying
them outside the United States. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354-U.S. 1 (1957). This statute does not seem to
have direct relevance to the issues raised by The Order, except to the extent that both this provision
and the report regarding 18 U.S.C. § 2441 would seem to indicate that Congress has limited the con-
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Perhaps the most relevant of these criminal statutes is the Anti-
Terrorism Act of 1990.98 This comprehensive anti-terrorist criminal legis-
lation prohibits terrorist acts that "transcend national boundaries in
terms of the means by which [the acts] are accomplished, [of] the per-
sons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which
their perpetrators operate or seek asylum,"99 and criminalizes any violent
action intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population, alter the
policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or affect the con-
duct of a government by assassination.' °° This statute, therefore, tracks
fairly closely the subject matter of The Order, and includes within its
coverage all "persons," whether U.S. citizens or not.1°1
This statute, as well as similar legislation, seems to present clear evi-
dence that Congress considered the subject-matter in depth,re and indi-
cated its preference regarding the forum where these crimes against the
United States, its citizens, and their property, are to be tried and de-
cided. While circumstances now facing the United States may require
new approaches and new solutions to these situations, until Congress
changes its legislative scheme or appropriately delegates to the President
those powers that can constitutionally be delegated to the executive, it
would a 3pear that Youngstown requires compliance with Congress's pref-
erence.
As it does not appear that the Constitution, alone, can sustain The
Order, we will now look to the supposed statutory support for its validity.
currentjurisdiction between the civil and military courts to those two specific statutes, leaving intact its
preference for a civilian forum in all other instances.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331 et seq. (1990) (amended 1992, 1994, 1996). Seegenera/yJennifer A. Bull, Note,
Are We Only Burning Wtches? The Anti-Ternism and Effective Death Penalty Ad of 1996's Answer to Terror-
im, 73 IND. L.J. 693 (1998) (arguing that the AEDPA curtails some fundamental constitutional rights);
Thomas C. Martin, Note, The Comprehensive Terroinsm Prevention Ad of 1995, 20 SErON HAIL LEGtS. J.
201 (1996) (examining the legislative history and constitutional issues surrounding certain anti-
terrorism legislation).
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1) (C). See United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that the District Court had authority to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction over defendants on charges
of conspiracy to blow up U.S. aircraft).
100 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (B) (i), (ii), (iii).
101 Id § 2331(3).
1 As part of its anti-terrorism strategy, Congress also enacted the 1984 Act to Combat Interna-
tional Terrorism, 18 U.S.C.§§ 3071 a seq., which establishes a scheme to allow for rewards for the pro-
vision of information leading to the arrest or conviction of persons engaged in terrorist activities or to
the prevention or frustration of such acts against a United States person or property.
103 Cf Michael P. Scharf, Defining Temism as the Peace Time Equivalent of War Crimes, 7 ILSAJ. INT'L
& COmP. L 391, 392 (2001)'("[T]errorism is not covered by the laws of war, but rather by a dozen
anti-terrorism conventions.").
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B. Of legislation and joint resolutions
We begin with Joint Resolution 23 (JR 23),'04 cited by The Order as
authority for its issuance. It is not dear how JR 23 creates presidential
authority to issue The Order. As is apparent from its text, Congress
passedJR 23 because Congress understood that it was needed to comply
with the requirements of Section 8 (a) (1)105 and 5 (b)'06 of the War Powers
Resolution, a relic of the Vietnam War.1°7 Congress thus sought to ex-
empt the President from the War Powers Resolution's proscriptions. JR
23 authorizes the President "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order
to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United
States."'ta It is not a grant of unlimited powers to the President; it does
not go beyond its stated purpose: authorizing the President "the use
[of] all necessary and appropriate fore. " °9 Nothing in the text of JR 23,
including its references to the War Powers Resolution, explicitly author-
izes the President to issue a directive in the nature of The Order. Fur-
thermore, nothing in the scant legislative history of JR 23 leads to a dif-
ferent conclusion. Neither, of course, is JR 23 a declaration of war by
104 S.J. Res. 23,107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224 (2001) (enacted).
105 See HR.J. Res. 542 § 8(a)(1), 93d Cong. (1973) (specifying that the authority to commit United
States Armed Forces is not to be inferred from any law, but requires specific authorization by Con-
gress).
See H.R.J. Res. 542 § 5 (b), 93d Cong. (1973) (requiring that the report required by Section 4(a)
by the President to Congress, when United States Armed Forces are committed to hostilities in the
absence of a dedaration of war, is dispensed with if Congress has enacted specific authorization for
use of the armed forces). Cf Chadhw; 462 U.S. at 919.
10 See generaly JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILrIY: CONSTITInONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND rrs AFmRMATH (1993); Alexander M. Bickel, Congress, the President, and the Power To Wage War, 48
(HL-KENT L REv. 131 (1971); William Van Alstyne, The President's Powers as Commander-in-Chief Versus
Congres War Pow erandAppropriation Power, 43 U. MIAMI L HEv. 17 (1988);Joseph . Biden &John B.
Hitch III, The War Power at a Constituional mpasse: A oint Dedsion' Solution, 77 GEO. J. 367 (1988);
John McGinnis, Constitutional Raiw by the Executive in Foreign Affairs and War Powers: A Consequence of
Rational COwice in the Separation of Powers, 56 L & CoNTMP. PROBs. 293 (1993); Phillip Bobbitt, Cours
and Constitutions: WarPowers: An Essay on John Hat's "War and Responsibity: Constitutional Lessons of
VWetnam and its Aftermat "92 MICH. I REv. 1364 (1994); Mchael Hahn, The Conflict inKosovo: A Con-
stitutional War?, 89 GEo. UJ. 2351 (2001); see also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY, 159-63 (1973); JOHN F. LEHMAN, MARG WAR: THE 200-YFAR-OLD BATrIE BETEN THE
PRESIDMENT AND CONGRESS OVER HOW AMERICA GOES TO WAR (1992) (a general historical and political
overview of the exercise of the war power by Presidents, from 1801 action in Tripoli, Libya through
Desert Storm in 1991, and the interplay with Congress).
10 Pub. L No. 107-40,115 Stat. 224, § 2(a) (emphasis added).
109 Id. (emphasis added).
110 See 147 CONG. REc. S9412-06, 15638-04 (2001). Itvas reported that Congress rejected language
that would have authorized broader powers. John Lancaster, Cogress Clears Use of Force, WASH. POST,
Sept. 15, 2001, atA4.
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Congress as such procedure is contemplated in the Constitution, or as it
has been acted upon by Congress in the past."'
Second, The Order points to Sections 821112 and 836113 of Title 10 of
the U.S. Code as a basis of authority, but again this may also be subject to
some question. These provisions are simply part of the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (U.C.M.J.) n4 and authorize the President solely to pre-
scribe rules for the conduct of courts-martial and other military tribunals
and commissions, in cases arising under the UC.M.J. The U.C.M.J. was en-
acted pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, of the Constitution,
which empowers Congress "[t]o make rules for the Government and
Regulation of the land and naval Forces.115 Military commissions are not
within the rules established by the U.C.MJ. 11 6 Therefore, it would ap-
pear that the text of the U.C.M.J.1 1 7 was not intended to cover the subject
matters upon which The Order focuses.
Article 2 of the U.C.M.J. n8 enumerates all persons subject to the pro-
visions of this statute. Although, in addition to military personnel, it also
covers "[p]risoners of war in custody of the armed forces,"". this lan-
guage only applies to prisoners of war tried for acts committed after their
capture and during their detention as prisoners of war.'2 This stipulation is
I See supra note 49.
112 10 U.S.C. § 821. Section 821 states:
The provisions of this chapter conferringjurisdiction upon courts-martial do not deprive mili-
tary commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrentjurisdiction with re-
spect to offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be tried by military com-
missions, provost courts, or other military courts.
Id. See In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 65 n.31, for the history of the military commission and an explana-
tion of the various types of military courts mentioned in Article 21.
n1 See 10 U.S.C. § 836 (U.C.M.J. Art. 36). Section 836 states:
(a) Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including modes of proof, for cases arising under
this chapter triable in courts-martial, military commissions and other military tribunals, and
procedures for courts of inquiry, may be prescribed by the President by regulations which
shall, so far as he considers practicable, apply the principles of law and the rules of evidence
generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts, but which
may not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter.
(b) All rules and regulations made under this article shall be uniform insofar as practicable.
114 ,See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950.
11 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (emphasis added).
16 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20. Military commissions "have been called our common-law war
courts. They have taken many forms and borne many names. Neither their procedure nor their ju-
risdiction has been prescribed by statute. It has been adapted in each instance to the need that called
it forth." Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 34648 (1952). This has taken place, however, upon decla-
ration of war by Congress. Id at 348; see also Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20.
17 This may not be the case during a congressionally declared war. Se Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,
30-36; Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7. In those cases the Court relied on the text of Article 15 of the Articles
of War, which is substantially the same as Article 21 of the U.S.M.J. (10 U.S.C. § 821), to hold that
Congress had authorized the military commission.
1110 U.S.C. § 802.
19 Id. § 802(a) (9).
120 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20 (interpreting a similar provision in the Articles of War that pre-
ceded the U.C.MJ.).
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similar to provisions found in international law.12' Although the U.C.MJ.
is also applicable to foreign nationals serving alongside United States
troops outside the United States by reason of a treaty or agreement, 22
that is obviously not the situation contemplated by The Order.
Thus, it would appear that there is also some question whether Sec-
tions 821 or 836 of Title 10 of the U.S. Code provide a legal basis for is-
suance of The Order.
C. Historical and precedential comparisons
Despite the seeming lack of authority for The Order in the Constitu-
tion and in the Acts of Congress, it is not without historical and prece-
dential equivalents. However, after closer examination these are distin-
guishable from the legal and constitutional circumstances present when
The Order was promulgated. As previously alluded, the principal distin-
guishing feature is that past presidential directives creating militarg
commissions were promulgated during congressionally declared wars.I
The closest precedents, in terms of time and facts, are those that took
place during World War II.
1. The German saboteur cases
Ex parte Quinin,2' decided in 1942, involved the imposition of the
death sentence upon several German saboteurs caught after landing on
the Atlantic coast of the United States. Their trials were conducted be-
fore military commissions created by virtue of two presidential orders, ts
similar in many respects to The Order. President Roosevelt established
military commissions to try non-U.S. citizens "of any nation at war with
the United States" who, "during time of war," enter the United States
1 See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, § 6, chs. 2, 3, 6
U.S.T. 3316, T.IAS. 3364.
1 10U.S.G. § 802(a) (11), (12).
SSee Ex parte Qurin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). Cf 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 470, 471 (1871) (war need not be formally pro-
claimed for laws of war to apply to military engagements with Indian tribes); see also discussion supra
notes 41-54.
124 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
125 By the Presidential Order of July 2, 1942, the President appointed a Military Commission, di-
rected it to try the petitioners for offenses against the law of war and the Articles of War, and pre-
scribed regulations for the procedures to be followed at the trial and for review of the record and any
judgment or sentence. SeeAppointment of a Military Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
Presidential Proclamation No. 2561, entered on the same day, declared that "all persons who are
subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with the United States or who give obedience to or
act under the direction of any such nation, and who during time of war enter or attempt to enter the
United States ... and are charged with committing... sabotage, espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or
violations of the law of war, shall be subject to the law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribu-
nals...." Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942). The Proclamation also provided
that persons so charged were to be denied access to the courts.
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and are charged with committing or attempting to commit "sabotage,
espionage, hostile or warlike acts, or violations of the law of War .... 12
The trials were held in the United States, a fact not without constitu-
tional significance.l27 The saboteurs challenged their convictions on
Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds, contending that the President
lacked the authority to create the military tribunals or to try petitioners
before them, and also claimed the right to be indicted by a grand jury
and to be tried before a petitjury in the civil courts.
Before addressing these challenges the Supreme Court had to decide
whether petitioners were lawfully before the Court. The government
contended that petitioners should be denied access to the civil courts,
"both because they are enemy aliens or have entered our territory as en-
emy belligerents, and because the... Proclamation undertakes in terms
to deny such access '"ss similar to a provision found in The Order.'2
However, the Court concluded that nothing in the Proclamation or the
fact that they were enemy aliens foreclosed consideration by the courts
of the constitutional challenges presented by the petitioners.
The Court then proceeded to reject petitioners' contentions on the
merits, relying on the various constitutional provisions which authorize
Congress and the President in time of war to enact stipulations for military
tribunals to trl enemy agents apprehended in the United States during
such periods." The Court, in approving the summary proceedings at
issue, explicitly referred to situations where there is a declared war by Con-
gress, a point made abundantly clear by the Court's thirteen references to
war, 132as well as citations to previous times when military commissions or
tribunals were used or authorized.1is
After sanctioning the trial of enemy saboteurs before military com-
missions, and confirming their death sentences-proceedings and sen-
tences that would appear to be totally warranted in a declared war-the
Supreme Court next passed to one of its least glorious moments, suc-
12 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7,1942).
12 See discussion infra note 173.
12 Quiin, 317 U.S. at 24.
129 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 7 (h).
1 Qui7in, 317 U.S. at 25.
131 See id at 26.
132 This included the use of the phrases, "nation at war," "during time of war," "conduct of war,"
and similar language, which in the context of the opinion clearly signifies that the Court was referring
to congressionally declared war. Id at 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 35, 37, 38, 42. See also United States v.
Averette, 19 GM.A. 363, 365 (C.MA. 1970) ("[T]he words 'in time of war' mean... a war formally
declared by Congress."); Zamora v. Woodson, 19 C.M.A. 403, 404 (C.MA 1970) ("[The words 'in
time of war' mean... a war formally declared by Congress"--Vietnam could not qualify as such)
(quoting Averette); Robb v. United States, 456 F.2d 768, 771 (Ct. Cf. 1972).
13 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31 n.9, 42 n.14, 32 n.10 (discussing the use of military tribunals or com-
missions during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Mexican War of 1848, and the Civil
War).
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cumbing perhaps to the war hysteria of the moment, by approving the
internment of U.S. citizens ofJapanese descent.
2. The internment of Americans ofJapanese descent
In two seminal cases, Hirabayashi v. United StatesM and Korematsu v.
United States,135 the Court addressed the various restrictive _presidential
orders directed atJapanese-Americans during World War II.1 a
In Hirabayashi, the defendant, a U.S.-bom citizen of Japanese ances-
try, was convicted of a misdemeanor for disregarding a curfew restriction
imposed by a military commander against Japanese-Americans. A state
of war with Japan had, of course, been declared since December 8th,
1941.'37 At the time the order was issued, however, no act of Congress
specifically authorized the presidential action or the restrictions imposed
by the military commander. Nevertheless, in affirming the conviction
against a challenge to the President's authority to issue the order, the
Court indicated that Congress, by enacting a later statute had "ratified"
the executive order and the actions taken thereunder.'M The Court then
approved all these actions based on the war powers of the national gov-
ernment.
In language that might be applicable to the present controversy, were
it not for the lack of a congressional declaration of war, the Court said:
The war power of the national government is "the power to wage war success-
fully." It extends to every matter... so related to war as substantially to affect
its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of victo-
ries in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of
the national defense, including the protection of war materials and the
members of the armed forces from injury and from the dangers which attend
the rise, prosecution and progress of war.13
IM 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
1 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13 See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942); Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg.
2165 (Mar. 20, 1942); Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (Mar. 26, 1942); Proclamation No. 4, 7
Fed. Reg. 2601 (Apr. 4, 1942); Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 7, 1942); Civilian Exdu-
sion Order No. 34, 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (May 28, 1942); Cvilian Restrictive Order No. 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982
(Jan. 21, 1942); see alsoAct of Mar. 21, 1942, ch. 191,56 Stat. 173.
SeeDeclaration of State of Warw ithJapan, ch. 561, 55 Stat. 795 (1941).
Hiryabashi 320 U.S. at 91-92. Compare Hirayabashi to congressional ratification of President
Lincoln's suspension of the writ of habeas corpus during avil War. See supra note 70; see also WmnJAM
H. REHNQUIsT, ALL T LAWS Btrr Oixa ch. 2 a seq. (1993). It is important to note, in distinguishing
the order in !-rhyabashi from The Order, that there is a considerable difference between an order
that merely requires compliance with a military directive, even though onerous, in wartime, and one
that seeks to supplant the civil courts, particularly if the latter is issued in the absence of a congres-
sional declaration of war.
M3 H-rabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93. As authority for this proposition the Court cites to United States v.
Miller, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 303, 314 (1870) (finding that Act of Congress during Civil War author-
ized confiscation of property used by "rebels"); Steward v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506, 507
(1870) (holding that Act of Congress extended statute of limitations in area where the courts were
May 2002]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Court continued:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise
of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has neces-
sarily given them wide scope for the exercise ofjudgment and discretion in
determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in
the selection of the means for resisting it. 140
It is clear that upon the formal declaration of war Congress was, by that
extraordinary act, conferring extraordinary powers on the President to
prosecute that war to a successful conclusion. As will be further empha-
sized, the formal declaration of war is not a mere constitutional formal-
ity, it is a solemn affirmation by Congress, entrusting one person, the
President, with far-reaching authority unknown in time of peace.
Korematsu involved the conviction of another native-born U.S. citizen
of Japanese ancestry for failure to comply with a military order promul-
gated pursuant to the same presidential decree at issue in Hirabayashi,
and which effectively excluded Korematsu from his home located within
a prohibited military area.141 The outcome of this appeal tracked Hiraba-
yashi in reasoning and outcome,'4 except that Justice Black's majority
opinion was challenged in a strongly worded and well-reasoned dissent
byJustice Murphy, as well as in separate dissents by Justice Roberts and
Justice Jackson. All three dissents coincide, however, in that the exclu-
sionary order, and the subsequent actions taken, constituted racially mo-
tivated constitutional violations. 43
inoperative during Civil War); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (finding that statute of
Congress authorizing the draft in 1917 is constitutional); McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397
(1919) (holding that Act of Congress delegating to the Secretary of War authority to determine allow.-
able distance of brothels to military camp held constitutional); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605 (1931) (holding that Congress, not the Constitution, is the appropriate body to determine
whether a conscientious objector serves in the Armed Forces).
140 Hirabayash4 320 U.S. at93 (citing Expalre Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).
141 The prohibited military area included all of the states of California, Washington, Oregon,
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, and the southern portion of Arizona. See Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg.
2320 (Mar. 2, 1942).
142 See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223:
[Korematsu] was excluded [from the area in which his home was located] because we are at war
with theJapanseEmpire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion
of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided
that the military urgency of the situation demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be
segregated from the West Coast temporarily, and finally, because Congress, reposing its confidence
in this time of war in our military leaders-as inevitably it must-determined that they should have the
power to do just this.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike in Hirabo'ash4 this is the case "of con-
victing a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based
on his ancestry, and solely based on his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty
and good disposition towards the United States"), 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (noting that the exclu-
sion of persons ofJapanese ancestry from the Pacific Coast area "goes over 'the very brink of Constitu-
tional power' and falls into the ugly abyss of racism"), 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting that a citi-
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Justice Murphy was of the view, the logic of which seems inescapable,
that
[i]n dealing with matters relating to the prosecution and progress of a war,
we must accord great respect and consideration to the judgments of the mili-
tary authorities who are on the scene and who have full knowledge of the
military facts ....
[However, at] the same time... it is essential that there be definite limits to
military discretion, especially where martial law has not been declared[,] [be-
cause] [i]ndividuals must not be left impoverished of their constitutional
rights on a plea of military necessity that has neither substance nor sup-
144
port.
Justice Murphy went on to state that:
like other claims conflicting with the asserted constitutional rights of the in-
dividual, the military claim must subject itself to the judicial process of having
its reasonableness determined and its conflicts with other interests recon-
ciled. "What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or
not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions."
145
On this point at least, the majority, following its holding on this issue in
Ex parte Quirin, agreed with Justice Murphy that the actions of the mili-
tary were subject to judicial review. This, of course, will be at least one of
the issues arising in the present situation: obtaining judicial review of
actions taken under The Order.
Justice Murphy laid down the standard to be employed when review-
ing the actions of military authorities in which it is arguably claimed that
they cause constitutional deprivations:
The judicial test of whether the Government, on a plea of military necessity,
can validly deprive an individual of any of his constitutional rights is whether
the deprivation is reasonably related to a public danger that is so "immediate,
imminent, and impending" as not to admit of delay and not to permit the in-
tervention of ordinary constitutional processes to alleviate the danger.146
But he warns the courts that, "[i] n adjudging the military action taken in
light of the then apparent dangers, we must not erect too high or too
zen's presence in the area was made a crime, not based on "anything he did, said, or thought," but
based only on the fact "that he was born of different racial stock").
4 Id. at 233-34 (MurphyJ, dissenting).
145 I. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). For this proposition, Justice Murphy re-
lied on Steringv. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 401 (1932) (holding that Governor of Texas' declaration of
martial law and subsequent taking over of oil production was subject to judicial review).
" Kornat.4 323 U.S. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 623, 627-28 (1871) (involving the temporary use of Mississippi River steamboats by military
authorities during Civil War was legal and holding that private owners were entitled to compensation);
Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1851) (holding that a military order taking private
property to prevent it from falling into enemy hands during the War with Mexico was valid, but the
government was required to compensate owner for loss); Raymond v. Thomas, 91 U.S. 712, 716
(1875) (holding that a military order suspending a decree by a civil court, after the Civil War had
ended, was not authorized by any act of Congress)).
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meticulous standards; it is necessary only that the action have some rea-
sonable relation to the removal of the dangers."
147
In between Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court decided Ex parte
Endo,'4 a decision which breaks pace with the other two cases in terms of
outcome. As in the other two cases, Mitsuye Endo was a U.S. born citi-
zen ofJapanese ancestry, who was sent to what was euphemistically called
the "Central Utah Relocation Center," in Topaz, Utah, pursuant to vari-
ous presidential orders and military proclamations issued thereunder.'49
Although the government conceded that the petitioner was "a loyal and
law abiding citizen," she was required to remain in the camps and was
allowed to leave only temporarily and on condition that she not enter
certain areas of the United States.- ' Her leave could be revoked at the
discretion of the director of the Relocation Center if it was found that it
was necessary "in the public interest."' 51
The opinion of the Court by Justice Douglas manages to avoid the
main constitutional issues presented by focusing on the fact that Mitsuye
Endo was detained by a civilian agency. This civilian detention distin-
guishes Endo from Ex pate Quiin, where German saboteurs were held in
custody by the military authorities. "[Whatever power the War Reloca-
tion Authority may have to detain other classes of citizens, it has no
authority to subject citizens who are concededly loyal to its leave proce-
dure."'5 The bottom line was that Mitsuye Endo got her freedom, an
outcome that does not seem extraordinary today but required a break
with previous Supreme Court action. However, it is important to note
that Justice Douglas left the door open to the continued detention of
"other classes of citizens." 53 Ultimately, the Court's narrow language
147 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (MurphyJ, dissenting).
14 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
1 See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 25, 1942) ("Authorizing the Secretary of War
to Prescribe Military Areas"); Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320 (Mar. 2, 1942) ("Military Areas
Nos. 1 and 2 Designated and Established"); Proclamation No. 2, 7 Fed. Reg. 2405 (Mar. 16, 1942)
("Establishment of Military Areas 3, 4, 5, and 6"); Exec. Order No. 9102, 7 Fed. Reg. 2165 (Mar. 20,
1942) (establishing the War Relocation Authority within the President's Office of Emergency Man-
agement "to provide for the removal from designated areas of persons whose removal is necessary in
the interests of national security"); Proclamation No. 4, 7 Fed. Reg. 2601 (Mar. 27, 1942) ("Restriction
of Migration from Military Area No. 1"); Public Proclamation No. 7, 7 Fed. Reg. 4498 (June 8, 1942)
(including ratification of Civilian Exclusion Order No. 52 directly involving Mitsuye Endo); Civilian
Restrictive Order 1, 8 Fed. Reg. 982 (May 19, 1942) ("Persons of Japanese Ancestry, Procedure for
Departure from Assembly Centers, etc."); Proclamation No. 8, 7 Fed. Reg. 8346 (June 27, 1942) ("War
Relocation Projects"); Exec. Order No. 9423, 9 Fed. Reg. 50 (1944) (transferring the War Relocation
Authority to the Department of Interior).
150 The regulations on leave are at 7 Fed. Reg. 7656 (Sept. 28, 1942) ("Issuance of Leave For De-
parture from a Relocation Area"), 9 Fed. Reg. 154 (1944) (same).
1 Endo, 323 U.S. at 291-92 n.9.
152 Id- at 297.
's Id,
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makes this case of restricted precedential value, and limits its symbolic
importance.
Justice Murphy, although concurring, was "of the view that detention
in Relocation Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of loy-
alty [was] not only unauthorized by Congress or the Executive but [was]
another example of the unconstitutional resort to racism inherent in the
entire evacuation program."154
We thus come to one of the major World War II cases involving issues
of presidential war powers, In re Yamashita,1 6 a case which, although fac-
tually different from others of similar vintage, was a watershed in terms
of producing jurisprudence that is relevant to the subject matter under
discussion.
3. The trial of General Yanashita
On September 3, 1945, the Japanese Army occupying the Philippine
Islands surrendered to the United States Armed Forces there. For some
time prior, General Tomoyuki Yamashita was the Commanding General
of the Japanese forces in those Islands.'56 Upon becoming a war pris-
oner, he was charged with a violation of the law of war, specifically, fail-
ing to discharge his duties as commander of the Japanese troops in the
Philippine Islands by not controlling and preventing these forces from
committing numerous atrocities against the Philippine civilian popula-
tion and against prisoners of war under the custody of the Japanese
Army. To try him of this charge, Lt General Wilhelm D. Styer, Com-
manding General of the United States Forces, Western Pacific, which in-
cluded the Philippine Islands,"57 convened a military commission. Gen-
eral Styer purportedly was acting under authority delegated to General
Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, United States Forces, Pacific,
by the President. This delegation can be traced to a presidential proc-
lamation, issued on July 2, 19 42 '-s and also used in Quiin, which de-
clared that all enemy belligerents who entered the United States, or any
15 l at 307 (Murphy, J., concurring). This tracks his concerns in Koremats Justice Roberts, also
concurring, was ofsimilarview. Se id. at 310 (Roberts,J, concurring).
15 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
156 & at 52 n.17 (1946).
157 At the time, the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands was still an unincorporated territory
of the United States. See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1901) (holding that territories, if not
made part of the United States by congressional action, are not entitled to a system of laws guarantee-
ing trial by jury); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 245 (1901) (holding that Puerto Rico Territory was "not
part of the United States within the revenue clauses of the Constitution"). It was granted independ-
ence in 1946. See Proclamation No. 2695, 3 C.F.R. 86 (July 4, 1946) ("Independence of the Philip-
pines").
1 Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942) ("Denying Certain Enemies Access to
the Courts of the United States").
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of its territories or possessions, during time of war, and who violated the
law of war, would be subject to trial by military tribunals. 9
After pleading not guilty, General Yamashita was tried before a mili-
tary commission composed of five Army officers, all appointed by Gen-
eral Slyer. General Yamashita's main defense was that the devastating
attacks by American forces made it physically impossible for him to
communicate with or control his troops throughout the far-flung Philip-
pine archipelago. This defense fell on deaf ears and on December 7,
1945(!), the commission found him guilty of the offense charged and
sentenced him to death160
Various issues were raised before the Supreme Court, only two of
which are relevant to this discussion. The first was whether the conunis-
sion which tried and convicted General Yamashita was created lawfully
and could be convened after the cessation of hostilities between United
States and Japan. The second questioned the legality of General Yama-
shita's trial by military commission, it being alleged that the proceeding
was contrary to the Geneva Convention of 1929, to Articles 25 and 38
of the Articles of War,16' and to the due process clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution.
It did not take long for ChiefJustice Stone, writing for a majority of
the Court, to dispose of the first question. For the proposition that
authority existed to try enemy combatants accused of offenses against the
law of war before military commissions, the Court looked to Ex parte
Quiin 63 The fact that the German saboteurs in Quirin were not in uni-
form when captured, and thus "unlawful combatants" according to in-
ternational law, was neither mentioned or distinguished from the Yama-
shita situation despite the heavy reliance of the Quirin Court on that very
point.' 6 The Court indicated, as it had done in Ex parte Qirin, that
Congress had, by approving Article 15 of the Articles of War, author-
159 In the present situation, no such advance notice was given prior to the issuance of The Order
on November 13, 2001. This may raise questions about ex post facto application of The Order, issues
that cannot be raised if suspects are charged under the normal federal criminal statutes that were in
effect on September 11, 2001.
160 For the decision of the military commission, see 2 THE LAW oF WAR 1596 (Leon Friedman ed.,
1922). For General Douglas MacArthur's order confirming the death sentence on February 6, 1946,
see id at 1598.
161 Geneva Convention ofJuly 27, 1929,47 Stat. 2021.
1 10 U.S.C. §§ 1496, 1509 (1946).
16 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7 (finding that "Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred
upon it by Article I, § 8, cl. 10 of the Constitution to 'define and punish... Offenses against the Law
of Nations...'" recognized military commissions as appropriate tribunals for "the trial and punish-
ment of offenses against the law of war.").
1 SeeEx parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-36 (1942) (discussing how the law previously treated unlawful
combatants).
165 For all purposes identical to Article 21 of the modem U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1999), which in
its relevant parts states that "[g]eneral courts-martial also have jurisdiction to try any person who by
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ized the President to create military commissions to try "person [s] who
by the law of war [were] subject to trial by military tribunals." 16 Further-
more, the Court said, that by making reference to the law of war, Con-
gress "thus adopted the system of military common law applied by mili-
tary tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable by
the courts, and as further defined and supplemented by the Hague Con-
vention."1 67 As we shall see, the "common law of war" is considerably
more amorphous than the Common Law itself.16a
the law of war is subject to trial by military tribunal and may adjudge any punishment permitted by the
law of war."
16, Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 7.
167 Id at 8. Se also Hague Convention, No. IV of Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2295, art. I, annex (defin-
in the persons to whom belligerent rights and duties attach).
63 See 1 TH E LW 0F WAR 782, supra note 160:
The present state of the law of war is necessarily uncertain. The many trials after World War II
established strict rules of accountability to the highest military and political levels to mitigate
the cruelties ofiwar. But the Vietnam cases show that the principles have not taken firm root
among the laws of nations. Nations are extremely reluctant to expose the wrongs of their own
soldiers or to punish their own men for overreacting to the pressures of war, let alone to bring
their generals into court to answer these charges.
Id The author points out that the instructions to the members of the courts-martial that tried Captain
Ernest Medina, for actions against civilians in the My Lai massacre by troops under the command of
his subordinate, Lt. William CalleyJr., where directly counter to those that convicted Gen. Yamashita.
Id. at 782. Cf "Court-Martial of Gen. Jacob H. Smith," held in the Philippine Islands, Apr. 1902, S.
Doc. 213, 57th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.5-7 (General Smith, upon being found guilty of ordering the com-
mission of atrocities against the civilian population of the Philippine Island of Samar, was directed to
be retired from the active list and to "repair to his home."). See also BRIAN McALLISTER LINN, THE
PHniPPiNWAR, 1899-1902 at 306, 312-16 (2000).
A succinct history of the law of war by Telford Taylor is found in Foraord to 1 TlE LA.W OF WAR at
xiii, supra note 160. Quincy Wright, in his STUDY OF WAR, has an incisive comment on this subject:
If it is Christianity against Islam, each may be prepared to destroy all the adversaries if only a
few of its side can remain to perpetuate the true faith .... When war is fought for broad, ideo-
logical objectives, such rules [limiting destructiveness and attacks on civilian populations] have
tended to break down because the end is thought to justify all means and war has tended to
become absolute.
1 QUIcNCYWRtGIrr, STUDY OF WAR 160 (1942). These views are reflected in parts of both the Bible
("You go and smite Amalek, and utterly destroy all that they have, and spare them not; but slay both
man and woman, infant and suckling, ox and sheep, camel and ass." 1 Samuel 15:3, (KingJames)) and
the QWr'an ("But there is a ban on any population which we have destroyed. that they shall not re-
turn" Qur'an 21: 95 (AbdullahYusufAli trans., 1999)).
ThusJoan of Arc announced to the British that no quarter would be given in her campaigns, and
thus we have seen how unarmed civilian populations have been decimated in all wars, commencing
with the Crusades, to pick an arbitrary historical point, to the most recent conflicts. This almost inevi-
table fact of war did not prevent numerous scholars, starting with the Spaniards Francisco de Victoria
(1484-1546), Balthazar Ayala (1548-1584) and the Dutch Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), from writing and
expounding as to what should be deemed acceptable behavior in the conduct of war. See FRANcisco
DE ViCrom, DE INDIs Er DE IvR BEta RELEcrnONES [ON THE INDIES AN THE Lxw OF WAR] (Ernest
Nydes ed.,J.P. Bate, trans., Carnegie Inst. Ed. 1917) (1557); BALTHAzAR AYALA, THREE BOOKS ON THE
L.kW OF WAR AND ON THE DUTnEs CONNECTrD wrm WAR (John Westlake ed., 1995) (1582)); HuGO
GRoTus, THE LkW OF WAR AND PEACE (Leon Friedman eL, 1922) (1646). Many of these principles,
particularly those of Grotius, were eventually written into the latter-day Hague and Geneva Conven-
ions, although even the ostensibly enlightened Grotius stated that the right of killing enemies in a
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The Court, in narrowing its holding, discusses an issue that is more
than tangentially related to the subject matter of The Order- it states
that it is not "concerned with the power of military commissions to try
civilians."' 69 This limitation may have been inserted because the Court
recognized that there is considerable doubt whether under normal cir-
cumstances jurisdiction exists to try civilians before military commis-
sions.'7° However, this is an issue that will arise under The Order. The
government will have to classify individual detainees, both members of al
public war included "the right to kill and injure all who are in the territory of the enemy." 1 LAW OF
WAR at 33, supra note 160.
In between the time when these scholars wrote and the time when these Conventions were actually
negotiated, there were periodic multinational conferences, some which resulted in the signing of trea-
ties dealing with the subject of the law of war. One of the earliest of these treaties was entered into
between the United States and Prussia in 1785 and dealt with the treatment to be accorded prisoners
of war. SeeA Treaty of Amity and Commerce, Sept. 1785, U.S.-Prussia, 8 Stat. 84. Since the Declara-
tion of Paris in 1856 there have been in excess of sixty treaties, conventions, agreements and procla-
mations that have attempted to restate or codify the law of war and the various customs and practices
that provide its common law. See generally 1 THE LkW OF WAR, supra note 160, for a full compendium
of these, the most important of which are: Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV) (1907),
The Hague Rules of Air Warfare (1922), Convention on Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva,
1929), Geneva Convention (I) (Wounded and Sick) (1949), Geneva Convention (Ill) (Prisoners of
War) (1949), Geneva Convention (IV) (Protection of Civilians) (1949), Report on Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts (United Nations, 1970) (Part IX, Guerrilla Warfare; Part X, "Freedom fighters"), Re-
port to the Secretary General, A/8052, Resolution on Protection of Civilians, United Nations, Dec. 9,
1970. General Assembly Resolution 2675.
The law of war, whose genesis is the Law of Nations and international law, often overlaps with mili-
tary law, which derives from the common law. In the United States, military law has many of the
common law's principles, doctrines and techniques of resolving legal issues related to the federal mili-
tary regime. See generally WiLLAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTs 41 (2d ed. 1920).
According to Winthrop, laws and customs of war will be taken into consideration by military com-
missions in passing upon offenses, but these must be "uniform, known practice[s] of long standing,
which are also certain and reasonable, and [are] not in conflict with existing statutory or constitu-
tional provisions." Id. at 778. "All officers or soldiers offending against the rules of immunity of non-
combatants ... become liable to the severest penalties." Id. at 779.
Irregular armed groups or persons not forming part of the organized forces of a belligerent are
not generally recognized as legitimate troops, and are subject upon capture to summary punishment,
even death. Id, at 783. Such actions were taken in many instances during the American Civil War. Id.
at 784 n.87. This would be in keeping with Pomponius who said: "Enemies are those who in the name
of the state declare war upon us, or upon whom we in the name of a state declare war, others are brig-
ands and robbers." GROnus, supra note 160, ch. mI(1), cited in 1 LAw OF WAR, supra note 160, at 21.
The United Nations seems to take a more "progressive" view of this issue. See Report on Human
Rights in Armed Conflicts, supra note 168; see also infra note 232 and accompanying text.
16 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9.
1,See id.; see alsoExparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) (finding that a military commis-
sion had no jurisdiction to my a civilian where "the courts are open and their process unobstructed");
Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1930) (finding that district court hadjurisdiction to review Texas
governor's declaration of martial law and subsequent commandeering of oil production). But see
Qui/n, 317 U.S. at 45 (concluding that "the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not restrict whatever
authority was conferred by the Constitution to try offenses against the law of war by military commis-
sion"). An exception is where there are no civil courts in operation. See Miigan, 71 U.S. at 121. See
genera//y WUJAI H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE (1993). This issue will be further discussed in
connection with Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946), infra notes 192-98 and accompanying
text.
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Qalida and/or the Taliban, to determine what rights, if any, these detain-
ees have under the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and the
various treaties to which the United States is a signatory.17' Succinctly
put, the issue is whether the detainees are civilians or combatants, and if
the latter, whether they are "unlawful combatants." 172 Although The Or-
der is directed at non-U.S. citizens, additional issues arise if either the
detention or the trial takes place in the United States.173
The Court next discusses whether the commission to try General Ya-
mashita was lawfully created and, if so, whether this authority allowed his
trial to take place after the cessation of hostilities.' 74 The Court finds
ample support in "long-established American precedents"' sanctioning
171 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, T.IAS. 3364. Cf. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tume of War,
Aug 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.IAS. 3365,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
Although this is an issue that will be further discussed later, infra note 307 and accompanying
text, it may be of some help in understanding the scope and ramifications of this problem to quote
from the Supreme Court's definitions of these terms in Quitn:
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war by opposing miii-
tary forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition
they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their bel-
ligerency unlawful. The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a bel-
ligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information... or an enemy combatant who
without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction
of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be
entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals.
317 U.S. at 31 (emphasis added).
173 Outside of the United States, non-U.S. citizens have few, if any, rights under the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See United States v. Verdugo-Urqufdez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment is not applicable to a search of the residence of a non-U.S. citizen conducted by U.S. govern-
ment agents in Mexico);Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (finding habeas corpus relief not
available to an enemy alien challenging a military commissions where the alleged crimes, the deten-
tion, and the trial all occurred outside the United States). As to those detained in Guantinamo, does
the Constitution follow the flag? See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 245 (1901). See generally JUAN R.
TORRuELLA, THE SUPRutE COURT AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL
(1984).
The situation changes once an alien is within the United States, whether or not that presence is le-
gal. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 ("Mhe Due Process Clause applies to all persons within the
United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or perma-
nent."); WongWing v. United States, 163 U.S 228 (1896) (holding that aliens, whether or not lawfully
in the United States, are entitled to the rights of the Fifth and Sixth amendments before criminal
penalties may be imposed). Cf. Exparte Quidn, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); 14 Op. Att'y Gen. 249 (1873) (ar-
guing that Modoc Indian prisoners accused of crimes against civilians during hostilities with the
United States could be tried by military tribunals). These issues will be further discussed later, infra
notes 192, 250, 293-306 and accompanying text.
174 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9-13.
175 Id. at 10. The Court does not cite any precedents in particular, although there are many, dur-
ing times of congressionally declared wars. See supra note 133. The Court's citation to Article of War
8, which deals with the authority to appoint general courts-martia4 would seem irrelevant to the author-
ity to appoint military commissions. Although sometimes overlapping in subject matter jurisdiction,
military commissions are a different type of military tribunal, created by a different source of author-
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the creation of military commission "by any field commander, or by any
commander competent to appoint a general court-martial," 6 where
such officers have been authorized by order of the President, as they had
in Yamashita.17
In language directly relevant to the subject at hand, the Court next
resolves the question of whether the authority to create the military
commission, and to direct a trial by military order, continued even after
the cessation of hostilities:
The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have committed viola-
tions of the law of war is ... not only a part of the conduct of war operating as
preventive measures against such violations, but is an exercise of authority
sanctioned by Congress to administer the system of military justice recog-
nized by the law of war. That sanction is without qualification as to the exer-
cise of this authority so long as a state of war exists-from its declaration until
peace is proclaimed.
7 8
A formal state of war had been proclaimed by Congress, but peace had
not been agreed upon or proclaimed. Therefore, the President retained
his full war powers as Commander in Chief to appoint and to put in ef-
fect military tribunals, even after hostilities had ceased but before the of-
ficial end of the war, when peace was officially proclaimed."' Thus, the
Court again lays heavy emphasis on the need for a formal declaration of
war by Congress in order for the President to exercise the extraordinary
powers that allow him to establish special judicial procedures, notwith-
standing that they are part of a separate military regime.'
8
General Yamashita's objection to the proceedings, by virtue of their
alleged violations of Articles 25181 and 38' of the then applicable Articles
of War, was also rejected. The Court concluded that enemy combatants
were not among those persons subject to the Articles or entitled to their
benefits;1 although Article 15 spoke of the concurrent jurisdiction of
courts-martial, military commissions, and other military tribunals, the
ity. See supra notes 112, 116 and accompanying text (discussing the Yamashita ae); see also Yamashita,
327 U.S. at 65 n.31.
176 Id.
177
17 Id at 11-12 (emphasis added). As applied to the present situation, the proscribed actions would
have to be prospective
1,1 See Instruments of Surrender of Italy, Germany, and Japan, World War I, Oct. 4, 1945, 79th
Con., Ist Sess., Doc. No. DOCYI. /2 10, Serial 10949 (1946).
See Bum v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953) ("Military law, like state law, is a jurisprudence
which exists separate and apart from the law which governs in our federal judicial establishment.");
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 309 (1946) ("[M]ilitary tribunals are not part of our judicial
system").
181 41 Stat. 787, Art. 25 (1920) (providing for the taking and use of depositions in non-capital mili-
tary tribunals, except that they may be used by the defense in a capital case).
182 Id Art. 38 (1920) (providing that the President shall establish the procedures to be followed in
the various military tribunals, including military commissions).
183 See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 20.
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military commission convened to try General Yamashita was not sum-
moned pursuant to the Articles of War but rather "pursuant to the
common law of war."1s4 The Court thus indicates that military commis-
sions are not created by the authority of the Articles of War (or their
successor, the U.C.M.J.), but rather are established pursuant to the
common law of war to try combatants for violations of the common law
of war, after war had been proclaimed by Congress.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in responding to General
Yamashita's contention that he was entitled to the benefits of Articles 25
and 38 of the Articles of War because Article 63 of the Geneva Conven-
tion of 19 29"0 required that he be tried "only by the same courts and ac-
cording to the same procedures as in the case of persons belonging to
the armed forces of the detaining Power." The Court determined that
this provision was meant to cover only offenses "committed while a pris-
oner of war, and not for a violation of the law of war committed while a
combatant.""' Thus was sealed General Yamashita's fate.
But this did not occur without vehement dissents from Justices Mur-
phy and Rutledge. Justice Murphy could very well have been writing
about a case under The Order.
The grave issue raised by this case is whether a military commission... may
disregard the procedural rights of an accused person as guaranteed by the
Constitution, especially by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The answer is plain. The Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process of law
applies to "any person" who is accused of a crime by the Federal Government
or any of its agencies. No exception is made as to those who are accused of
war crimes or as to those who possess the status of enemy belligerent. In-
deed, such an exception would be contrary to the whole philosophy of hu-
man rights which makes the Constitution the great living document that it is.
The immutable rights of the individual, including those secured by the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, belong not alone to the members of
those nations that excel on the battlefield or that subscribe to the democratic
ideology. They belong to every person in the world, victor or vanquished,
whatever may be his race, color or beliefs. They rise above any status of bel-
ligerency or outlawry. They survive any popular passion or frenzy of the mo-
ment. No court or legislature or executive, not even the mightiest army in
the world, can ever destroy them. Such is the universal and indestructible na-
ture of the rights which the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment rec-
ognizes and protects when life or liberty is threatened by virtue of the author-
ity of the United States. The existence of these rights... cannot be ignored
by any branch of Government, even the military, except under the most ex-
treme and urgent circumstances .... The trial was ordered to be held in ter-
184 Id.
18 47 Stat. 2052 (1929).
18 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 21. The Court rejected on similar grounds General Yamashita's challenge
under Article 60 of the Geneva Convention, to the failure of the United States to notify Japan's repre-
sentative as Protecting Power, Switzerland, of the proceedings against him.
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ritory over which the United States has complete sovereignty. No military ne-
cessity or other emergency demanded the suspension of the safeguards of
due process.187
Justice Murphy continues, in language that provides a warning for the
future:
The high feelings of the moment doubtless will be satisfied. But in the sober
afterglow will come the realization of the boundless and dangerous implica-
tions of the procedure sanctioned today. No one in a position of command
in an army, from sergeant to general, can escape those implications. Indeed,
the fate of some future President of the United States and his chiefs of staff
and military advisers may well have been sealed by this decision. But even
more significant will be the hatred and ill-will growing out of the application
of this unprecedented procedure .... The effect in this instance, unfortu-
nately, will be magnified infinitely, for we are dealing with the rights of man
on an international level.
... That just punishment should be meted out to all those responsible
for criminal acts of this nature is... beyond dispute. But these factors do not
answer the problem .... They do not justify the abandonment of our devo-
tion to justice .... To conclude otherwise is to admit that the enemy has lost
the battle but has destroyed our ideals.
If we are ever to develop an orderly international community based upon
a recognition of human dignity it is of the utmost importance that the neces-
sary punishment of those guilty of atrocities be as free as possible from the
ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.
8 8
The balance ofJustice Murphy's dissent cogently refutes, point by point,
the majority's finding that a recognized violation of the laws of war had
been proven, much less by competent evidence.
Justice Rutledge's dissent is as passionate as that ofJustice Murphy.
It is not too early, it is never too early, for the nation steadfastly to follow its
great constitutional traditions, none older or more universally protective
against unbridled power than due process of law in the trial and punishment
of men, that is, of all men, whether citizens, aliens, alien enemies or enemy
belligerents. It can become too late. This long-held attachment marks the
great divide between our enemies and ourselves. Theirs was a philosophy of
universal force. Ours is one of universal law, albeit imperfectly made flesh of
our system and so dwelling among us. Every departure weakens the tradition,
187 Id at 26-27. But see Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 245 (1901) (finding that the Constitution does
not follow the flag except as to fundamental rights); United States v. Verdugo-Urqufdez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not applicable to a search in Mexico of a non-U.S.
citizen's house). The question arises as to the Constitution's applicability to the United States military
enclave in GuantAnamo, Cuba, where persons captured in Afghanistan by United States forces, or
turned over to them, are presently being detained for interrogation and possibly trial pursuant to The
Order. See Katharine Q. Seelye, ForAmerica's Captive Home Is a Camp in Cuba, with Goggies and a Koran,
N.Y TMES, Jan. 20, 2002, at A12.
18 Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 28-29.
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whether it touches the high or the low, the powerful or the weak, the trium-
phant or the conquered. If we need not or cannot be magnanimous, we can
keep our own law on the plane from which it has not descended hitherto and
to which the defeated foes' never rose.189
The balance of Justice Rutledge's dissent includes a devastating at-
tack on the majority's rulings on the denial of a reasonable opportunity
to prepare a defense by General Yamashita's lawyers, the vagueness of
the charge itself, the proof and findings of the military commission, and
the applicability of the safeguards provided by the Articles of War, the
Geneva Convention, and the due process clause of Fifth Amendment
Justice Rutledge, as did Justice Murphy, warns that the majority's con-
struction of the Geneva Convention as inapplicable would have adverse
effects on "the security of our own soldiers, taken prisoner, as much
as... that of prisoners we take."19°
As the Second World War wound down so did the Supreme Court's
enthusiasm for military tribunals, and thus we come to the last of the ma-
jor cases coming out of that period in our history.
4. The last of the Mohicans: Duncan v. Kahanamoku919
The power of the military to try U.S. civilian citizens,192 even during a
congressionally declared war, is the subject of these companion cases de-
cided in 1946. They arose from incidents that took place in early 1942
19 Id at 41-42.
190 Id. at 76. See also id. at 72-73 n.36 ("We should, in my opinion, so hold, for reasons of security to
members of our own armed forces taken prisoner, if for no others.").
191 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
1
92 John Walker Lindh, a U.S. citizen captured in the present Afghan theater of operations, where
he was allegedly a member of the Taliban forces, has been remitted for trial in the United States. See
Walker TIW Face Terrorism Counts in Cvilihan Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al, Al0; see also Duncan
v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (finding lack ofjurisdiction of military tribunals to try civilians
during existence of martial law declaration). Cf Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (holding that US.
civilian accompanying Armed Forces overseas is entitled to constitutional rights under the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments even when charged with criminal conduct occurring outside the United States);
John mintz, Justice Says It Won't Charge a U.S. Citizen Moved from Cuba; Man in Custody as Government De-
libeMates What To Do, WASH. Posr, Apr. 9, 2002, at A10. But see Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Supports
DetainingInmate with U.S. Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,2002, atA21.
As to the authority of military authorities over non-citizens in U.S. territory during peacetime (in-
cluding possible non-congressionally declared wars), see Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
("But once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause
applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is law-
flu, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (holding
that aliens, whether or not laIfully in the United States, are entitled to the rights of the Fifth and
Sixth Amendments before criminal penalties may be imposed). Cf Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823
F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the due process clause of Fifth Amendment applies
to the United States Naval Base at Guantinamo, Cuba, which is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction
and control of the United States, and where the criminal and civil lawa of the United States apply).
But see Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) (denying constitutional
protection to Cuban and Haitian immigrants residing in U.S. military base in Cuba and Panama).
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(White) and 1944 (Duncan). The time that elapsed between these inci-
dents and the decision by the Court is thought by some to have aided in
their outcome. The passage of time and the ending of the hostilities
probably allowed for a more dispassionate consideration of the issues
raised.
In any event, on December 7, 1941, immediately following the Japa-
nese attack at Pearl Harbor, the Governor of Hawaii, acting pursuant to
the provisions of the Hawaiian Organic Act,'93 proclaimed a state of mar-
tial law for the Islands. To validate the Governor's action, the Organic
Act required that the President approve his action, which was done orally
on December 8, 1941, in a message over the radio.
Immediately after the Governor's proclamation of martial law, the
Commanding General of the Army in Hawaii installed himself as Military
Governor of the Islands. Thereafter, on December 8, 1941, he issued an
order forbidding both the civil and criminal courts from summoning ju-
rors or conducting trials. The order also established military tribunals to
take the place of these courts. These military tribunals were to try civil-
ians charged with violating the laws of the United States and of Hawaii,
as well as the rules, regulations, orders or policies of the Military Gov-
ernment. The order provided that the rules of evidence and procedure
applicable in civilian courts did not control, and that penalties commen-
surate with the offense committed would be imposed upon a determina-
tion of culpability, including the death penalty in appropriate cases. By
virtue of a subsequent order dated August 25, 1943, courts in Hawaii
were prohibited from accepting petitions for writs of habeas corpus.
Additionally, both prisoners and their attorneys were prohibited from
filing for such writs, with violations of this proscription subjecting them
to criminal sanctions.
On August 20, 1942, Harry E. White, a stock broker, was charged in a
military court, designated a "provost court,"1'9 allegedly for embezzling
the stocks of another civilian, all in violation of the laws of Hawaii. De-
spite challenges to the jurisdiction of this tribunal and a demand for a
jury trial, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to five years by a mili-
taryjudge. Thereafter, on February 24, 1944, the other petitioner, Lloyd
C. Duncan, a dockworker at the Navy yards, was charged with brawling
with two armed Marine sentries. Notwithstanding challenges similar to
those made by White, he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to six
months' imprisonment by a military court for violating a military regula-
tion that prohibited assaults on military personnel. Both White and
Duncan sought writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for Hawaii, and the court issued the writs. These rulings were promptly
3 Act of Apr. 30, 1900, ch. 339, sec. 91, 31 Stat. 159.
19 In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 64 n.31 (1946) (describing the various military courts including the
.provost court").
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reversed by the court of appeals.'9 The Supreme Court subsequently
granted certiorari, reversed the appellate court, and ordered issuance of
the writs. 19
Given the nature of the military order involved and the charges
made, this outcome is hardly surprising when viewed in hindsight How-
ever, at the time, it represented an important change in the almost un-
broken line of government victories upholding the exercise of extraor-
dinary powers by the executive in times of a congressionally declared
war. As Justice Burton, dissenting in Duncan, stated, it constituted judi-
cial boundary-setting at "the outer limits of the jurisdiction of our mili-
tary authorities ... even under such extreme circumstances as those of
the battlefield."' 97 Nevertheless, Justice Black, writing for the majority,
took care to distinguish these cases from those involving the exercise of
military jurisdiction by military courts over "members of the armed
forces, those directly connected with such forces, or enemy belligerents,
prisoners of war, or others charged with violating the laws of war."'9 Ad-
ditionally, Justice Black found nothing in the Organic Act tojustify what
amounted to the "obliterat[ion of] thejudicial system of Hawafi."1
[The] military trial of civilians charged with crime, especially when not made
subject to judicial review, [is] so obviously contrary to our political traditions
and our institution of jury trials in courts of law, that the tenuous circum-
stances offered by the government can hardly suffice to persuade us that
Congress was willing to enact [into statute, authorization] permitting such a
radical departure from our steadfast beliefs.2
19 &eeExparteDuncan, 146 F.2d 576 (9th ir. 1944).
19 See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. at 314 ("IT] hese petitioners were tried before tribunals set
up under a military program which took over all government and superseded all civil laws and
courts.").
19 Id. at 342 (Burton,J, dissenting).
19 I& at 313-14.
19 11 at 315.
I& at 317.
Justice Jackson did not participate, apparently still involved in the Nuremberg trials. As ex-
pectedJustice Murphy, although this time in the majority, railed against the government's arguments
tojustify "[t]he swift trial and punishment which the military desires [but which] is precisely what the
Bill of Rights oulaws." Id at 331 (Murphy, J., concurring). The Justice took particular umbrage
against the claim that the failure of the civil courts to convict in some cases would diminish the mill-
tary's authority and ability to perform because this claim "assumes without proof that civil courts are
incompetent and are prone to free those who are plainly guilty." I&
ChiefJustice Stone's concurrence points to the fact that from February of 1942 the civil courts in
Hawaii were capable of functioning and that the trial of petitioners in the civil courts no more endan-
gered the public safety "than the gathering of the populace in saloons and places of amusement,
which was authorized by military order." It at 337 (Stone, GJ., concurring).
Justice Burton's dissent, joined by Justice Frankfurter, raises some valid points, suggesting that the
majoritywas second guessing military decisions with the benefit of hindsight. Since "[w]ithin the field
of military action in time ofivar, the executive is allowed wide discretion," the Justice asked: "What is
a battle field and how long does it remain one after the first barrage?" Id. at 342 (Burton, J., dissent-
ing).
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a. Shades of the Lost Battalion: Ex parte Milligan2 0 1
The outcome in Duncan should not have come as any great surprise,
were it not for the hysteria resulting from the attack on Pearl Harbor. As
far back as the Civil War era, a time of obvious strain on civil liberties,
the Supreme Court has laid down rules that placed military commissions
on a short leash.
In Ex parte Milligan, the Court granted a writ of habeas corpus to ex-
carcerate a civilian convicted by a military commission in a trial held out-
side the theater of the ongoing civil war. In doing so the Court provided
some instructional language which may be considered applicable to the
present situation:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is im-
possible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre
of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a neces-
sity... as no power is left but the military [for the military to temporarily step
in] .... As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for if this gov-
ernment is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation
of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the
proper and unobstructed exercise of theirjurisdiction.M
Finally, in words that seem tailor-made for The Order, the Court stated:
We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war
where no war has been declared or exists .... [I]t is within the power of
Congress to determine [when] ... such great and imminent public danger




Although mathematical certainty is hardly an attribute of the law-
and within the law, the subject under study is imprecise indeed-some
general guidelines can be gleaned from the prior discussion. The first
and foremost is that although military commissions are part of our legal
and constitutional history, in recent times they have received judicial ap-
proval only when Congress has authorized them by virtue of a formal
declaration of war. These are extraordinary tribunals, and extraordinary
action by Congress seems to be a sine qua non to their validity. The sec-
ond general principle seems to be that where Congress has specifically
legislated on a subject matter, the courts will be reluctant to override the
path chosen by Congress in favor of executive action which departs from
that legislative solution.
With this background to serve as our framework, we delve into the
substance of The Order.
2DI 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
MId at 127 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 140 (Chase, CJ., concurring).
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II. THE ORDER
A. The findings
The Order makes findings, preliminary to its substantive provisions,
that are important in establishing the background against which it was
issued and in helpinito frame its parameters.m
The first finding is that "[ilnternational terrorists, including mem-
bers of al Qaida," have carried out attacks upon United States diplomatic
and military personnel, facilities abroad, citizens, and domestic property
on such a scale as to have created a "state of armed conflict" requiring
the use of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is then indicated
that because of these attacks, including those perpetrated on September
11, 2001 in the United States, the President has proclaimed a national
emergency.0 These findings define the scope of The Order in broader
2H As to the significance of the preamble to the operative parts of The Order, see generally
NORMANJ. SINGER, IA STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:04 (5th Ed.). See alSo Yazoo v.
Thomas, 132 U.S. 174 (1889) (matters in the preamble not having been enacted cannot be given any
binding legal effect); Price v. Forrest, 173 U.S. 410, 427 (1899) (holding that the preamble cannot
control the enacting part of legislation where the enacting part is expressed in dear, unambiguous
terms, but where such is not the case it may be resorted to help discover the intention of the law-
maker). Where facts found by the enacting body appear in the preamble, this legislative determina-
tion is usually beyond the reach of judicial inquiry. However, where the determination of fact also
involves judgment factors, such as the existence of any emergency, and where the fact could poten-
faily change, then the courts may review the origin of the facts and the justification for their con-
tinuation in the enactment. SeeBlockv. Hrsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (upholding law made necessary by
emergencies of war upon review of facts); A.LA. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935) (striking down congressional law despite claim of economic crisis); Leary v. United States, 395
US. 6 (1969) (questioning statutory presumption upon examination of facts); United States v. Morri-
son, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000) (concluding that a statute is not immune from judicial review just be-
cause it is based on congressional findings; whether a statute is within Congress's power is "ultimately
a judicial question"); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 US. 180, 195 (1997) (noting that courts
should review predictive judgments of Congress with "substantial deference" when determining the
constitutionality of a statute, since Congress is better equipped to amass and evaluate large quantities
of data); Richmond v.JA Croson Co., 488 US. 469 (1989) ('The fact finding process of legislative
bodies is generally entitled to a presumption of regularity and deferential review by the judiciary.")
(citing Wflliamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 US. 483, 488-89 (1955)).
As for factual findings in executive orders, it can be argued that such an order, when supported by
findings of fact similar to those supporting a congressionally promoted statute, is also entitled to def-
erence. Cf United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
In a somewhat different setting, however, Justice O'Connor stated in Richmond v. J.A. Crason, Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 501 (1989), that "blindjudicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of
necessity [have] no place in equal protection analysis" (citing to Justice Murphy's dissent in Korematnu,
323 U.S. at 235-40).
SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 1(a).&ee i&. § I (b).
Proclamation No. 7463, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,199 (2001). In this document the President declares
that a national emergency has existed as of September 11, 2001 and invokes the National Emergencies
Act (50 U.S.C. §§ 1601 et seq.) to put into effect sections 123 (suspension of scheduled separation of
officers of the Armed Forces), 123a (suspension of end-strength limitations), 527 (suspension of the
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terms than at least one of the sources of authority upon which The Or-
der relies, JR 23, which both in its preamblem and in its substantive pro-
visions makes clear that its authorization for use of military force is with
reference only to "the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001. "20 This is an important point because the apparent intent of The
Order, as well as expressions made by the Executive branch, indicate
that military operations will be expanded to a more general "war against
210terrorism," including various countries and organizations.
The third finding211 states that " [i] ndividuals acting alone and in con-
cert involved in international terrorism" have both the capability and in-
tention of carrying out terrorist acts of such magnitude against the
United States to "place at risk the continuity of the operations of the
United States Government." This very portentous statement appears to
be based upon the President's superior knowledge about prospective
dangers to the nation. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that any court will
probe into this finding or attempt to second-guess the President's ability
to perform his most basic duty, protecting the existence and continuity
of the nation.2  The importance of the President's finding cannot be
underestimated, particularly in the initial period after The Order is is-
sued. 3  Nevertheless, this conclusion may not totally insulate the sub-
stantive provisions of The Order from judicial scrutiny if an appropriate
constitutional challenge is made.
The fourth finding concludes that the ability of the United States to
protect itself and its citizens and "to help its allies and other cooperating
"peacetime" authorized strengths of commissioned officers on active duty above the grades of major
and lieutenant commander, and of general and flag grade officers), 2201(c) (funding of increase in
the armed forces), 12006 (waiver of armed forces strengths limitations), and 12302 (mobilization of
"ready reserve") of Titlel0 U.S.C, and sections 331 (authority to recall to active duty of any regular
officer on retired list), 359 (authority to recall to active duty any enlisted personnel on retired list),
and 367 (authority to detain Coast Guard personnel beyond enlistment), of Title 14 of the United
States Code.
SJ. Res. 23, 107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, pmbl. (2001) (enacted) ("To
authorize the use of United States Armed Forces against those responsible for the recent attacks
launched against the United States"; "Whereas, on September 11, 2001, acts of treacherous violence
were committed against the United States.").
209 Id. § 2(a).
210 See President Promised To Defeat the Twin Threats of Teroism and Recession, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30,
2002, at Al; Abbas Amanat, Editorial, A Risky Message to Iran, N.Y. TIM Es, Feb. 10, 2002, at A15; Nicho-
las D. Kristof, A Safe Place for War, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at A13 (op-ed); Todd S. Purdum, U.S.
Weighs Tacklinglraq on Its Osn, Powel Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A10; David E. Sanger, Allies Rear
Sour Notes in "Axis of Evil" Chorus, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 17, 2002, at 18; Michael R. Gordon, Chaney R'eje
Oiticism by Allies over Stand on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2002, at A6; James Dao, The War on Ternism
Takes Aim at Crime, N.Y. TIMEs, April 7, 2002, § 4, at 5.
211 See The Order, supra note 9, § 1(c).
212 It is also a position that is not likely to be assailed by the normal political processes, at least at
the beginning, while there is still a sense of emergency.
213 As we have seen, the Court also tempered its views in the period between Korematsu and Duncan.
See supra notes 192-203.
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nations protect their nations and their citizens" from further terrorist at-
tacks in the future depends in "significant part" upon using the United
States Armed Forces "to identify terrorists and those that support them,
to disrupt their activities, and to eliminate their ability to conduct and
support such attacks."14 The purported intention of using U.S. troops in
aid of "allies and other cooperating nations" is again a significant depar-
ture from the congressional authorization of JR 23, which makes no
mention of such broader activities. Thus, this situation raises a series of
important but tangential issues which are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle.215
The fifth21 6 and sixth 217 findings are the most crucial in terms of the
substantive portions of The Order. First, the President determines that
in order to protect the United States and its citizens and "for the effec-
tive conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks," it
is necessary for individuals, subject to The Order, to be detained and
"tried for violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by mili-
tary tribunals." Second, "[g]iven the danger to the safety of the United
States and the nature of international terrorism... it is not practicable
to apply in military commissions under [The Order] the principles of
law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of crimi-
nal cases in the United States district courts."
These findings raise the question whether the President is authorized
to appoint these military tribunals absent a declaration of war by Con-
214 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § I(d).
215 The President can deploy troops abroad in defense of American lives and property for brief
periods of time and has historically exercised such powers without any legal challenge having been
successfully made. Examples include the invasion of Grenada in 1983, allegedly to rescue American
students, see RobertJ. Beck, International Law and theDeision To Invade Grenada- A Ten-YearRetrospective,
33 VAJ. INT'LL 765,772-84 (1993), and the invasion of Panama in 1989 to aid the "war on drugs," see
Louis Henkin, The Invasion of Panama Under International Law. A Gross Violation, 29 COL.J. TRANSNAT'L
L 293 (1991). See also STEVE ALBERT, THE CASE AGAINST THE GENERAL: MANUEL NORIEGA AND THE
PoLrrcs OF ARmmcANJuSTIcE (1993). The issue is more blurred when it comes to such actions on
behalf of other nations or their citizens. See genera/ly Note, Congress, the Presiden4 and the Power To Com-
mit Forces To Combat, 81 Htv. L REV. 1771 (1968); North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2244,
T.I.AS. No. 1964; Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Feb. 4, 1955, 1 U.S.T. 81, T.IAS. No.
3170. Such actions are more sustainable where the President acts in compliance with a treaty obliga-
tion. Under those circumstances it can be argued that the Senate, which ratifies the treaty, has acted
to authorize such action beforehand. Treaty obligations by the United States are usually couched in
terms such that the United States must be "in accordance with constitutional process." Such action
could also be grounded on the duty of the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted," U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, in that treaties have the force of law. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stat-
ing that treaties are "the supreme Law of the Land").
Interestingly enough, the September 11 terrorist attacks have set in motion an inverse scenario
ith the United States invoking the mutual defense provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty and thus
seeking the support of its European allies in its "war against terrorism." See supra note 5.
216 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 1(e).
217 SWid § I(f).
218 Id
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gress, especially given the availability of U.S. civilian courts to try these
cases and their proven ability to do so.219 It is unlikely that a court of law
can or will question the premises upon which this finding is based, that
the use of military commissions is necessary "for the effective conduct of
military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks" and that the
"danger to the safety of the United States and the nature of international
terrorism" make it "not practicable to apply the principles of law and
rules of evidence" used in the federal courts. However, these vague and
ill-defined general statements are difficult to accept at face value. The
manner and method by which persons accused of engaging in interna-
tional terrorism are tried would seem to bear little relevance to "military
operations." Furthermore, the connection to other, prospective terrorist
attacks seems even more tenuous, unless The Order contemplates that
the detention of suspects without bail prior to trial is a means of prevent-
ing such attacks. If so, the outcome would in all likelihood be the same
if the trial were held in a federal court, given the provisions of the Bail
Reform Act.m
It should be recognized, however, that there is one important benefit
to the government, and indeed the public, derived from the ability in-
definitely to incarcerate individuals covered by The Order, and, in the
process, interrogate them while incommunicado and outside the con-
straints of the Constitution, the Geneva Conventions, or the U.C.M.J.:
the securing of information about past crimes, and more importantly,
receiving intelligence on future terrorist activities. In this respect, we are
likely, sometime in the future, to be faced with an in extremis situation in
which the rights of the few may have to give way to those of the many.221
219 See United States v. Salameh, 54 F. Supp. 2d 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); see also United States v.
McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Colo. 1996) (ordering the government to turn over all exculpatory or
impeaching statements by defendant), affd, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. deniea 528 U.S. 934
(1999); United States v. Bin Laden, 156 F. Supp. 2d 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying preclusion of death
penalty for participating in East African embassy bombings); United States v. Yousef, 261 F.3d 271 (2d
Cir. 2001) (denying post conviction appeals by two convicted participants in 1993 World Trade Center
bombings); United States v. Haouari, No.S400C1,15 JFK), 2001 W 1154714 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28,
2001) (denying judgment of acquittal and motion for new trial to defendant who was convicted of
sugorting a terrorist act to blow up the Los Angeles Airport in December 1999).
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (placing the burden of production on the defendant to show his release
would not pose a flight risk or danger to any person or the community). In none of the trials held in
federal court involving terrorism has bail pending trial been granted to persons accused of terrorism
or related activities.
22 A possible, no longer far-fetched, scenario would be one in which a terrorist is detained after it
is known that he has placed a nuclear device in the heart of a major city in the United States. The
question is: to what extent is our society willing to go to obtain whatever information is needed to
prevent such a mass disaster? These are moral and legal issues that we must face, discuss, and attempt
to resolve, before they happen. There must be in place some mechanism to deal with these in extremis
situations. There will not be time for seeking search warrants or engaging in debate. Compare Philip
B. Heymann, Torture Should Not Be Authorize, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A.15, with Alan M. Der-
showitz, Yes, It Should Be 'On the Books,'BoSrON GLOBE, Feb. 16, 2002, at A15. A similar situation is the
"shoot down" authority of civilian air craft by the military. Eric Schmitt, New Power To DownJets Is Last
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There is an urgent need to discuss these scenarios and look for practical,
constitutional solutions.
It should also be stated that an argument can be made, relying on
Yamashita, that the use of military commissions is an integral part of the
prosecution of the "war effort."22 However, there are several problems
with this argument First, it fails to take into account that Yamashita dealt
with a congressionally declared war. There, Congress specifically in-
structed the President "to employ.., all the resources of the country" to
cany on the war.un Here, we have no declaration of war, andJR 23 limits
the President to "use all necessary and appropriate for. " 224 Second, on a
related point, there is a distinct difference as to what is entailed in action
in aid of a "war effort" and that which is related to supporting "military
operations." The implied scope of the latter is considerably more lim-
ited in nature. These are not mere plays on words. We should keep in
mind that the Supreme Court did not hesitate to strike down what was
undoubtedly a much more serious impediment to the "war effort" dur-
ing the Korean War when the President overstepped his constitutional
225
powers.
The idea that allowing the "principles of law and rules of evidence" to
apply in a proceeding in which the liberty, and possibly the life, of the
accused are at stake, is "not practical" because of the nature of interna-
tional terrorism, and because such standards somehow pose a "danger to
the safety of the United States," are premises that are difficult to accept
on simple faith. First, whether constitutional protections are "practical"
or not, by which apparently is meant, "expedient," has never been rele-
vant to determining whether constitutional rights need to be respected
by the government. It is always more "practical" or "expedient" for the
government to act without such restraints. However, ease in attaining
convictions should not be a primary constitutional goal of government.
Furthermore, such a conclusion runs contrary to experience, plain
facts, and common sense. Trials of this nature have been taking place in
United States District Courts with some regularity, with an almost unbro-
Resort, Rumsfdd &ays, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 28, 2001, at B7. The detention of a large number of persons as
"material witnesses" by the Department ofJustice shortly after the September 11 incidents could also
be related to these concerns. 18 U.S.C. § 3144.
n The trial and punishment of enemy combatants who have committed violations of the law of
war is... a part of the conduct of war .... That sanction is without qualifications as to exercise of this
authority so long as a state of war exists--from its dedaration until peace is proclaimed." In reYama-
shita, 327 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1946) (emphasis added). I
= SJ. Res. 116,77th Cong., Pub. L No. 77-328,55 Stat. 795 (1941) (emphasis added). For the full
quotation, see supra note 49.
22 SJ. Res. 23,107th Cong., Pub. L No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (enacted) (emphasis added).
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (Vinson, QJ., dissenting) (noting that the President was enjoined
from taking over the steel industry notwithstanding that "a work stoppage would immediately jeopard-
ize and imperil our national defense and the defense of those joined with us, in resisting aggression,
and would add to the continuing danger of our soldiers in the field").
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ken success record for the government 6  There have been no allega-
tions that these trials pose any danger to the safety or security of the na-
tion,7 although the government is held to a higher standard of proof
than is contemplated by The Order. None of these allegations seem a
sufficient justification, under the Constitution, to dispense with the re-
quirements of due process under the Fifth Amendment. Furthermore,
any fear that classified information may be divulged by virtue of the na-
ture of these trials, thus compromising American intelligence sources
and adversely affecting national security, a legitimate concern, has been
addressed by Congress through the passage of the Classified Information
Procedures Act in 1980.228 These procedures have been used on numer-
ous occasions in security-sensitive trials, again most of which the gov-
ernment has won.
Let there be no doubt that there are considerable, mostly practical,
problems raised by the application of the normal criminal procedures to
the Afghanistan scenario. But these are not insurmountable and not
completely unlike many of the problems that have been successfully
overcome with relation to the "war on drugs" or organized crime. It may
be that there is a need for special legislation to deal with the special
problems of this special crime wave.2 However, this is properly a matter
for Congress to consider in light of relevant Constitutional protections.
The rejection of the "principles of law and rules of evidence" appli-
cable in federal courts for military commissions has the unintended
negative effect of downgrading the quality of this type of military justice
by permitting the use of less reliable evidence in these tribunals. This is
contrary to the intent of Congress when it enacted the Uniform Code of
Military Justice.2° This downgrading gives the appearance that the gov-
2Z See supra notes 2 and 219.
M Although it could be argued that jurors and witnesses may be put at risk by these proceedings,
this is true of many criminal trials in federal courts, particularly those involving organized crime or
illegal narcotics. There are many time tested methods for shielding jurors and witnesses from these
situations. See, e.g., David Weinstein, Protecting aJurors Right to Privacy: Constitutional Constraints and
Pot Options, 70 TEMP. L REv. 1, 26 (1997) (describing precautions taken to maximizejuror safety).
Pub. L No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980), cod/fled at 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §§ 1 et seq. Although it can
be argued, with some validity, that this statute does not sufficiently protect the sensitive sources and
methods of the intelligence community, it is up to Congress to correct these perceived deficiencies.
Furthermore, the statute has considerable self-correcting mechanisms. See 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1980).
For example, the Military Extraterritorial Act of 2000, 1400 Stat. 2488 (Nov. 22, 2000), author-
izes a federal magistrate to hold some of the preliminary proceedings by telephone with the defen-
darn, who is represented by a qualified judge advocate.
o See 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950. For a comparison of the differences and similarities in the pretrial,
trial, and post-trial phases in cases before the federal district courts, military courts-martial under the
U.C.MJ., and military commissions, see the testimony of Maj. Gen. (Ret.) Michael J. Nardotti, Jr.,
formerJudge Advocate General of the Army, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee
on Administrative Oversight and the Courts, "Military Commissions" Hearings, Dec. 4, 2001, available
at http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=1288avitjid=767; see also Bruce Landnum, Military
Rule of Evidence 404(b): Toothless Giant of the Evidence Worl4 150 ML. L REv. 271, 284-86 (1995) (noting
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emiment is creating a special forum for the specific purpose of attaining
preordained convictions. This perception unnecessarily undermines our
image in the international arena.
Finally, the President concludes "that an extraordinary emergency
exists for national defense," constituting "an urgent and compelling gov-
ernment interest" which makes the issuance of The Order "necessary to
meet the emergency."2 !
1. Of terrorists and freedom fighters
One identifiable problem with The Order is that it fails to define
some of its key terminology. The terms "international terrorist," "acts of
international terrorism," and "terrorism" are at the forefront of this co-
nundrum.2 In the context of what we are dealing with here, it may not
that "military evidence rules were drawn from the rules applied in federal courts"); MANUAL FOR
CoURT-MARTAL, UNITED STATES atl 137 (1995).
23 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 1(g).
The word "terrorist" is defined in the dictionary as one who systematically employs terror as a
means of coercion to achieve an end. ME.RIMAN-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICIONARY 1213 (10th ed.
2001). The modem use of the term "terrorist" developed to describe the Jacobin regime during the
French Revolution. SeeTodd S. Purdum, What Do You Mean, Terrorist?, N.Y. Tnizas, Apr. 7,2002, § 4, at
1. It is now more generally applied to describe those who use violent action, or the threat thereof,
against a civilian population for the purpose of attaining political goals. Clearly a bank robber is not
normally considered a terrorist, although violent action is used to accomplish this crime. So, if, in
addition to being a common criminal, the same bank robber perpetrates the crime for the purpose of
raising funds to promote a political goal, he could be called a "terrorist," although in the United
States such actions are commonly charged as common crimes regardless of motivation. See United
States v. McVeigh, 940 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Colo. 1996); Maureen Dowd, Black Berets Rising; N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 20, 2002, § 4, at 13; James Stemgold, 4 Fonner Radicals Are Charged in 1995 Killings in Bank Robbery,
N.Y. Ticms,Jan. 17, 2002, at Al.
If the use of stealth is used as a criteria, we would run into problems with certain methods of war-
fare commonly used by modem armies, such as those carried out by our own Special Forces and simi-
lar groups who many times operate behind enemy lines and may use stealth accompanied by violence.
A distinguishing feature of these, and most military operations, is that the participants are usually uni-
formed, which grants them theoretical Hague Convention status as lawful combatants. See Hague
Convention No. IV of Oct. 18, 1907,36 Stat. 2295; see also Quit/n, 317 U.S. at 30-31. But seephotograph
appearing in the N.Y. Tuazs, Jan. 12, 2002, at A8, captioned, "Americans on the Watch-American
soldiers who identified themselves as members of the Special Forces, arrived in Spinbaldak, Afghani-
stan, yesterday to provide security," and depicting armed, non-uniformed U.S. personnel in Afghani-
stan. Typical guerrilla operations, in which those so engaged are not usually uniformed, come closer
to what would be considered "terrorist." But under such criteria the United States would have quali-
fied as a supporter of terrorism, because the United States granted aid to the guerrillas who fought
the Soviet troops in Afghanistan (which in turn, probably are now subject to the proscriptions of The
Order because many of them joined the Taliban or al Qaida), as well as those in Nicaragua, Viemam,
Cambodia, and many of the covert operations caried out or supported by our varioil government
agencies so occupied. John J. Lumpkin, CEA s Paramilitary a Cross Between Spies and Soldiers; Part of 'Se-
cret' Wir, GCANAIAN PRESS, Dec. 2, 2001, available at 2001 WL 30389734.
The use of nationality or citizenship as a factor in determining whether a particular action is "ter-
rorist" in nature is particularly problematic considering such home-grovn terrorists as Timothy
McVeigh, the Puerto Rican Macheteros, and others in the United States, or the IRA or Basque sepa-
ratists, among others, elsewhere. Cf Is This a Tenrist?, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2002, at Cl.
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be possible to define those terms in an all-encompassing manner, per-
haps leaving us with an unsatisfactory but practical answer we know one
when we see one.
Another issue raised by the language in the Findings is the reference
to "[i]nternational terrorists, including members of al Qaida" as the
perpetrators of the various attacks against the United States and its citi-
zens and property.2 This finding seems to be broader in scope than the
substantive definition of who is an "individual subject to the order,"
which focuses on members of al Qaida, although aiders and abetters,
and those knowingly harboring them, are also included within its cover-
age, irrespective of al Qaida membership.
At least one problem with defining what constitutes terrorism, or better yet who is a terrorist, is
that "one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter." See Russia Urges West To Condemn Chzedhn Ter-
nwrist, N.Y. TtMs, Feb. 4, 2002, at A13 (quoting Sergei Ivanov, Russia's Defense Mlnister. "If those who
blow up apartment houses in Moscow or Buinakak in Dagestan are declared freedom fighters, while in
other countries such persons are referred to as terrorists, one cannot even think of forging a united
anti-terrorist front."); Anthony Deutsch, Milasevic Opens Defense at Tribunal, Clains He Was Fzlt*ing Ter-
rorism, SAN JUAN STAR, Feb. 15, 2002, at 22 (referring to Milosevic's accusation that NATO bombed
civilian villages and collaborated with a terrorist force, the KIA); see also James Wathers, Countering
Terror"i A New Cha/le to Our National Conscience, SEA POWER MAG. Nov. 1984; MiCHAEL CONNOR,
TERRORISM 1-6 (1987) (chapter entitled "Terrorism: A Definition"); Oliver LibMaw, Defining Te"risr
Little Agreement on here To Draw the Line, ABC.News.com, http://-v.abcneis.go.com/
sections/us/dailynes/strikejllOlldefiningterror.htm. It is reported that at the early stages of our
War for Independence the British refused to give combatant status to captured "rebels." This
changed as the Continental Anny took on a more European look and form and as Americans began
taking British prisoners. See WILLIAM WINTHROP, MImTtARY IAW AND PRECEDENTs 796 (2d ed. 1920)
(explaining case of Maj. Gen. Charles Lee). Several of Israel's Prime Ministers, including Ben Gurion
and Menachem Begin, were members of organizations labeled as "terrorist" by the British authorities
and engaged in activities that would fall under the proscription of The Order. The Palesinian Lib-
eration Organization, as well as its chairman, Yasser Arafat, are equally compromised. See Todd S.
Purdum, President Assails Paletinian Chief on Arns Shipmen N.Y. TI mEs, Jan. 26, 2002, atAl ("In harsh-
est words on subject, Bush suggests that Arafat is 'enhancing terror.'"). Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Is
Given Papers that Israelis Assert Tie Arafat to Terror, N.Y. TMs, Apr. 12, 2002, at Al; Frank Rich, The Bush
Doctrine, RI.P., N.Y. TsIms, Apr. 13, 2002, atA17 (op-ed). If we engage in activities to destabilize Sad-
dam Hussein's regime in Iraq, will we be supporting "terrorist organizations" or "freedom fighters,"
and how will we know the difference? If our special operation forces engage in clandestine operations
there, will they be "uulawful combatants," or will they be entitled to Geneva Convention protection if
captured? See Bryan Bender, Bush Sees Military as Option on Iraq-But Covert Action May Be the Focus,
BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14,2002, atAl.
Although The Order does not define these terms, there are several Federal criminal statutes that
use these terms, and provide definitions within the context of the particular statute involved. See 18
U.S.C. § 2331(1) ("international terrorism"); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5) ("Federal crime of terrorism");
18 U.S.C. § 2339(B) (g) (6) ("terrorist organization"); 18 U.S.C. § 3077(1) ("act of terrorism"); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182 (a) (3) (B) (ii) ("terrorist activity"). It is probably legally acceptable to incorporate these defini-
tions in interpreting the application of The Order. Cf A. Magano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 4647
(1934) (noting that words used in a statute will be construed according to their ordinary meaning
unless the context demonstrates that they are being used differently).
SeeJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I know it when I see
it," referring to pornography). The fact of the matter is that in realpolitiks, the definition of terrorism
is often a flexible one.
2M SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 1(a).
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In this respect the unmentioned quandary (or should we say
"quarry') is the Taliban.2 Specifically, what are the consequences under
The Order of membership in the Taliban, whether as part of the gov-
ernment or of its army? This and other subsidiary questions are not sub-
ject to facile disposition.
The Taliban is a fundamentalist Islamic group that assumed control
of a large part of Afghanistan and became the de facto government of
Afghanistan after the departure of the Soviet troops in 1989, and the fall
of its puppet government during the 1990s.2 It arose in response to a
power vacuum in the region created by the withdrawal of the United
States from the scene, which gave Pakistan and Saudi Arabia "free rei"
in the civil war that ensued, in which they backed the Taliban.Y Despite
consolidating power in over ninety percent of the country,2 the Taliban
regime was refused diplomatic recognition by most of the international
community, including the United States, as well as denied a seat in the
United Nations.m It was, however, accredited by the governments of
Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia.24° In fact, the
Taliban's ambassador to Pakistan is presently being detained by United
States forces in Afghanistan, apparently under the authority of The Or-
der.241 This, together with the detention of members of the Taliban's
armed forces captured in Afghanistan by the Northern Alliance, 242 some
25 See generaly AmimD RAS=lD, TAUBAN: MIUTANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDANiENTIAUsM IN CENTRAL
ASIA (2001). "Talib" is arabic for an Islamic student. "Taliban," which is the plural for talib, means
"students of Islam." For a brief sketch of Afghan history from 1709 to the present, see From Empire to
Revolt and Back: A Sampling of Afghanistan's Waiors, Kings and Dynasties, N.Y. 'DMEs, Dec. 9, 2001, at
B5.
See RASHID, supra note 235, at 17-30. Its basic agenda was, and still remains, "to restore peace,
disarm the population, enforce Sharia law, and defend the integrity and Islamic character of Afghani-
stan." Id. at 22. Until it was toppled over by a combination of the ground attacks of the Northern Al-
liance, see supra note 235, and the air bombardments of the United States forces, the Taliban's senior
leader was Mullah Mohammed Omar and its political leader was Mullah Mahaammed Rabani.
27 &e RASHID, supra note 235, at 175-76.
For a detailed listing of the Taliban's governmental and military structure, see RASHID, supra
note 235, atApp. 2,220.
There were a number of high level contacts between the Taliban government and the United
States and other nations, as well as with the United Nations. These were basically interrupted as a re-
sult of the September 11 incidents and the refusal of the Taliban government to turn over Osama bin
Laden to the United States. Taliban Balk, Refuse Bin Laden Handover, N.Y. DAmLY NEWS, Sept. 22, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 27901686.
240 SeeRASHID, supra note 235, at 58.
241 See Robin Wright, U.S. Troops Head to Cuba To Build Jai4 Afghan Detainees Expeted in Days,
CHICAGO TRIBuNEJan. 7, 2002, at 1.
2 The Northern Alliance is a conglomerate of mostly Uzbek and Tajik Afghan tribes from north-
western Afghanistan, who became the Taliban's principal opposition in the struggle to take over that
country after the Sovietwithdrawal in 1989. Notwithstanding their being backed by Iran, Turkey, Rus-
sia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Taikistan, they were soundly routed on the battlefield in
almost every encounter with the Taliban, who in turn was backed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, until
the United States joined forces with it after the September 11 incidents. The Northern Alliance pro-
vided the bulk of the troops that eventually defeated the Taliban's forces in Afghanistan. See generally
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of whom have been transported to the United States Naval base in Guan-
tAnamo, Cuba, 43 would lead to the conclusion that The Order is being
interpreted to apply to members of the government and armed forces of• • 244
the Taliban regime. Although, if found to be "unlawful combatants,"
their rights under international law may be limited,245 their designation
as such is a major issue yet to be decided, and is probably dependent on
the facts of each particular case. There is rising concern on this matter
among some members of the international community.246
B. Definition and policy
1. Individuals subject to The Order
Section 2 of The Order contains its only definition, that of the term
"individual subject to this order."2 47 This is obviously a key provision
whose import is best understood by a dissection of its provisions.
An individual is subject to the provisions of The Order if he or she is
not a citizen of the United States, and the President has determined in
writing that there is reason to believe that such individual:
(i) is or was a member of al Qaida, [OR]
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of interna-
tional terrorism, or acts in preparation thereof, that have caused, threaten to
cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy or economy; [OR]
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals [covered by The Or-
der]; [AND]
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to
[The Order].248
The non-citizenship requirement of the definition avoids many of the
constitutional entanglements raised by the trial of U.S. citizens by mili-
RAsHID, supra note 235, at 2-6. Cf David Filipov, Alliance that Drove Out Taliban Unraveling; BosroN
GLOBE, Feb. 3, 2002, at Al (chronicling the demise of the Northern Alliance coalition).
243 See News in Brief PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Feb. 3,2002, atA4.
244 This is probably pursuant to the provisions of Section 2(a) (1) (iii) which relates to persons who
knowingly harbor members of al Qaida. It is also possible that those detained are suspected of being
or having been members of al Qaida, in which case they would be subject to the provisions of Section
2 (1) (i) of The Order.
24 SeeExparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
24 See Charles M. Sennott, Saudis Ask U.S. To Turn Over Detainees, Boston Globe, Jan. 29, 2002, at
Al; Barbara Crossette, Diplonats Protest Lack of Information, N.Y. Tnias, Dec. 20, 2001, at B5; cf Philip
Shenon, Britain Defends US. Treatment of Detainees in Guantdnamo, N.Y. Ti Es, Jan. 22, 2002, at A12.
247 The Order, supra note 9, § 2(a).
248 Id. § 2(a).
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tary tribunals.24 9 Those entanglements may not be altogether avoided,
however, if the trial of the non-citizen is held in U.S. territory.
The presidentially self-imposed standard, "reason to believe," is a low
one. It is certainly much lower than what the Constitution requires to
make a valid arrest in the civilian system.25 However, such standards,
and in fact, most of the Constitutional protections available to U.S. citi-
zens anywhere, or to all persons, including aliens, while in U.S. territory,
are not relevant if these detainees are considered prisoners of war, re-
gardless of whether they are legal or unlawful combatants, particularly if
their detention and trial is wholly outside the United States.52
Most likely, following the pattern of the World War II cases, the de-
tentions and/or convictions will be challenged in the federal courts by
petition of habeas corpus. If the detainees are not in U.S. territory, and
if existing Supreme Court precedent is followed, these courts, will likely
declare themselves without jurisdiction to act.2' 1owever, if the deten-
tion is within U.S. territory, the initial substantive questions likely to be
raised in the federal courts will be: (1) whether the detainees are pris-
oners of war or civilian detainees in military custody; and (2) if they are
prisoners of war, whether they are lawful or unlawful combatants. A
third issue will be what process they are entitled to under the Constitu-
tion.
As previously discussed, there has been no congressional declaration
of war. Although this raises the issue of the President's authority to ap-
point military commissions in this conflict, once that problem is solved,
the question still remains whether persons engaged in hostile activities in
Afghanistan are entitled to the recognition of any rights. This issue is
complicated by the fact that most, if not all, of those detained by United
States forces are either persons not captured in the battlefield, as is the
case of the former Afghan Ambassador to Pakistan,24 or are combatants
249 SeeReidv. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
250 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) ("But once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent."); Wong
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (finding that aliens, whether or not lawfilly in the United
States, are entitled to the rights of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments before criminal penalties may be
imposed). Cf Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028. 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) (noting that the
due process clause of Fifth Amendment applies to the United States Naval Base at Guantinamo, Cuba
which is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, and where the criminal
and civil laws of the United States apply). But see Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412
(11th Ir. 1995) (holding that Haitian and Cuban migrants held in military bases in Cuba and Pan-
ama did not have constitutional rights).
23 U.S. CONsr. amend. IV ("[N]o Warrant[] shall issue, but upon probable cause").
Z2 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (noting that habeas corpus relief is not available to
enemy alien to challenge military commission where crimes charged, and the detention and trial all
occurred outside the United States).
3 Id.
2 PaulineJelinek, Pentagon Close to Finishing Tribunal Rues, SANJUAN STAR, Feb. 27, 2002, at 17.
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captured by the Northern Alliance and turned over to the United States
Armed Forces.2'
The United States has engaged in several undeclared wars or armed
conflicts since World War II. These include the Korean, Vietnam and
Gulf Wars.6 Notwithstanding Congress's failure to act constitutionally
pursuant to Article I, Section 8 with respect to those conflicts, the United
States has considered itself bound by the provisions of the Geneva Con-
vention, and other international treaties to which the United States is a
signatory, with regards to the lights of captured enemy combatants in
those actions.257 This includes non-uniformed Viet Cong prisoners dur-
ing the Vietnam conflict, who were accorded, at least in theory, lawful
combatant status when captured by our forces. Interestingly, in none of
these past conflicts were presidential directives similar to The Order is-
sued nor were military commissions created to try enemy combatants,
lawful or otherwise. It is also of some relevance that in all those conflicts,
we claimed prisoner of war status and treatment under the Geneva Ac-
cords for all our troops captured by the enemy.
As previously stated, the Afghan government under the Taliban re-
gime was not recognized by the United States as the legitimate govern-
ment of that country. This matter may be a closed issue in the courts of
the United States because it is likely to be considered a political question
beyond the purview of judicial adjudication.m This probably means that
the fighting elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan, and possibly also
those of al Qaida, could be considered rebel or insurgent groups under
Protocol II of the Geneva Convention, as "organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercis[ing] ... control over a part
of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted
25 See Carlotta Gall, Prison Packed with Taliban Raises Cancern, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 5, 2002, at Al. But see,
Bryan Bender, US. Ground Focus Nets 27Prisoners, BOSTON GLOBE,Jan. 25, 2002, at Al.
256 Others of smaller proportions are actions in Lebanon in 1958, Dominican Republic in 1965,
Grenada in 1983, Panama in 1989, Somalia in 1992, and Haiti in 1994.
257 See Ariane L DeSaussare, The Role of the Law of Armed Conflict During the Persian Gulf War An
Ovendew, 37 A.F. L REV. 41 (1994) (noting general respect and compliance with the Geneva Conven-
tion during the Persian Gulf War and Vietnam War); Geoffrey S. Corn and Michael L Smidt, "To Be or
Not To Be, That Is the Question": Contemporary Military Operations and the Status of Captured Personnel,
ARMYLAwJune 1999, at 1, 8 (noting the Secretary of the Army's policy that United States forces must
comply with the full body of the law of war with respect to captured enemy personnel, regardless of
the type of conflict); Vaughn Ary, Accountingfor Prisoners of War. A Legal Review of the United States Armed
Forces Identyication and Reporting Procedures, APitY LAw 16 (Aug. 1994) (same). See also the court-
martial of Lt. William Calley, Jr. in Mar., 1971, and of Capt. Ernest L Medina, on Sept., 1971, in LEON
FRIEDMAN, 2 THELAw OFWAR 1703, 1729 (1972).
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) ("[S]uch issues frequently turn on standards that defy
judicial application, or involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the executive
or legislature... such questions uniquely demand single-voiced statement of the Government's
view.").
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military operations and to implement [the Protocol]. ' ' 59  As such they
are entitled to certain protections.
259 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), pt. I, art 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
(1977).
Article 2 of Part I indicates that the Convention applies to "any armed conflict" even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of the parties. It further provides that any signatory to the Convention is
bound by its provisions even if opposing belligerents are not. Article 3 states that
[i]n case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties... the following acts are and shall remain prohibited- (1) (d)
the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pro-
nounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recog-
nized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
Article 4 includes within the definition of "prisoners of war," members of militias and organized resis-
tance movements "(a) that... [are] commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates... (b)
that ... hav[e] a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that... carry[] arms openly,
[and] (d) that... conduct[] their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." Arti-
cle 7 prohibits waiver of Geneva Convention rights by prisoners of war.
Part II of Section I of the Convention deals with the treatment that must be accorded prisoners of
war. Under Article 17 it is established that such persons need only give their name, rank, date of
birth, and serial number, or equivalent information, to their captors. This Article also provides:
[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, may be inflicted on prisoners
of war to secure from them information of any kind whatever. Prisoners of war who refuse to
answer may not be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treat-
ment of any kind.
Article 20 states that "[tihe evacuation of prisoners of war shall always be effected humanely and in
conditions similar to those for the forces of the Detaining Power in their changes of station."
Section II deals with the conditions of interment of prisoners of war. Article 21 provides that sub-
ject to penal or disciplinary sanctions, "prisoners of war may not be held in dose confinement except
where necessary to safeguard their health and then only during the continuation of the circumstances
which make such confinement necessary." Article 22 provides that they be assembled in camps or
camp compounds, "provided that such prisoners shall not be separated from prisoners of war belong-
ing to the armed forces with which they were serving at the time of their capture, except with their
consent." Article 25 indicates that
[p]risoners of war shall be quartered under conditions as favourable as those for the forces of
the Detaining Power who are billeted in the same area.... The foregoing provisions shall ap-
ply in particular to the dormitories of prisoners of war as regards both total surface and mini-
mum cubic space, and the general installations, bedding and blankets.
Section V deals with relations of "prisoners of war with the exterior" and provides the right of a
prisoner of war to write his or her family within one week of arrival at a camp. It gives the Detaining
Power a duty to notify the Central Prisoner of War Agency of the prisoner's capture, address, and state
of health for the purpose of forwarding this information to the prisoner's family (Article 70).
Chapter III of Section VI of the Convention relates to penal and disciplinary sanctions to which a
prisoner of war may be subject. Article 82 sets the general premise that
[a] prisoner of war shall be subject to the laws, regulations and orders in force in the armed
forces of the Detaining Power, the Detaining Power shall bejustified in takingjudicial or disci-
plinary measures in respect of any offence committed by a prisoner of war against such laws,
regulations or orders. However, no proceedings or punishments contrary to the provisions of
this chapter shall be allowed.
Any law, regulation or order of the Detaining Power that declares as punishable acts committed by a
prisoner of war, that would not be punishable if committed by a member of the Detaining Power can
only entail "disciplinary punishment." Article 84 provides for trial of prisoners of war "only by a mili-
tary court, unless the existing laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a
member of the armed forces of the Detaining Power" with respect to the offense charged. This Article
goes on to state that
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An individual initial determination will have to be made whether a
detainee was a member of the Taliban, or al Qaida, or both, and the po-
sition of each individual within each organization, to decide upon the
applicability of The Order.2 ° It would be impractical to bring within the
aegis of The Order all persons who were members of the Taliban, in-
cluding common foot soldiers, even though it might be possible to do so
under a very broad and general conspiracy theory. The logistical night-
mare of detaining, charging, and trying thousands of such Talibans,
however, is mind boggling, and would dilute the effort of going after the
leading culprits. 61
The case of the Taliban leaders, who may have harbored terrorists, is
different from that of the rank and file.262 Knowing participation in the
harboring of al Qaida operatives would place such persons within the
zone of probable accusation under The Order. Whether they are "un-
[i] n no circumstances whatever shall a prisoner of war be tried by a court of any kind which
does not offer the essential guarantees of independence and impartiality as generally recog-
nized, and in particular, the procedure of which does not afford the accused the rights and
means of defen[s]e provided for in Article 105.
Article 85 provides that prisoners of war retain their rights under the Convention, even for acts com-
mitted "prior to capture." Under Article 87 the military authorities and courts of the Detaining Power
are prohibited from sentencing a prisoner of war applying penalties different than would be applied
to a member of the Power's armed forces for the same acts.
Chapter M also refers to judicial proceedings to which prisoners of war may be subjected. Article
99 prohibits ex post facto application to a prisoner of war of any law of the Detaining Power or of in-
temational law. It also prohibits the use of "moral or physical coercion" to induce admission of guilt,
and provides that no prisoner ofwar may be convicted without having been granted the opportunity
to present a defense with "the assistance of qualified advocate or counsel." Under Article 102, a pris-
oner of war can only be validly sentenced if it is "pronounced by the same courts according to the
same procedure as in the case of members of the armed forces of the Detaining Power, and if, fur-
thermore, the provisions of the present Chapter have been observed." Further, confinement awaiting
trial cannot exceed three months (Article 103).
In defense of charges, war prisoners are entitled under Article 105 to the assistance of one of his
.prisoner comrades," to representation by a qualified advocate or counsel chosen by him, to the right
to call witnesses, and to the services of a qualified interpreter. Also, according to Article 105, the ad-
vocate or counsel shall have at least two weeks to prepare a defense and shall be provided with ade-
quate facilities to do so, to freely visit the accused in private, as well as to confer with any witnesses for
the defense, including other prisoners of war. The particulars of the charges against the prisoner of
war must be communicated to him or her, and defense counsel "in good time before the opening of
the trial" (Article 105).
Article 106 provides for the right of appeal from any sentence imposed, "with a view to quashing or
revising of the sentence or the reopening of the trial," in the same manner as the members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power would be able to appeal.
2W U.S. Trying To Sort Out 220 Detained in Cuba, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2002, at A26; Eric Schmitt,
U.S. Releasing 27 Captured in Raid, N.Y. TIMas, Feb. 7, 2002, at Al; Amy Waldman, In a Comic Mixup,
US. Frees 12 Afghans Suspected of Being Iranian Agents, N.Y'TMES, Mar. 21, 2002, at A18;James Dao, Pis-
onerHed at Cuba Camp Says He Is an American, N.Y. Ti ms, April 4, 2002, at A14.
261 See Louis Meixler, PremierFrees 320 Talban Prisoners, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 10, 2002, at A26.
Id. Mullah Ahmed Muttawaski, former Taliban foreign minister, is in United States custody in
Afghanistan while Mullah Fasal Maziloon, former chief of staff of the Taliban armed forces is a de-
tainee in Guant3inamo. See also Eric Schmitt, U.S. Takes Custody of a Qaeda Trainer Seized ty Pakistan
N.Y. TIMSJan. 5,2002, atAl.
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lawful combatants" subject to trial before military commissions, however,
is a different issue. Although chargeable under United States aider and
abetter and conspiracy statutes, a question exists whether such acts can
independently be considered violations of the laws of war,263 which is a
predicate for jurisdiction by a military commission under the Yamashita
doctrine, assuming Congress's failure to declare war is overlooked.
Membership in al Qaida and engaging in or aiding and abetting ter-
rorist acts or conspiracies whose object is to carry out such acts is the
strongest case for treating such persons as "unlawful combatants." Such
actions, when directed at unarmed civilian populations, are violations of
the common law of war, including treaty law.2 4 There should be no
doubt that the massive attacks against civilian targets in New York on
September 11, 2001, constitute violations of the law of war when commit-
ted by members of organized militias, s which al Qaida claims to be.
Under the Yamashita doctrine, in a congressionally declared war, such
persons are subject to trial by a military commission because they are
considered "unlawfiul combatants."26
A question exists as to whether mere membership in al Qaida, with-
out more, is sufficient for a valid conviction under the law of war or our
criminal statutes.267 But any foreign citizen who can be linked by compe-
m See generay supra note 168. Cf Neil A. Leis, U.S. Is Seeking Basis To Charge War Detainees, N.Y.
Tmms, Apr. 21, 2002, at Al ("Bush administration officials are considering a new legal doctrine that
would allow prisoners to be brought before military tribunals without specific evidence that they en-
gaed in war crimes."); Winginglt at Guantanamo, N.Y. Thms, Apr. 23,2002, atA22 (editorial).
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Tune of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,75 U.N.T.S. 287.
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, art. 4(2).
266 See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding statute that criminalizes know-
ing or willful advocacy to overthrow the U.S. government) and Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203
(1961) (sustaining conviction under Smith Act prohibited membership in organization advocating
overthrow of U.S. government), with Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (reversing and re-
manding conviction under Smith Act), Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961) (reversing and re-
manding conviction under Smith Act based on insufficient evidence showing defendant's actions were
calculated to incite overthrow), United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (finding portion of Sub-
versive Activities Control Act of 1950 prohibiting members of Communist Party to work in and De-
fense Facility to be overbroad and violative of the right to association under the First Amendment)
and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (striking down Ohio criminal statute that punished
mere advocacy). Mere presence at the scene of a crime, alone, is not evidence of guilt as an aider and
abetter. See Hicks v. United States, 150 U.S. 442, 447-48 (1893) (holding defendant's mere presence
at shooting is insufficient to sustain murder conviction); United States v. Gomez-Pabon, 911 F.2d 847,
853 (1st Cr. 1990) (holding presence at crime scene does not prove conspiracy); cf. United States v.
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (holding that mere presence in suspected car does not strip individ-
ual of immunity from search). See generaly Robert Plotidn, FIrst Amendment Challenges to the Membership
and Advocay Provisions of the Anti-Tenrisn and Effetive Death Penalty Act of 1996, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. UJ.
623 (1996) (criticizingAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which allows exclusion and de-
portation of aliens based on their membership in a terrorist organization); Keisha A.Gary, Note, Con-
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tent evidence to the September 11 attacks against civilians may be con-
sidered an unlawful belligerent subject to the jurisdiction of military
commissions, assuming valid authorization. They can, of course, also be
charged in the courts of the United States.
The proscription in Section 2(a) (1) (ii) against acts of international
terrorism, or in preparation thereof, "that have caused, threaten to
cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects
on ... the foreign policy, or economy"26 of the United States, presents a
novel problem particularly as applied to military, commissions. It ap-
pears to be overinclusive to the point of vagueness.2 Although there are
certain terrorist actions that have had clearly adverse effects on the for-
eign policy of the United States, such as the terrorist bombings of its
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the term "adverse effects" is often an
elusive one. The term "foreign policy" is merely an overall description of
a conglomerate of ideas and actions. It is hardly the subject of specificity
or certainty; in fact, at times it is altogether impossible to discern what is
foreign policy on a particular issue or point in time, especially as presi-
dential administrations change.
The problems caused by this uncertainty are exacerbated when ap-
plied to the standard, "adverse effects on... the.., economy' 27 by rea-
son of a terrorist act. Again, the adverse effects on the economy of the
crash of the two aircraft into the Twin Towers in New York, which physi-
cally destroyed a substantial part of the economic nerve center of the
United States are not in any serious doubt. But when one leaves the
heartland of such dramatic happenings,2 the focus becomes blurred
and there is an incursion into an area of cause and effect speculation not
normally permissible when criminal prosecution is the business at hand.
There is the added question, of course, whether terrorist acts against
the foreign policy or economy of a nation violate in an~manner the laws
of war. The proviso in Section 2(a) (2) of The Order, reserving to the
President the ultimate discretion whether to charge individuals, other-
wise meeting the criteria of The Order, according to whether it is "in the
interest of the United States," is not a mere recitation of the principle of
gasonProposals To Revive Guilt by Association" An Ineffective Plan To Stop Terorism, 8 GEO. IMMIG. LJ.
227 (1994) (arguing against exclusion of aliens based on association).
There is a further question whether the attack against the Pentagon on September 11 comes
within the purview of a military commission. Arguably such an attack was not upon a civilian target
and, thus, may not be contrary to the laws of war.
The Order, supra note 9, § 2(a) (1) (ii).
M A criminal statute must give fair notice of the conduct that is prohibited. SeeJordan v. De-
George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (invalidating criminal statute for vagueness); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964) (same). See generally A- Amsterdam, Note, The Voidfor-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court 109 U. PA. L REv. 67 (1960).
27 The Order, supra note 9, § 2(a) (1) (ii).
M David E. Sanger, Economic Forum Shils Its Focus to NewDangers, N.Y. TIrMs, Feb. 3, 2002, at A15.
SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 2(a) (2).
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prosecutorial discretion, although undoubtedly the executive branch has
that unique authority. It flags the fact that there are areas of sensitive in-
ternational relation s 4 and intelligence gathering,2 intermingled with
the law and order aspects promoted by The Order, which may require
the President to stay his hand in prosecuting otherwise culpable indi-
viduals.
Sections 2(b) and (c)27 state that it is the policy of the United States
for the Secretary of Defense to detain and try individuals subject to The
Order, and that all such persons be put under his custody and control.
This seems like a fairly straightforward proposition. Thereafter, this pol-
icy is put in effect by Sections 3 (Detention Authority of the Secretary of
Defense)2 and 4 (Authority of the Secretary of Defense Regarding Tri-
als of Individuals Subject to this Order),m which establish the authority
of the Secretary of Defense to detain and subject to trial by military
commissions the individuals covered by The Order, and set out the crite-
ria to be followed by him.
C. Offenses triable under The Order
Although the jurisdiction of the military commissions created under
The Order seems to be defined in terms of the individuals subject to The
Order,2 this jurisdiction appears to be expanded by the language of
Section 3.B of MCO No. 1, which provides that these commissions "shall
have jurisdiction over violations of the laws of war and all other offenses
triable by military comnission."2 °
The scope of the language is not certain. What is certain is that the
Secretary's regulation broadens the jurisdiction of these tribunals from
that of The Order when it was issued and whose original aim was di-
24 As an example, there is strong evidence that both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, officially and sub
rosa, lent material, and, in the case of the latter, considerable man power support to the Taliban, and
in the case of Pakistan, probably also to al Qaida. See generally RASHID, supra note 235, at 77, 176.
Nearly forty percent of the Taliban's fighters are from Pakistan. See Bill Nichols, Taliban May Be the
hrst Target of US. Retaliation for Ten-or Wave, USATODAY, Sept. 13,2001, atAS. In fact, Pakistan's Inter
Services Intelligence agency reputedly introduced bin Laden to the Taliban in 1996. See RAsHID, supra
note 235, at 181; see alsoJeffJacoby, Souring on Saudi Arabia Since Sept. 11, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 31,
2002, atA21.
It has been reported that detainees are being interrogated for purposes of gathering informa-
tion, not only to be used as evidence in the forthcoming trials, but also for intelligence purposes of
uncovering potential terrorist attacks. It would not be unusual for trade-offi to occur, in which infor-
mation is exchanged for anything from freedom to lesser penalties, as happens under our criminal
system. S eg., Gerard V. Bradley, Plea Bargaining and the Criminal Defendant's Obligation To Plead
Guilly, 40 S. TEx. L REV. 65 (1999).
&eThe Order, supra note 9, § 2 (b), (c).
2n I § 3.
slt § i
See id and prior topic heading.
MCO No. 1, supranote 9, § 3.B.
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rected at the September 11, 2001 acts of terrorism. As a practical matter,
however, it may be that the offenses charged under The Order will re-
main within the scope of its original intent.
D. The place of detention
The Secretary of Defense can detain individuals subject to The Order
in any "appropriate location.., outside or within the United States. "2s l
At present, persons are all being detained outside the United States
proper, in facilities located in Afghanistan, in the Guantfnamo Bay Na-
val Base in Cuba, and aboard United States naval vessels located in the
Indian Ocean.2 It appears that this course of action is taking place un-
der the perception that the detaining authorities will be able to act with-
out the constraints of the Constitution and laws of the United States be-
cause the detention is "outside" the United States. At least as to the
detentions in Afghanistan, this may be the case.2 As to those held
aboard U.S. ships and in Guantdnamo, the situation is not as clear.2
Considering that conditions aboard a U.S. vessel, and at the Guan-
tSinamo Base, are totally within the control of the United States govern-
ment, it is difficult to accept a principle that allows the government, itself
a creature of the Constitution, to be wholly outside its proscriptions. M
Let us first consider the question of those detained aboard United
States vessels. It is an accepted fiction of law, recognized in both mu-
28 Id. § 3(a).
2 SeeAnthony Shadid, U.S. EyingPitsoners To Base in Cuba, BoSrON GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2002, at Al;
Katharine Q. Seelye, irst 'Unlawful Combatants' Seized in Afghanistan Arrive at US. Base in Cuba, N.Y.
TIMEsJan. 12, 2002, atA7.
M SeeJohnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that habeas corpus relief is not avail-
able to an enemy alien to challenge a military commission when the crimes charged, the detention,
and the trial all occurred outside the United States); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (relying in part on the decision in Eisentrager that aliens are not entitled to Fifth
Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States to conclude that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to search and seizure by U.S. agents of property of a nonresident alien
located in a foreign country). Cf Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (re-
versing state court's decision that it had jurisdiction to hear lawsuit against foreign manufacturer);
United States v. Streifel, 665 F.2d 414 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding that principles applicable to investiga-
tory stops on land are applicable to the high seas); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.
1974) (holding that criminal defendant alleging he was brought into the United States after being
kidnapped wss entitled to an evidentiary hearing on such allegations). There are other considera-
tions, of a political and international relations nature, which are beyond the scope of this Article but
which may ultimately be decisive in resolving many of the issues under discussion.
2H These cannot be considered detentions "in the field," which is interpreted to mean "in an area
of actual fighting." Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1957).
"The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no
other source. It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution."
Reid 354 U.S. at 5-6. "The concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against
arbitrary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when expediency dictates
othenvise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish would destroy the benefit of a written
Constitution and undermine the basis of our Government." Id at 14.
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nicipal and international law, that a ship constitutes an integral part of
its territory and the laws of its flag are those that are applicable, at least
as to the governance of its internal affairs.2 This principle of territorial
integrity may be even more applicable to naval vessels, whose crews are
charged with the defense of their ships against any outside incursion,
and who are immune from even peaceful boarding without the consent
of the crew.27
That conclusion, in itself, does not end the inquiry, which can follow
one of two paths. The first is that detainees, being in U.S. territory, are
entitled to the protection of the Constitution, at least as to fundamental
rights.2 However, it seems logical to conclude that being a military ship,
it is subject to a different reginen of laws and rights than are applicable
in civilian national territory. This question is further complicated by
the fact that those detained aboard United States ships in the Indian
Ocean were mostly combatants, either lawful or, as is claimed by the gov-
ernment, unlawful.
The determination of a detainee's status depends upon an individual
inquiry into the relevant facts of each person's participation in unlawful
belligerent activities. It would seem that the government's initial deter-
mination of a detainee's unlawful combatant status would be subject to
challenge and ultimate determination in the courts.2 This has been the
past practice even in congressionally declared wars, and even in the face
of presidential orders proclaiming the lack of jurisdiction in the courts
to intervene in the matter. Any other course would lead to the anomaly,
unprecedented in our system of government, of the accuser determining
the rights of the accused.
The second alternative, one which does not appear promising, is for
the courts simply to conclude that persons in custody aboard a U.S. ves-
sel as a result of military capture, whether they be lawful or unlawful
combatants, are in a situation so far removed from what was contem-
plated by the Constitution, as to make the Constitution inapplicable. Al-
though these are largely uncharted waters, it is probably safe to say that
courts abhor a constitutional vacuum just as much as nature dislikes a
physical one. Thus, it seems unlikely that in the long run, any branch of
See United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 155-56 (1933) (applying United States law to crime
committed aboard United States flag vessel 250 miles up the Congo River); McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21 (1963) (holding that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act is inapplicable aboard foreign flag vessel even when in U.S. waters).
"Under international law, foreign flag vessels are generally accorded the right of undisturbed
navigation on the high seas." United States v. Rubies, 612 F.2d 397, 402 (9th Cir. 1979). If a nation
wishes to board a foreign flag vessel, it must obtain authorization from the nation whose flag the vessel
flies. See United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1979).
See, eg., Verdugo-Urquid; 494 U.S. at 259.
289See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that the military
is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.").
290 SeelnreYamashita, 327 US. 1 (1946); ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24 (1942).
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government can count on having such unfettered constitutional dispen-
sation.291
1. Is Guantdnamo an offshore Constitutional haven?
The practice of detaining persons in Guant~namo, particularly for
long periods of time,m presumably unencumbered by constitutional
scrutiny, is not new,24 but is becoming more prevalent, even outside of
the refugee context.2 ' The impression is given that the government
views Guantdnamo as an offshore haven beyond the reach of the Consti-
tution, something akin to the well-known tax or banking havens that ex-
ist throughout the Caribbean.2 6 Since the rights that aliens have under
the Constitution depend in large part on the status of the territory on
which they stand or where they claim that the violation took place, it is
incumbent upon us to explore further the status of our naval enclave in
Cuba.
291 "There cannot exist under the American flag any government authority untrammeled by the
requirements of due process of law...." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,
669 n.5 (1974) (citations omitted).
See Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); see also Zadvydas v. Davis,
533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001):
A statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional prob-
lem. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause forbids the government to 'deprive' any
Iperson ... of liberty... without due process of law.' Freedom from imprisonment-from
governmental custody, detention, or other form of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the
liberty that the Clause protects.
This may be an unwarranted assumption because the Supreme Court has on several occasions
held that various constitutional limitations apply to the government even when acting outside the con-
tinental United States. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 8 (1956) (as applied to citizens). In U.S. territo-
ries, see Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312-13 (1922) (due process of law); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138, 144-48 (1904) ("fundamental" constitutional rights); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S 244,
277 (1901) (First Amendment, prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder); Lamont v.
Woods, 948 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the Establishment Clause is applicable to federal
grants to religious schools abroad). Cf United States v. Verdugo-Urqufdez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990)
(holding that the Fourth Amendment is not applicable to a search conducted by U.S. officials in Mex-
ico of an alien's house).
See Mireya Navarro, Last of Refugees from Cuba In '94 Right Now Enter U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1,
1996, at Al (noting how Cuban refugees were detained in Guantinamo for nearly two years); see also
Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412 (11th Cir. 1995) (describing the conditions of the
detention of the Cuban and Haitian refugees in Guantinamo).
295 See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000).
See supra notes 292-306 and accompanying text.
2 "It is locality that is determinative of the application of the Constitution... not the status of the
people who live in it." Baza, 258 U.S. at 309 (holding that U.S. citizenship of Puerto Rican residents
is irrelevant to determination of what constitutional rights apply there); see also Ralpho v. Bell, 569
F.2d 607, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that fundamental constitutional rights apply in U.N. Trust
Territory to a national of that territory); Gov't of the Canal Zone v. Scott, 502 F.2d 566 (applying same
logic to the Canal Zone); United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227 (U.S.D.C. for Berlin, 1979) (same, for
alien tried in U.S.-occupied Berlin). But see Cuban Am. BarAss'n, 43 F.3d at 1424-25 (holding that the
Guaninamo Bay Naval Base is not "United States territory" to which constitutional rights apply).
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In 1903, the United States and Cuba entered into an "Agreement for
the Lease of the United States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval
Stations"' s (Lease). This agreement was a side product of the so-called
Platt Amendment to the Cuban Constitution whereby the United States
exercised considerable control over Cuba's internal affairs.2 The Lease
has no term and has now been in effect for ninety-nine years.
In 1934, the Lease was modified and continued in effect pursuant to
a treaty between both countries, in exchange for which the United States
gave up its rights under the Platt Amendment.' Article III of the Treaty
maintains in effect all of the provisions of the Lease governing the
United States Naval Base at Guantnamo, including the following:
While on the one hand the United States recognizes the continuance of the
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba over the above described areas
of land and water, on the other hand the Republic of Cuba consents that dur-
ing the period of the occupation by the United States of said areas under the terms
of this agreement the United States shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control over
and within said areas, with the right to acquire (under conditions to be here-
inafter agreed upon by the two Governments) for the public purposes of the
United States any land or other property therein by purchase or by exercise
of eminent domain with full compensation to the owners.301
The criminal laws of the United States apply to all persons on the
Base, and both aliens and citizens have been prosecuted for crimes
committed on the Base premises.m As a logical sequel to that proposi-
tion, it would further appear that the United States Naval Base at Guan-
tinamo "is subject to the exclusive control and jurisdiction of the United
States." 3 As quoted above, the United States even has the right to ac-
quire property by eminent domain, an authority that is usually associated
with the sovereign powers of the state.O
Because of the nature of the Lease and, thus, the undoubted prop-
erty interest that the United States has in the Base, it would appear, at
least while the United States occupies that enclave and exercises all the
29 Agreement for Lease of the United States Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, 6
Bevans 1113 (Feb. 23, 1903) [hereinafterAgreement for Lease].
2N See geray HuGH THOMAS, CUBA: THE PuRsuIrr OFFREEDOM (1971).
M Treaty between The United States of America and Cuba Defining their Relations, June 9, 1934,
48 Stat. 1682, 1934WL 29045.
301 Agreement for Lease, supra note 300, at 1114 (emphasis added).
United States v. Lee, 906 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. Rogers, 388 F. Supp. 298
(E.D. Va. 1975). See also 18 U.S.C. § 7 (defining "special maritime.. .jurisdiction of the United States"
for purposes of US. crimes).
Haitian Ctrs. Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342 (2d Cir. 1992) (emphasis added). Cf. In
Cuba, Muted Acceptance Greets Preence of Prisoners, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 2002, at AS. But see Cuban Arm
Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d at 1424-25 (rejecting the argument that U.S.-leased military bases
abroad which continue under the sovereignty of foreign nations are the functional equivalent of U.S.
territory).
504 United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 236 (1946) ("The power of eminent domain is essential
to a sovereign government.").
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powers normally associated with sovereignty to the exclusion of the Re-
public of Cuba, that the Constitution would apply in Guantunamo, by
virtue of its territorial clause.3°5 It would further appear that all persons
on the Base should, at a minimum, be entitled to "fundamental" rights
under the Constitution.-
2. To be prisoners of war or "unlawful combatants, "that is the question
The more specific question confronting us is whether the persons de-
tained in Guantinamo are either lawful or unlawful combatants. If they
are lawful combatants, which has to be decided on a case-by-case evalua-
tion, such a detainee would probably be entitled to prisoners of war
status. This will trigger the application of the Geneva Convention even
in Guantfnamo or aboard ships, which provides a whole panoply of ad-
ditional rights.30
7
The government has taken a somewhat ambivalent and inconsistent
position on the status of the detainees. Originally it claimed that all de-
tainees were unlawful combatants and, thus, not entitled to Geneva Con-
vention protection." The validity of this position requires a case-by-case
evaluation and presupposes presidential authority to issue The Order in
the first place. During congressionally declared wars, unlawful combat-
ants have enjoyed few rights, although under Qyirin and Yamashitajudi-
cial oversight over the military commissions was exercised through ha-
W5 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("The Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other property belonging to the United
States").
The United States' relationship to the Guantqnamo property appears similar to that of Great Brit-
ain to Hong Kong, over which it exercised sovereignty until its lease with China expired on July 1,
1997. See A Draft Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land and the Government of the Peoples Republic of China on the Future of Hong Kong Sept. 26, 1984, 23
I.LM. 1366 (1984); Susan L. Karamanian, Legal Aspects of the Sino-British Draft Agreement on the Future of
HongKong 20 T x. INT'L LJ., 167, 182-83 (1985).
Wo See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (stating that "only 'fundamen-
tal' constitutional rights are guaranteed to inhabitants of... territories" not clearly destined for state-
hood).
W See supra note 259.
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Detainees Are Not P.O.W.'s Cheney and Rumsfeld Declare, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 2002, at A6. An intense public debate has developed over this issue. SeeA] Neuharth, So, We're at
War, but No "risoners, 'USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 2002, at A15; Charles M. Sennott, U.S. Handling of War Cap-
tivesDrawire, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2002, atAl; Serge Schmemann, Prisoners, Surely. ButP.O.W's
N.Y. TIMIs,Jan. 27, 2002, § 4, at 14; Katharine Q. Seelye, Powell Asks Bush To Review Stand on War Cap-
tives, N.Y. TIMEsJan. 27, 2002, at Al; Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. and Senate Clash Over Bush Actions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2001, at B7; Alberto R. GonzAles, MartialJustice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30,
2001, at B3. Most recently, the United States has modified its position on the status of the detainees to
the extent that Taliban captives will be accorded Geneva Convention treatment, but will not be
granted prisoner of war status. See Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva Rules Fit Taliban Cap-
tives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at Al. This position is strongly contested by the International Red Cross
and several of our European allies. See Diluting the Geneva Convention, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2002, at A26.
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beas corpus proceedings in the face of presidential directives barring
such review.
The government's initial position has now been modified, with the
Administration asserting that Taliban members will be accorded rights
under the Geneva Conventions, but not prisoner of war status, while al
Qaida members will continue to be considered unlawful combatants.
E. Standards of detention
Sections 3 (b) through (e) spell out the conditions under which indi-
viduals subject to The Order are to be detained.m They contain no sur-
prises and are the minimum that would be expected of the United
States."'
Detainees are to be "treated humanely, without any adverse distinc-
tions based on race, color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar
circumstance. 31 They are to be "afforded adequate food, drinking wa-
ter, shelter, clothing, and medical treatment, 1 "allowed the free exer-
cise of religion," and "such other conditions as the Secretary of Defense
may prescribe.
'313
Although these are all requirements of the Geneva accords, they are
not coextensive with the conditions of these treaties. 4
F. The trials before the military commissions
In many ways Section 415 is at the heart of The Order, for it punctu-
ates the process to be followed in the trials before the military commis-
sions created by this presidential directive. However, it relates not only
to procedure. In fact, in its very first paragraph, it sets out the standards
and boundaries of the military commissions' sentencing authority. To
such effect, it establishes that those individuals subject to The Order
shall be tried before military commissions for all offenses so triable and
SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 3 (b), (c), (d), (e).
310 There is, nevertheless, the perception that the detention does not comply with minimum hu-
mane standards. See Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. To Hold Taliban Detainees in 'the Least Worst Place 'N.Y.
ThMEs, Dec. 28, 2001, at B6;James Dao, US. Is Taking War Captives to Cuba Base NY. TIMs,Jan. 11,
2002, at Al; Wayne Washington, Rumsfeld Defends Detainee Conditions, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 28, 2002, at
Al; Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfdd Defends Treatment By US. of Cuba Detainees, N.Y. TIMs,,Jan. 23, 2002,
at Al; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. Suspends the Transport of Terror Suspeds to Cuba, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan.
24,2002, at Al.
3 SeeThe Order, supranote 9, § 3(b).
312 Id. § 3(c).
1 Id. § 3(d), (e).
See supra note 259.
31 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4.
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"may be punished in accordance with the penalties provided under ap-
plicable law, including life imprisonment or death."31
The power to impose the death sentence will be presently discussed
from a constitutional perspective. However, there are other issues raised
by this provision. If extradition is sought of any individual subject to The
Order from any of the fifteen member nations of the European Union in
which the death penalty has been renounced, it is unlikely that it will be
granted.317
Several questions are raised by the phrase "penalties in accordance
with applicable law" in Section 4(a). The first question is what is the ap-
plicable law and where does one find it? It is a basic principle of federal
law, one that has existed from the beginnings of the Republic, that there
is no federal criminal common law. All federal criminal law is statu-
tory.-Is Although there are several federal criminal statutes that pro-
scribe some, if not all, of the acts that The Order penalizes, these laws
could only be referenced by analogy, a Soviet legal technique that has
been soundly rejected by our courts. 9
Although the Uniform Code of Military Justice is a federal statute,m
there are several problems raised by attempts to apply it to this situation.
As we have previously discussed, this Code only applies to prisoners of
war for crimes committed after capture.32 l In the present circumstances,
the government is focused on acts allegedly committed by the detainees
before they were captured, and is denying that they are entitled to pris-
oner of war status, because it is claimed that those acts were violations of
the laws of war. Even if the Code were to apply, however, there does not
appear to be any penalty authorized by the President under Article 56.322
If The Order is the basis for authorization under Article 56, there is the
316 Id. § 4(a).
317 See Spain To Study US. Requests To Extradite Terror Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2002, at A15. Al-
though the death penalty issue is likely to crystallize foreign opposition to The Order, there are grow-
ing signs that there are other areas of concern. See Serge Schmemann, Swedes Take Up the Cause of 3 on
US. Terror List, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26, 2002, at A7; Barbara Crossette, Diplomats Protest Lack of Information,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2001, at B5; James Brooke, Unease Grows in Philippines on US. Forces, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 19, 2002, at Al; see also BRIAN McALuSTER IUNN, THE PIIuPPiNE WAR, 1899-1902 (2000); Clifford
Krauss, Canada's Transfer of Prisoners to US. Roils Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2002, at A12; cf. Philip
Shenon, Britain Defends US. Treatment of Detainees at Guantdnamo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, at A12;
Suzanne Daley, French Minister Calls US. Policy 'Simplistic, 'N.Y TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A14; Indira A.R.
Lakshmanan, Indonesia's Wdlingness in Terror War Questione4, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al;Jane
Perdez, The HdpingHand Ges Limp Shakes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2002, § 4, at 5.
318See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137,
151-52 (1933).
319 See United States v. Anzalone, 766 F.2d 676 (1st Cir. 1985).
0 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-950.
See supra note 186.
10 U.S.C. § 856 (U.C.M.J. Art. 56) ("The punishment which a court-martial may direct for an
offense may not exceed such limits as the President may prescribe for that offense."). The provisions
relating to maximum limits of punishment are found in the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States,
1984, Part II, Rule 1003, and Part IV, 48 Fed. Reg. 17152.
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added problem that it was issued on November 13, 2001, after the terror-
ist attacks of September 11th-its application to prior acts exposes it to
challenge as an invalid ex post facto rule 323
A possible problem also arises if the military commissions are based
on Yamashita3 They would be considered military tribunals authorized
by the "common law of war," not the U.S.M.J.2s5 The presidential order
that was the basis for the trial and punishment of General Yamashita and
the German saboteurs was in effect prior to the time of the acts that vio-
lated the law of war. 6 The same is not true today, although it can be al-
leged that the 1949 Geneva Convention for the protection of civilian
persons in time of war was sufficient warning that such attacks would vio-
late the laws of war. Unlike The Order, the Convention does not pro-
vide for penalties.
It is unlikely that the imposition of any sentence by the military
commissions, particularly if they involve long prison sentences or capital
punishment, will avoid judicial scrutiny for long.
Paragraph (b) of Section 43t starts with a theme that is repeated
elsewhere in The Order, invoking a "military function" as the basis for
The Order. The purpose of this language is to exclude The Order from
the strictures of the Administrative Procedures Act,Sta which removes
from rulemaking procedure any agency action involving military or for-
eign affairs fumctions. This seems an appropriate premise, considering
how the individuals covered by The Order were detained and other cir-
cumstances surrounding the issuance of this directive.
In any event, pursuant to Section 4(b), the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to issue orders and regulations, including the appointment of
one or more military commissions as required to carry out any trials.
MCO No. 1 was issued pursuant to this provision,33 1 although no one has
yet been appointed to any commission. Under Section 4(c),33 MCO No.
1 shall govern the procedures of the military commissions, including pre-
trial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process,
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, c. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.").
24 In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
" Seel kat20.
Proclamation No. 2561, which is relevant to both the Quirin and Yamashita cases, is directed to
"subjects, citizens or subjects of any nation at war with the United States" and "during time of war,"
neither of which are prevalent conditions in the present circumstances. See Proclamation No. 2561, 7
Fed. Reg. 5101 (1942).
SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4(b).
Id § 5(a). As noted earlier, MCO No. 1 has labeled The Order the "President's Military Order."
See supra note 36.
5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1).
= Id. § 554(a) (4).
33 Seesupranote 9.
SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4(c).
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and qualifications of attorneys. At a minimum, these regulations to be
issued must provide that:
1. The Commissions may sit at any time and place consistent with guidelines
established by the Secretary ofDefense
3
3
This provision, as well as others yet to be discussed, sets the tone as to
what to expect in the proceedings before military commissions: a short
leash will be kept on the process through the executive and military
chain of command.3m If this is in fact the case, these proceedings are in-
deed the antithesis of criminal trials before the United States courts,
and, to some extent, even the normal military trials covered by the
U.C.MJ.3s
5
This provision raises issues of where individuals charged under The
Order will be detained and tried. Trying to avoid entanglement with the
United States courts through habeas corpus petitions and similar ex-
traordinary procedures, these trials may be held outside the United
States, with GuantAnamo Bay Naval Base being the most probable venue.
Whether GuantAnamo is actually a non-U.S.jurisdiction is an unresolved
question.36
Id. § 4(c) (1). See also MCO No. 1, supra note 9, § 6.B.4.
3M Cf. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 1.
Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 826(c) (U.C.MJ. Art. 26):
Unless the court-martial was convened by the President or the Secretary [of the Service] con-
cerned, neither the convening authority nor any member of his staff shall prepare or review
any report concerning the effectiveness, fitness, or efficiency of the militaryjudge so detailed,
which relates to his performance of duty as a militaryjudge.
Under Article 37(a) (10 U.S.C. § 837(a)):
[n]o authority convening a general, special, or summary courts-martial, nor any commanding
officer, may censure, reprimand, or admonish the court or any member, military judge, or
counsel thereof, with respect to the findings or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect
to any other exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding.
Attempts to coerce or influence these tribunals or their members are also proscribed thereunder.
Paragraph (b) of Article 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837(b), also prohibits the conduct or rulings of a member of a
courts-martial in preparing fitness or similar reports used for promotions, assignments or transfers, or
for retention in the armed forces.
Military commissions are specifically excluded from mention as deserving these safeguards, not-
withstanding that they are distinctly referred to, separately from "courts-martial ... and other military
tribunal" in the prior Article, Article 36, which authorizes the President to prescribe the procedures
for the various military courts. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (U.C.VLJ. Art. 836(a)).
See supra notes 292-306; Haitian Ctrs. Council v. Sale, 823 F. Supp. 1028, 1041 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(noting that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to the United States Naval Base at
Guantinamo, Cuba which is subject to the exclusivejurisdiction and control of the United States, and
where the criminal and civil laws of the United States apply). See also United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D.
227, 249-53 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (holding that fundamental constitutional rights attach to non-
citizens in territory subject to exclusive U.S. jurisdiction and control); Government of Canal Zone v.
Scott, 502 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying same holding to the Canal Zone); Ralpho v. Bell,
569 F.2d 607, 618-19 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (applying same holding to the Pacific Trust Territories); Nitol v.
United States, 7 C1. Ct. 405 (1985) (same); cf. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (ruling that
United States citizens in Puerto Rico are not entitled to constitutional protection of trial byjury). But
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The Guant~namo venue raises additional Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment questions that are portentous in nature. Conducting what will
likely be weighty criminal trials, some of which may charge capital of-
fenses, in the isolated environment of the Guantnamo Naval Base will
likely entail considerable difficulties, if not outright impediments, to the
defense lawyers. These problems are not limited to client accessibility,
but also to the fact that the defense attorneys will be separated in very
practical and physical ways from the support of their offices, staff, and
practices for long periods of time. A direct effect of this is not only to
limit the pool of qualified lawyers from which detainees will be able to
draw legal aid, but also to undoubtedly affect the quality of the attorneys'
work product. Most important, accessibility to defense witnesses and
evidence, much of it thousands of miles away, will also be a major prob-
lem, although this may very well be the case even if the trials are held in
the courts of the United States.
2. A full and fair trial shall be conducted before the military commissions sitting
as the triers of bothfact and law37
With the issuance of MCO No. 1 a clearer picture emerges as to what
is meant by this provision. Pursuant to Section 4.A.2, the commission
shall be composed of between three and seven members, which accord-
ing to paragragh 3 shall be commissioned officers of the United States
armed forces. These, as well as the alternate members, are appointed
by the "Appointing Authority" from persons "determined to be compe-
tent to perform the duties involved" and are subject to removal by the
Appointing Authority for "good cause. '' 3'
The Appointing Authority shall designate a Presiding Officer who
"shall be a Military Officer who is ajudge advocate of any United States
armed force." The Presiding Officer shall have initial authority to rule
upon admission of evidence' and the closure of proceedings.3
A Chief Prosecutor shall be appointed to supervise the overall prose-
cution efforts under The Order. The Chief Prosecutor shall be a judge
cf Cuban Am. Bar Ass'n v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1424-25 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base is not "United States territory" to which constitutional rights apply); Bird
v. United States, 923 F. Supp. 338 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding that the Federal Tort Claims Act does not
apply to accident in United States base in Guantdnamo because sovereignty over this enclave still lies
in the Republic of Cuba and, thus, the accident comes within the "foreign country" exception to that
statute, whereby there is no waiver of U.S. sovereign immunity to suit).
SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4(c) (2).
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advocate of any United States armed force.4 3 The Chief Prosecutor shall
be assisted by a Prosecutor and, as appropriate, one or more Assistant
Prosecutors, who may be judge advocates of any United States armed
force or special trial counsel of the Department ofJustice.344 The Prose-
cutor shall prepare charges for approval by the Appointing Authority,
conduct the prosecutions, and "represent the interests of the Prosecu-
tion in any review process. "
MCO No. 1 also enumerates the rights of the accused before the mili-
tary commissions which include, in addition those already mentioned:
(A) [to be provided] sufficiently in advance of trial to prepare a defense, a
copy of the charges being in English and, if appropriate, in another language
that the Accused understands.
(B) [the] presum[ption of] innocen[ce] until proven guilty.
(C) [a standard of guilt of] beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evi-
dence admitted at trial.
(D) [a] t least one Detailed Defense Counsel ... sufficiently in advance of
trial to prepare a defense and until any findings and sentence become fi-
nal ....
(E) ... access to evidence the Prosecution intends to introduce at trial and
with access to evidence known to the Prosecution that tends to exculpate the
Accused ....
(F) ... not [to] be required to testify during trial. A Commission shall draw
no adverse inference from an Accused's decision not to testify. This ... shall
not preclude admission of evidence of prior statements or conduct of the Ac-
cused.
(G) [to] testify at trial on the Accused's own behalf....
(H) [to] obtain witnesses and documents for the Accused's defense, to the
extent necessary and reasonably available [with] such investigative or other
resources.., available to the Defense as the Appointing Authority deems
necessary for a full and fair trial.
(I) [to have] Defense Counsel present evidence at trial in the Accused's de-
fense and cross examine each witness presented by the Prosecution who ap-
pears before the Commission.
J) [to have] the substance of the charges, the proceedings, and any docu-
mentary evidence.., provided in English and, if appropriate, in another lan-
guage that the Accused understands. The Appointing authority may appoint
one or more interpreters to assist the Defense, as necessary.
(K) [to] be present at every stage of the trial before the Commis-
sion... unless the Accused engages in disruptive conduct that justifies exclu-
M Id. § 4.B.1.
Id- § 4.B.2.
35 Id, § 4.B.2.a-c.
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sion by the Presiding officer. Detailed Defense Counsel may not be excluded
from any trial proceeding or portion thereof.
(L) ... access before sentencing proceedings to evidence the Prosecution in-
tends to present in such proceedings.
(M) [to] make a statement during sentencing proceedings.
(N) [to] have Defense Counsel submit evidence to the Commission during
sentencing proceedings.
(0) [to] a trial open to the public (except proceedings closed by the Presid-
ing Officer) ....
(P) ... not [to] be tried by any Commission for a charge once a Commis-
sion's finding on that charge becomes final ....
36
As a basis for comparison, it may be useful to describe the procedure
under the U.C.MJ. for courts-martial convened pursuant to Article 22,34
which are generally referred to as a general court-martial. In those pro-
ceedings, the presiding officers must be commissioned officers of the
armed forces who are attorneys licensed to practice and who must be
certified as qualified to serve as military judges by their respective Judge
Advocate Generals. The military judge makes all rulings of law 9 and
does not participate in the deliberations of the members of the courts-
martial, who function as ajury.2° The composition of the courts-martial,
whose number is determined by Article 16 ,-6' depends largely on the
rank of the accused.s 2 Although initially appointed by the convening
authority, both the military judge and the members of the courts-martial
are subject to challenge pursuant to procedures detailed in Article 4 1 .2s
It is important to mention that those subject to court-martial are enti-
tled to most, if not all, of the constitutional protections available in civil-
ian courts.3 These include the right to counsel, which attaches at the
investigative stage and allows the rght to cross examine witnesses even at
that early juncture in the process; the right to be free from compulsory
6Id. § 5.
47 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1999) (U.C.MJ. Art. 22).
Id § 826(b) (U.C.MJ. Art. 26(b)).
Id- § 851(b) (U .C. .Art. 51(b)).
Wo Id See also 10 U.S.C. § 851 n.13 (describing thejury-like duties of a court-martial, including de-
termining the credibility of a witness, the weight of evidence, reasonable doubt as to guilt, inferences
to be drawn from facts, interest or bias of witnesses, and "Vhere the truth lies").
s35 Id § 816 (U.C.MJ. Art. 16) (noting that a general court martial consists of not less than five
members or a militaryjudge; a special court martial consists of three members or a military judge; a
summary court martial consists of one commissioned officer).
M Id § 825(d) (2) (U.C.J. Art. 25) ("When it can be avoided, no member of an armed force may
be tried by a court martial [the] member[s] of which [are] junior to him in rank").
5 Id. § 841 (U.CMXJ. Art. 41).
34See genera!y Robinson 0. Everett, TheLaw of War Military Tibunals and the War on Teroism, F D.
LA.w. (Nov.-Dec. 2001);J. Gordon Forester, Jr. & KevinJ. Barry, Miitary Commisions, FED. L. W. (Feb.
2000).
10 U.S.C. § 832(b) (U.C.MJ. Art. 32(b)).
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self incrinination;5 and the right not to be put twice in jeopardy for the
same offense. 7
The procedure followed in courts-martial is not much different from
that of the United States courts, although the President can, as he pur-
ports to do in Section 1 (f) of The Order, by regulation "so far as he con-
siders practicable, apply [or not] the principles of law and the rules of
evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal cases in the United
States district courts, but which may not be contrary to or inconsistent
with" the U.C.MJ.? Thus the evidence at a court-martial is generally
presented as in the federal courts, with rulings on evidence by the mili-
tary judge, and with the right of confrontation and cross examination of
witnesses respected.359 Depositions generally may be taken and used by
both the government and the defensen under circumstances not unlike
that which is allowed in United States courtsy61 with the sole exception
being that in capital cases only the defense is entitled to take and use
depositions at trial. As previously discussed, this was one of the major is-
sues raised by General Yamashita in his appeal to the Supreme Court,
which he lost when the Court ruled that a military commission created
under the common law of war was outside the purview of the Articles of
War, the predecessor to the U.C.MJ., thereby allowing the use of deposi-
tions against him.362 This may very well be an important issue under The
Order considering the geographic dispersion of the prospective wit-
nesses and the isolated nature of Guant~namo, the likely venue.63
Lastly, the U.C.M.J. provides that the members of the courts-martial,
after receiving instruction from the military judge on the applicable law,
shall deliberate and determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. A
presumption of innocence attaches, and guilt must be "established by le-
gal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt.",
On many fronts, we can see that the contrast between the procedures
and standards under the U.C.MJ. and those of The Order is consider-
able.an
l56 Id§ 831 (U.C.MJ. Art. 31).
57 Id. § 844 (U.C.M.J. Art. 44).
Id. § 836(a) (U.C.M.J. Art. 36(a)).
69 See generaly Manual for Courts-Martial, Exec. Order No. 12,473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17152 (Apr. 13,
1984);J. Gordon Forester, Jr. and KevinJ. Barry, Military omissi, FED. LAIV. (Feb. 2000); Angle v.
Laird, 429 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1970) (involving right to confrontation ofwitnesses).
36 10 U.S.C. § 849 (U.C.M.J. Art. 849).
$6 SeeFed. R. Crim. P. 15.
m6 In reYamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 20 (1946).
Of course, similar concerns will arise if the trials should be held aboard ships, or even in United
States courts.
10 U.S.C. § 851. (U.C.M.J. Art. 851) (1999).
See DO] Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Tenorism: Hearing on "Military
Commissions" Before Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Dec. 4, 2001) (statement of Maj. Gen.
Michael J. Nardoatti, Jr.), available at 2001 WL 26188000. For a graphic, if somewhat sketchy, com-
parison of proceedings in the federal courts, courts-martial, and military commissions pursuant to The
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3. Evidence shall be admitted as will have, in the opinion of the presiding officer,
probative value to a reasonable man'
This is a very lax standard for admissibility of evidence, particularly
for a criminal proceeding with consequences that might entail long pe-
riods of imprisonment or even death and where there is no appeals pro-
cess for evidentiary matters.? The fact that it is for use in a military trial,
or rather, in a trial before a military commission, should not be an an-
swer sufficient to uphold this open-ended norm which is impossible to
predict and even more difficult to challenge. Almost any rumor or hear-
say, no matter how far removed, could have some probative value and
would, thus, theoretically be sufficient for admission, since the rule gives
no standard as to how much probative value is required to convince "a
reasonable man," that most elusive of legal fictions. Furthermore, if the
Yamashita majority rule still prevails, "the commission's rulings on evi-
dence .... are not reviewable by the courts, but only by the reviewing
military authorities. From this viewpoint it is unnecessary to consider
what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might require."3
Thus, as the law now stands,3 military commissions need not meet
any discernible due process standards in admitting evidence. Whether
this dispensation from Fifth Amendment application extends to the con-
frontation requirements of the Sixth Amendment70 has not been specifi-
cally decided in a military commission setting.37'
4. Classified or classifiable evidence72shall be protected from unauthorized
disclosure by reason of its handling admission into evidence,
and access to the same, and because of the conduct, closure of
and access to the proceedings'
73
From the emphasis placed on this subject by MCO No. 1, it is clearly
apparent that protection of intelligence sources and sensitive informa-
tion from unnecessary disclosure are a major concern of the Secretary of
Defense. 74 These are legitimate national security issues. It may be useful
to point out, however, that United States courts routinely hear cases in
Order (as amended by MCO No. 1), see Katharine Q. Seelye, Government Sets Rulesfor Miitary on War
TribunaLs, N.Y. Tis, Mar. 21,2002, atAl,A12 (chart entitled "Rules for MilitaryTribunals").
Sff SeeThe Order, supranote 9, § 4(c) (3).
36 See Yamashfta, 327 U.S. at 23.
Id. 327 U.S. at 23.
See MCO No. 1, supra note 9, § 6.D.1.
" US. CoNsr. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be
confronted wvith the witnesses against him").
M But see Yamoshita, 327 U.S. at 23.
m SeeExec. Order No. 12,958,60 Fed. Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995).
SeeThe Order, supranote 9, § 4(c) (4).
S74 SeeMCO No. 1, supra note 9, §§ 4.A.5.a, 4.C3.b.iv, and 6.B.3.
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which these questions exist, both in the criminal and civil settings, and
that there are in place satisfactory, time tested procedures for handling
them,37s although undoubtedly they could be improved.
There are two aspects to this part of The Order. The first concerns
disclosure of the information to persons directly involved in the proceed-
ings. At the trial level this includes the members of the military commis-
sion and staff, the prosecutors and their staff, defense lawyers and their
staff, the accused, interpreters, court reporters, clerks of court, those
witnesses as may be required to testify and in some manner be exposed
to the secret evidence, and investigators. Depending on the levels of in-
temal (i.e., non-judicial) appeals available, additional persons also may
come within the scope of this provision. Lastly, those courts with juris-
diction both at the trial and appellate levels, including eventually the
Supreme Court, and their various components, will also be restricted by
The Order. It is appropriate to suggest that existing congressional en-
actments for the courts are a possible guideline for dealing with this
376situation.
Pursuant to Section 4.A.5.a of MCO No. 1, the Presiding Officer has
the authority to close the proceedings or portions thereof to prevent the
disclosure of "classified or classifiable" information, to protect the physi-
cal safety of the participants in the proceedings, including prospective
witnesses; intelligence and law enforcement sources, methods, or activi-
ties; and other national security interests, and for "any other reason nec-
essary for the conduct of a full and fair trial."3r7 This decision can in-
clude the exclusion of the Accused and/or his civilian defense counsel,
but not his "Detailed Defense Counsel" (i.e., his appointed military law-
yer) .y
The second closely related issue raised by this portion of The Order
refers at least in part to questions involving the openness, or rather lack
of openness, of a trial before a military commission. This is an important
issue. The more public or open these proceedings are, the less weight
will be given to charges of governmental heavy handedness, both as to
the way they are conducted as well as to their eventual outcome.
See Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 3 (1999). See United States v. Mi-
mavicius-Viloria, 144 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121 (D.C. Cir.
1998); United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795
(2d Cir. 1996); In reNorth, 37 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v. Baptista-Rodriguez, 17 F.3d
1354 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Wilson, 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. McVeigh,
923 F. Supp. 1310 (D. Colo. 1996); United States v. Rezaq, 899 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C 1995); United
States v. Cardoen, 898 F. Supp. 1563 (S.D. Fla. 1995); United States v. Musa, 833 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.
Mo. 1993); Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 830 F. Supp. 19 (D.D.C. 1993); United
States v. Poindexter, 123 F.RD. 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
376 See Classified Information Procedures Act app. § 3.
__ SeeMCO No. 1, supra note 9, §§ 4A5.a, 6.B.3.
Id § 6.B.3.
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The question that arises is whether the Sixth Amendment's require-
ment of a public trialP is binding on military commissions. This appears
to be an open question, although there are obviously some basic consti-
tutional doctrines to be kept in mind.
The right to a public trial in criminal cases predates the founding of
our nation by several centuries.an This right has both individual and so-
cietal components, the first component being principally of Sixth
Amendment concern, while the second one brings into play mostly First
Amendment values. An individual facing criminal charges has an inter-
est in having a public trial because this may encourage witnesses to come
forward with evidence in his favor, because the presence of the public
and press help to keep the prosecution and judge within proper bounds,
and because an accused may want the presence of family and friends for
support during what is, at best, a difficult experience.Yl
The public also has a constitutionally protected interest in public tri-
als.3n Public trials can educate the public about the criminal justice sys-
tem and allow it to watchdog the system's operation. The ability to ob-
serve the judicial process, particularly in cases of renowned notoriety,
serves weighty cathartic functions not only to the general citizenry, but
more importantly, to the victims and their families. Thus, "[a]bsent an
overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case
must be open to the public."3a Furthermore, it is settled law that when
trial proceedings or records are closed to the public, media representa-
tives have standing to object.3
These principles notwithstanding, an overriding interest in closed or
partially closed proceedings may exist in a case involving state secrets or
in which evidence implicates national security concerns.a" However, as
M U.S. CONSr. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a... public trial.").
Lord Coke, in referring to rights established in the Satutum de Marlebridge of 1267, noted the
need "that all causes ought to be heard, ordered, and determined... openly in the King's courts." E.
COKE, SEcoND INsITrUEs 103.
SeeWaller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 571 (1980) ("The crucial prophylactic
aspects of the administration ofjustice cannot function in the dark.").
a & at 581. See also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct., 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984):
The presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on find-
ings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that in-
terest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing
court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered.
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 602 (1982) (granting newspaper standing to
sue and holding that state statute prohibiting public from being present in criminal trial of specified
sexual offense involving victims under age eighteen, violated the First Amendment); see also Richmond
Newspapers Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980) (noting that the news media "enjoy the same
right of access [to courts] as the public").
See United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (closure to protect safeguards against air
piracy).
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previously indicated, there are procedures in place in the United States
courts for such contingencies.
On a closely related point, if trials are held at Guantdnamo, the pro-
ceedings may de facto be closed to the public. Such a setting will im-
pact the ability of the families of the thousands of victims of the Septem-
ber 11 attacks to attend the proceedings. In the Oklahoma Bombing
case this problem was ameliorated somewhat by providing closed circuit
television viewing of the McVeigh trial. However, in that case, there was
at least the theoretical opportunity to personally attend the proceedings
by traveling to Denver. This will not be the case if the trials are held in
the Guantinamo Bay Naval Base because access is completely controlled
by the government, and facilities for civilian visitors are limited at best.37
Various provisions of MCO No. 1 attempt to deal with these issues.
Section 6.B.3 provides that proceedings will be open unless "otherwise
decided by the Appointing Authority or the Presiding Officer in accor-
dance with the President's Military Order and this Order."m Open pro-
ceedings may include, at the discretion of the Appointing Authority, at-
tendance by the public and accredited press.
Because of the physical isolation of the likely venue of these trials,
this might be an appropriate setting for some type of electronic record-
ing of the proceedings. MCO No. 1, however, prohibits any such possi-
bilities.39°
It is evident that MCO No. 1 raises as many issues about the openness
of the proceedings as it attempts to solve. This may well be an area of
major contention involving the rights of both the accused and the press.
5. The conduct of the prosecution by attorneys designated by the Secretary of
Defense and the conduct of the defense by attorneys for the individuals subject to
The rder
91
This provision in The Order receives considerable attention in MCO
No. 1. As the provisions on prosecutors' conduct have already been dis-
cussed,392 this Section will focus on the provisions on the conduct of de-
fense attorneys.
Under the general title of "Commission Personnel," MCO No. 1, in
addition to listing the Commission members and the Prosecutor's staff,
% See Note, Trial Secrecy and the Frst Amendment Right of Public Access toJudicialProceedings. 91 NARV.
L REV. 1899 (1978).
387 Travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens is also restricted. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
38 MCO No. 1, supra note 9, § 6.B.3. See also id. § 5.0.
9Id.
M Id.
391 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4(c) (5).
See supra note 343 and accompanying text.
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lists the Defense. 9 3 It establishes an "Office of the Chief Defense Coun-
sel," staffed by a Chief Defense Counsel, who shall be ajudge advocate of
any United States armed force, and who shall supervise the overall de-
fense efforts under The Order. The accused has apparently no choice in
this anomalous situation, one which is without an equivalent in the civil-
ian criminal system.9 4
In addition to this general defense counsel, MCO No. 1 provides for
a "Detailed Defense Counsel." This position is filled by a military officer
who is ajudge advocate of any United States armed force. The Detailed
Defense Counsel conducts the defense of each case tried before the
Commission.395 Detailed Defense Counsel are charged with defending
the "[a] ccused zealously within the bounds of the law without regard to
personal opinion as to the guilt of the Accused."396 This Detailed De-
fense Counsel may be substituted at the request of the Accused by an-
other military officer.397
The Accused is also entitled to retain the service of a civilian attorney
of his own choosing and at his own expense.39s This Civilian Defense
Counsel must be a citizen of the United States, admitted to the practice
of law in a state, district, territory, or possession of the United States, or
admitted to practice before a federal court. He or she must also not
have been the subject of any disciplinary action, and must have been de-
termined eligible for access to information classified at the level SECRET
or higher, and must have signed a written agreement to comply with all
applicable regulations or instructions for counsel, including any rules of
court for conduct during the course of proceedings.3"
Representation by Civilian Defense Counsel does not relieve Detailed
Defense Counsel, and the qualification of Civilian Defense Counsel does
not guarantee his~resence at dosed proceedings or, access to any classi-
fied information. The accused, however, must be represented at all
relevant times at least by Detailed Defense Counsel.401
These provision of The Order and the subsequent MCO No. 1 leave
one with an uncertain, perhaps undefinable uneasiness concerning the
status of the defense, particularly with regard to the use of Civilian De-
fense Counsel. This, together with the de facto establishment of two
M SeeMCO No. 1, supra note 9, § 4.B.1.
394 Public defenders are not supervisors of the defense of any defendant who has not voluntarily
accepted or sought their aid, and certainly not in multi-defendant situations in which conflicts of in-
terest are likely to arise. Furthermore, public defenders are appointed by the courts, not the Justice
Department.
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categories of defense counsel imposed by the government, with one
category having access to information that may be barred from Civilian
Defense Counsel, constitutes a highly anomalous situation. When one
adds to that a provision such as that found in Section 4A5.c to the effect
that "[i]n no circumstance shall accommodation of counsel be allowed
to delay proceedings unreasonably,"r one cannot but feel that Civilian
Defense Counsel may be sorely tried to adequately represent their cli-
ents.4°3
It is not clear what is intended by this language. It may be a simple
designation that the Secretary of Defense appoints the prosecuting at-
torney and the accused's defense lawyer. However, it would be unneces-
sary to have a regulation for those purposes. An alternative interpreta-
tion is that a regulation will be issued to regulate attorney behavior in
the courtroom. Although every tribunal has rules of conduct applicable
to all attorneys practicing before it, these are not usually imposed unilat-
erally on the bar by the regulating court, but rather are jointly agreed to
by bench and bar. There is a danger that rules of conduct may go be-
yond regulating what is permissible, and could have an inadvisable chill-
ing effect on vigorous but appropriate advocacy.
6. The concurrence of the votes of two-thirds of the members of the commission
present shall be sufficient for conviction, a moity of the commission constituting
a quorum,
This is probably the single most troublesome provision of The Order
because, together with the low standards that are allowed in the admis-
sion of evidence, it may tip the balance beyond what seems permissible
in favor of a conclusion of guilt in a criminal prosecution. The presump-
tion of innocence and the need for the government to overcome this
presumption by the use of competent evidence that establishes guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt are principles embedded in the Fifth Amend-
ment.45 These principles have protected the accused in every proceed-
ing where there is a charge of criminal conduct since before the
Constitution came into being.4 Because the provision applies to "per-
40 Id. § 3A5.e.
See Katharine Q. Seelye, Just Who Would Want To Defend Suspects Before a Tribunal? Probably Plenty,
N.Y. TuMEs, Dec. 28, 2001, at BS; Stephen Gillers, No Lawyer To Cal N.Y. TIMS, Dec. 3, 2001, at A19;
Tribunals Pose Tough Task for Corps of Military LanMers, BOSTON GLOm, Dec. 30, 2001, at A21; Deborah
L. Rhode, Terrorists and TheirLawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2002, at A3 (op-ed) (seeing new surveillance
powers as threat to basic rights).
._ SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4 (c) (6).
405 Cf Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 134 (1979) (holding that if ajury of six is used in a crimi-
nal trial, the verdict must be unanimous).
4N In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970). The provisions of the Fifth Amendment on indict-
ment by a grand jury ("except in cases arising in the land and navel forces"), have been held inappli-
cable to trials before military commissions. Exparte Quinin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942). The same applies to
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sons," it attaches to non-citizens as well as to citizens of the United
States.47 Additionally, as part of the due process component of the Fifth
Amendment, the presumption of innocence and the burden of overcom-
ing this presumption by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, constitute
"fundamental" constitutional precepts. They apply to all such actions of
the government, in any territory subject to its jurisdiction.4 -
MCO No. 1 provides that the accused "shall be presumed innocent
until proven guilty."409 It also states that a vote for a finding of guilty as to
an offense can only be made if the commission member is convinced be-
yond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence admitted at trial.410 Al-
though these provisions go a long way toward providing constitutionally
mandated protections to the accused, the question remains whether they
are de facto and de jure sufficient to overcome the low standard for ad-
mission of evidence and the less than unanimous voting standard.
7. The imposition of the sentence upon conviction shall be with the
concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the commission who are present, a
majotity of the commission constituting a quorum
As previously stated, Section 4(a) provides that any individual subject
to The Order who is found guilty by a military commission "may be pun-
ished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law,
including life imprisonment or death. 4  MCO No. 1 provides that "a
unanimous, affirmative vote of all members" of the commission is re-
quired for the imposition of the death sentence, 41 and that only a com-
mission of seven members may impose capital punishment.414 It would
appear that these provisions of MCO No. 1 contradict the standards of
the trial by jury provisions of the Sixth Amendment. I If we were to apply the principle of expressio
univus est edusio alterius to this interpretation of the text of the Fifth Amendment, it would be reason-
able to conclude that all of its other rights, including the right to due process of law, would apply to
trials before military commissions.
Se e g., Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998) (applying the proof beyond a
reasonable doubt standardwhen reviewing a conviction of an alien for violating his deportation).
Examining Board of Engineers v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976). Cf Addington v. Texas,
441 US. 418 (1979) (holding that in an involuntary civi commitment proceeding for the mentally ill,
a "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence" standard meets due process requirements). The Court
never reached the issue of application of Fifth Amendment in Yamashita 327 U.S. at 23. Appendix 2
of the U.C.M.J. provides that before a vote is taken, the military judge shall instruct the members of
the court that the accused shall be presumed innocent until his guilt is established by legal and com-
petent evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 U.S.C. § 851 (U.C.M.J. Art. 51) (Appendix 2). See
MANUALFORTHE COURTS MARnAL UNITED STATES (2000 Edition), Rule 920(c) (5) (providing a similar
provision).
SeeMCO No. 1, supranote 9, § 5.B.
410 Id. § 5.C.
411 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4(c) (7).
412 Id. § 4 (a).
413 MCO No. 1, supra note 9, § 6.F.
414 ILd. § 6.G.
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Section 4(a) of The Order which allows the imposition of the death pen-
alty by a two-thirds vote of the commission, with a majority of those pres-
ent being sufficient. According to Section 7.B. of MCO No. 1, the con-
flict has to be decided in favor of the requirements of The Order.
The commissions are both judge and jury, as indicated in Section
4(c) (2). This means that the accused does not have a right to ajury trial,
a situation that has been held to be valid as to military commissions con-
stituted under the conditions that were applicable when Ex pare Quiin
was decided. 4' 5 Leaving aside whether those conditions presently exist,
which has been amply discussed previously, the issue remains whether,
under Supreme Court case law on the rights of capital offenders, such a
sentence would be upheld in a case where a jury trial is not an option
available to the accused.4 6
8. The record of the trial, including any conviction or sentence shall be reviewed
for final decision by the President or if he so delegates, by the Secretary of
Defense.
417
This provision is probably the single most radical departure from the
41S1type of procedure usually present in a criminal trial . The final decision
on the guilt or innocence of those tried before military commissions or
the sentenced imposed belongs to the President. The Commission's
"decision" is more in the nature of a report and recommendation. The
record and outcome of the proceedings before the commissions are to
be packaged and sent to a Review Panel of which the Secretary of De-
fense is the Appointing Authority.419 This is not an appeal, and there is
no provision in The Order for an appeal as such. It is simply an adminis-
trative review of the record of the trial, for a final decision by the Presi-
dent or the Secretary of Defense.42
The Review Panel shall be composed of three military officers desig-
nated by the Secretary of Defense, but it may include civilians commis-
sioned pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 603.421 At least one member of the panel
shall have experience as ajudge. Within thirty days of receipt of the rec-
ord, the Review Panel shall either forward the case to the Secretary of
415 317 U.S. at 40.
416 See, e.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (upholding the validity of a sentencing scheme
which requires the judge to determine aggravating or mitigating circumstances after ajury has deter-
mined guilt for the elements of the offense in a death penalty case); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1948) (reviewing a case where defendant pled guilty and wvaived his right to ajury recom-
mendation on sentence and was subsequently sentenced to death).
417 SeeThe Order, supra note 9, § 4(c) (8).
418 "Under certain circumstances, the constitutional requirement of due process is a requirement
ofjudicial process." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,87 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
419 SeeMCO No. 1, supra note 9,§ 6.H.1.
420Id. § 6.H.3.
42 Id. § 6.H.4.
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Defense with a recommendation as to its disposition or return it to the
Appointing Authority for further proceedings, provided that a majority
of the Review Panel has forned a definite and firm conviction that a ma-
terial error of law occurred.42 After review by the Secretary of Defense,
the record of the trial and all recommendations will be forwarded to the
President for review and final decision.42 An authenticated finding of
not guilty as to a charge shall not be changed to a finding of guilty, 4 but
a not uilty finding will not necessarily lead to the release of the de-
tainee. Any sentence made final by action of the President or the Sec-
retary of Defense shall be carried out promptly.
4 6
However, to fully grasp the import of this provision, it should be read
together with the limitations on judicial review that The Order imposes
in Section 7(b). In paragraph (1), The Order indicates that "military
tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to offenses by the
individual."42 Among the issues raised by this provision is the authority
of the President to render inoperative the whole gamut of criminal stat-
utes passed by Congress previously enumerated, or to negate that body's
choice as to the forum where those crimes are to be tried.4
Paragraph (2) of Section 7(b) is again an attempt by the Executive
Branch to insulate itself from judicial oversight. This provision indicates
that no individual covered by The Order "shall be privileged to seek any
remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any
such remedy or proceeding sought on the individual's behalf in any
court of the United States, or any State thereof, or any court of any for-
eign nation or international tribunal."429 This provision is also similar to
the one found in the presidential orders in the Quirin ° and Yamashite'
cases, in which President Roosevelt by decree attempted to foreclose ju-
dicial review of the actions of those military commissions. As we know,
one of the few points won by petitioners in those cases was the right to
judicial review of their constitutional claims through habeas corpus peti-
tions in the federal courts. Of course, in those cases the presidential or-
4MId.
4Z § 6.116.
44 Id. § 6.12.
Statements by the General Counsel of the Department of Defense during C-Span interview on
Mar. 22, 2002.
V See The Order, § 7(b) (1). Cf Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692-93 (2001) ("[Ihe Constitu-
tion may well preclude granting 'an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make determi-
nations implicating fundamental rights.'" (quoting from Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472
U.S. 445,450 (1985))).
IM We do not attempt to cover the federalism issues raised by the implied denial to the States of
jurisdiction to try the alleged perpetrators of these acts, under the various state criminal laws that are
applicable.
Id. § 7(b) (2).
4W ExparteQuirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
431 In reYamasbita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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ders were approved by Congress. Here, we do not even have that situa-
tion.
The prohibition against filings in foreign national courts and interna-
tional tribunals is both surplusage and irrelevant. The President has as
much control over those entities as they have over us: none.4
III. CONCLUSION
A. Conclusions
It is always easier to engage in what amounts to after-the-fact second
guessing than to take actions that may have been deemed necessary by
the exigencies of the moment. The President's most basic duty is the
protection of the nation "against all enemies foreign or domestic," and it
is difficult to fault decisions taken in the heat of situations that required
immediate response.43' That said, however, it is not inappropriate, upon
the cooling of the urgency that promoted such actions, to step back and
weigh the rightness of these responses in the dispassionate light of objec-
tive analysis.
It has been said that in war the first casualty is truth. Perhaps we
should say that in crisis the first casualty is civil liberty. Because we in the
United States have been privileged to live in a relatively sheltered world,
we have been slow in developing what has been called "a jurisprudence
of civil liberties in times of security crises."" 4 Now, as we are faced with
the cold realities of a Newer World, it is important that we not lose sight
of why it is that we do not want to live in the kind of "society" that terror-
ists seek. A balance must be struck between what is really required to
meet a crisis and the civil liberties that preserve our way of life, taking
care that the damage to these is as fleeting as possible. To a nation like
-W See Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.cGJ. 14 (June 27) (military and paramilitary activities);
Nicaraguav. United States, 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26) (same).
43 See Alberto R. GonzMles, MartialJustice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 30, 2001, at B12.
4-M WilliamJ. Brennan, Jr., The Quest To Develop aJurisprdence of Civil Liberties in Tsmes of Security Cii-
ses, Speech given on December 22, 1987, at the Law School of Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel.
Cf Evan Thomas and Michael Isikott, Justice Kept in the Dar&, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 10, 2001, at 37.
4 .[T]he Constitution... is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160
(1962). See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (ackson, J., dissenting) ("There is danger
that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.").
42 See William Glaberson, Supportfor Bush's Antiterror Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2001, at B6; William
Glaerson, Tribunal v. Court-Martia: Matter of Perception, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2001, at B6; Laurie Good-
stein, Jewish Groups Endorse Tough Security Laws, N.Y. TIME, Jan. 3, 2002, at Al4; How To Ty a Ternist,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2001, at A32; Michael Ignatieff, Is the Human Rights Era Ending?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2002, at A29; Anthony Lewis, Captives and the Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, at A31; Anthony Lewis,
Dust in Our Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at A10; Anthony Lewis, Wake Up, America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2001, at B12; Matthew Purdy, Bush's New Rules to Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at Al; William Saire, Voices of Nigtivis-m, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2001, at A35;
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ours, although the crisis that we face is portentous, the technique lend-
ing to its solution(s), the balancing of alternatives, is not new.
The initial question is whether the President has the authority to
promulgate The Order.47 Considering the lack of specific congressional
authorization, there are serious problems in that respect Such executive
actions previously have been sanctioned only in times of congressionally
declared wars.4 Congress's declaration is not a mere formality or tech-
nicality, but evinces a momentous and solemn step whereby the civil
powers of the nation are concentrated in the office of the President and
there is a delegation by Congress of powers not normally authorized to
the President. Furthermore, this delegation is not open-ended; it com-
mences with the formal declaration of war and ends with the proclama-
tion of peace. The creation of a separate, ad hoc military tribunal with
exclusive jurisdiction over matters that have already been assigned by
Congress to the civil courts, should at the very least require specific con-
gressional authorization.439 Clearly, the absolute denial of access to the
courts is beyond even the power of Congress.
Absent a determination based on credible evidence that individual
detainees engaged in acts against the laws of war, detainees captured by
United States forces, or our surrogates, in the field of battle or its equiva-
lent, should either be given prisoner of war status, or charged under the
civilian criminal system for violations of those laws, and thereafter proc-
essed accordingly.
The detention and possible trial of the detainees in the Guantnamo
Naval Base presents significant constitutional problems, unrelated to the
issue of the conditions of detainment. It would seem that the issue is not
whether the United States Constitution applies to the activities there, but
rather to what extent it applies. At a minimum, "fundamental" rights are
likely to attach to all persons in this naval enclave. The presumption of
innocence, and the need for the government to overcome this presump-
tion by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, constitute fundamental rights.
Katharine Q. Seelye, Justice Department Decision to Forgo Tribunal B)passes Pentagon, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 13,
2001, at B6; Robin Toner, Civil Liberty v. Security: Finding a Wartime Balance, N.Y TIMEs, Nov. 17, 2001,
at Al; Tim Weiner, 7he C.I.A. Wens Its Domestic Reac N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 2002, § 4, at 1; Benjamin
Weiser, Ex-Posecutor Wants Tribunals To Retain Liberties, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 8, 2002, at A3;Robert Wright,
RumsfedId Momen N.Y. TIME,Jan. 20, 2002, § 4, at 13.
The Order, supra note 9.
42 SeeInreYamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); ExparteQuirin, 317U.S. 1, 24 (1942).
Cf. HR. 3468, 107th Cong. (2001) ("To authorize the President to convene military tribunals
for the trial outside the United States of persons other than U.S. citizens and lawful resident aliens
who are apprehended in connection with the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United
States") (Introduced Dec. 12, 2001 by Ms. Harman and Ms. Lofgren), and H.R. 3564, 107th Cong.
(2001) ('To authorize the limited use of military tribunals absent a war declared by Congress in cases
arising out of acts of international terrorism committed in the United States") (Introduced by Mr.
Barr on Dec. 20, 2001).
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Other constitutional rights are probably also implicated by reason of the
procedures established by The Order.
B. Some policy issues and considerations
Most, if not all, of the questions raised by The Order would be re-
solved in a satisfactory manner, or at least the mechanisms are in place
for such resolution, if the detainees were processed, charged and tried
pursuant to our normal criminal law system.44
There are many recent examples of such cases being handled in this
manner.44 One case that partakes of many similarities with the present
circumstances is that of the invasion of Panama in December 1989. The
United States Armed Forces took military action in the Republic of Pan-
ama against the government of General Manuel Antonio Noriega, bring-
ing about the collapse of his regime. As part of these actions General
Noriega was captured by U.S. Armed Forces and arrested there by U.S.
Marshals, and brought to the United States, where he was detained,
charged, tried and convicted in a United States court.443 He is now serv-
ing a long prison sentence in an appropriate federal facility.
This is a felicitous example of the principle, often quoted and usually
followed, that our armed forces are best at fighting battles. This is what
their training addresses. They are at their best when the objectives are
clearly defined. Unfortunately, they are not trained to be, and their ef-
fectiveness, not surprisingly, declines when they are called upon to act as
policemen. These realities are in part reflected in the Posse Comitatus
Act.
444
The removal of the Afghanistan detainees from the mainstream
criminal law system has brought about several unintended and deleteri-
+0 Although some of these concerns have been addressed by MCO No. 1, supra note 9, promul-
gated by the Secretary of Defense pursuant to authority delegated under The Order to establish pro-
cedures to be followed by the commissions (The Order, supra note 9, § 4(c)), these procedures still
fall short of the guarantees available to the accused in the Federal Courts and in the military justice
system under the U.C.M.J.
441 Cf United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denie, 523 U.S. 1060 (1998).
SeeNote, Responding to Terroris " Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARv. L Rv 1217 (2002) (analyzing
the various major episodes of foreign terrorism against the United States and our response to them);
Gary Hart, Sept 11 Has Scrambled Concepts of War, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2002, atA15 ("[Tierrorism is
not war. it is crime on a mass scale .... By confusing war and crime we have created a cul-de sac.").
See David Johnston, Man Held Since August Is Accused of Helping in Sept. 11 Terror Pan, N.Y. T1 N ES,
Dec. 12, 2001, at Al; DavidJohnston, Al Qaeda Trained Bombing Suspect, Indictment Scys, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan.
17, 2002, at Al; Katherine E. Finkelstein, Sept. 11 Shadow Lingers As Egytian's Trial Begins, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 14, 2002, atAl.
Noriega, 117 F.3d at 1206.
4M See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 ("Whomever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully use any part of the Army or the air Force as a posse
comitator or otherwise to execute the lavs shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.").
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ous consequences, not the least of which is that these alleged perpetra-
tors of terrorist attacks gain a valuable propaganda tool. Previously, we
have insisted on treating both foreign and domestic terrorists like com-
mon criminals.44 To sway from that policy just feeds the fire. Further-
more, our failure to process the alleged perpetrators in the civil courts
unjustifiably denigrates the proven ability of these courts to fairly and ef-
ficiently handle these cases. Using the military justice system in this un-
typical manner also does a disservice to that system's well-earned reputa-
tion under the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice.
The unnecessarily heavy hand of The Order provides ammunition
against us in the important battle of the minds. Much of the world looks
to the United States as the ultimate paradigm of justice. It will be diffi-
cult to explain the why's and wherefore's of an exception to the rules of
justice that we could not and would not apply to our own citizens. Criti-
cally, it will be overwhelmingly difficult to convince our enemies that our
captured soldiers be treated evenhandedly. Additionally, it will be in-
creasingly hard to avoid having our citizens, accused of terrorism, or
other crimes for that matter, tried before secret military courts, regard-
less of whether those nations are allies or enemies (as happened in Peru
in 1996 in the case of Lori Berenson, a situation strongly protested by
our State Department, with a modicum of success).446
It has been predicted that most conflicts in the twenty-first century
will be low intensity in nature, largely involving irregular forces, many of
them commencing as intra-national skirmishes. However, considering
the porosity of modem borders, the high mobility of populations, and
the great technological advances in communications, as well as the reali-
ties of the global economy, many of these "local" conflagrations will, as
they have in the recent past, spill out into the international scenario. A
prime example of this hypothesis is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which
is basically an internal ethnic/religious civil war that has at times become
a decidedly international one, and more in point, that has been a con-
stant source of violent transnational terrorist actions. This exportation
or spilling over of local conflicts into the global scene is likely to con-
tinue and will probably be a hallmark of this century.447
445 James Sterngold, 4 Former Radicals Are Charged in 1995 Killings in Bank Robbery, N.Y. TMEs, Jan.
17, 2002, atAl.
446See Berenson Asks Court To Overturn Prison Tern, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL,Jan. 23, 2002, atA6.
447See Raymond Bonner, 'Sleeper Cells' in Singapore Show Al Qaeda's Long Reach, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 26,
2002, at Al;Jane Perlez, Indonesian in Ternn- Inquby Lauds bin Laden, N.Y. TIME, Jan. 25, 2002, at A10;
Raymond Bonner, Qaeda MovingInto Indonesia, Ofiials Fear, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 23, 2002, at A1; Elisabeth
Rosenthal, Beijing Says Chinese Muslims Were Trained as Terrorists with Money From bin Laden, N.Y. TiMEs,
Jan. 22, 2002, at All; Neil MacFarquhar, Egeptian Group Patiently Pursues Dream of Islamic State, N.Y.
TiwEs, Jan. 20, 2002, at A3; I-.D.S. Greenway, Terrorisn in the Tropics, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2002, at
A19; Raymond Bonner, How Qaeda Linked with Malaysian Groups, N.Y. TMNES, Feb. 7,2002, at All; An-
drew Selsky, US. Plans for Wider Columbia Involvement, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 6,2002, atA3; Somini Sen-
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Because the United States, as the world's remaining super-power, is
perceived as having a decisive influence in tipping the balance that ulti-
mately decides these intramural conflicts, it is, and will continue to be,
the focus of the various participants in these conflicts, in an attempt to
accomplish by indirect means what they are unable to do directly. Thus,
rightly or wrongly, the United States will continue to be a major target of
attention and reaction from groups and entities, most of whom Ameri-
cans have never even heard of, much less encountered.48
The United States is probably better prepared to deal with these
situations using military preemption and response 449 than with other ar-
eas of its competency. This is partially because the armed forces have a
more central and unified command structure, are continually planning
and practicing for various and diverse scenarios, and because they have
been extensively exposed to foreign environments, which is a situation
that is not within the common experience of most of the other parts of
the government or citizenry.4 It goes without saying that the September
11 incidents have had, and will continue to have into the future, far
reaching and unforeseen consequences at all levels and throughout the
entire nation.45'
These are new and unfamiliar scenarios for the American homeland.
The labeling of the various actors in these encounters as "terrorists,"
"freedom fighters," "guerrillas," and "special forces," may not be very
productive. These encounters, although not totally predictable, can in
many cases be planned for. There is the need to involve all the branches
of government and the citizenry, and to do so in a central, coordinated
manner cutting across fictitious, bureaucratic lines.452 There is also an
imperative need to restore and upgrade our intelligence mechanisms,
which have never fully recovered from the emasculations of the Frank
gupta, India Passes Antiterror Bill Over Protests About Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A5; Celia w.
Dugger, As MaoistRevolt Grows, Nepal Fears for Its Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24,2002, at A3.
448 See DavidJohnston, U.S. Hunts 5 Men Seen on Tape, Saying They May Plan Attack, N.Y. TImEs, Jan.
18, 2002, at Al; Douglas Jehl, For Saudi Cleric, Battle Shapes Up As Infidel vs. Islam, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4,
2001, at B1;James Risen, Qaida Still Able To Strike U.S., Head of C.I.A. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at
Al; David Croy, Americans Were Targets Long Before Sept. 11, SANJUAN STAR, Feb. 24, 2002, p. 12.
449 See generally Thorm Shanker, Conduct of War Is Redefined by Success of Special Forces, N.Y. T11MEs, Jan.
21, 2002, atAl.
40 Edward Rothstein, Kipling Knew Wat the U.S. May Now Learn, N.Y. TIMEs,Jan. 26, 2002, at Al7.
451 Alison Mitchell, Give Me a Home Where the Buffalo Roam Less, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002, § 4, at 5;
Gary Hart, Sept. 11 Has Scrambled Our Concept of War, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11, 2002, at Al5.
452 Joel Brinkley, Ridge Meeting Opposition from Agencies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 7, 2002, at A12; David E.
Sanger, Bush, Focusing on Tenvrism Says Secure U.S. Is Top Priority, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2002, at Al; Ray.-
mond Hernandez, Kerik Asks That the F.B.I Share Terror Information, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at B10;
James Dao, Pentagon Is Seeking New Antiterror Command, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 2002, at All; Revisiting
Homeland Security, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A28 (editorial);John Markoff, Chief Takes Over at Agency
To Thwart Attacks on U.S., N.Y TIMES, Feb. 13,2002, atA27.
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Church era.4 We should also inform ourselves about how other socie-
ties have dealt with these problems, structurally, not necessarily militar-
ily, keeping in mind that other nation's solutions may not readily be
adaptable to our constitutional and cultural idiosyncrasies, but keeping
an open mind.
Lastly, we should consider the fact that complex problems, which
undoubtedly these are, are hardly ever resolved by facile solutions. Al-
though terrorism, particularly in the form of mass violence against civil-
ian populations, cannot be excused under any circumstance or for any
reason or cause, we must look to the underlying stimuli fomenting these
situations.4-5 Therein lies a large part of our ability to predict them, and
where it is possible to remedy the underlying sore, to eliminate, or at
least to reduce, the possibility of their recurrence in such virulent form.
The exigencies of the moment have put us on a slippery slope not
unlike the icy hills of Afghanistan. The nation is facing serious chal-
lenges to its security, and at this point, we seem to have more questions
than we do answers. This is not necessarily a negative point, for we are
dealing with new and dynamic experiences. The important thing is that
in looking for answers we not allow ourselves to slip backwards down our
own national slopes.
453 R.W. Apple, Jr., Reticence on a Failure of Intelligence May End, N.Y. IMEs, Dec. 14, 2001, at B32;
Scott Lehigh, Wen Clinton Slept, BOSTON GLOBEJan. 2,2002, atA15; TheFuture of the CA, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2002, § 4, at 10 (editorial).
4 Cf,Janny Scott, Foreign Born in U.S. at Record High, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at A26.
455 Elaine Sciolino, Radicalic- Is the Devil in the Demographics?, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, § 4, at 1;
Elaine Sciolino, Saudi Affirms U.S. Ties but Says Bush Ignores Palestinians' Cause N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2002, at Al; Salman Rushdie, America and Anti-American, N.Y. TINES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A27; BERNARD
IVIS, WHAT WENT WRONG (2001); Nicholas D. Kristof, Behind the Rage, N.Y. TIcEs, Apr. 16, 2002, at
A27 (op-ed).
How long will this '%var" last and how will it be brought to a closure? What "war" powers will the
President implement to reinforce our homeland security? Are we on the road to internal passports or
identification cards? Travel restrictions? Pervasive electronic surveillance? See Woods v. Clayd W.
Miller, 333 U.S. 133, 134 (1948) ("[I]f the war powers can be used in days of peace to treat all'the.
wounds which war inflicts oni our society, it may... swallow up all other powers of Congress....');
Note, BlonmAway? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARv. L REV. 2074 (1996);Joseph Kahn,
Raids, Detentions, and Lists Lead Muslims To Oy Persecution, N.Y. TiMEs, Mar. 27, 2002, at All; Jeffrey
Rosen, Silicon Valley' Spy Game N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 14,2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 46.
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APPENDIX: TilE ORDER
7
Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens
in the War Against Terrorism
November 13, 2001
By the authority vested in me as President and as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States of America, including the Authorization for
Use of Military Force Joint Resolution (Public Law 107-40, 115 Stat. 224)
and sections 821 and 836 of Title 10, United States Code, it is hereby or-
dered as follows:
SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
(a) International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have car-
ried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and
facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on
a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of
the United States Armed Forces.
(b) In light of grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism, includ-
ing the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the headquarters of
the United States Department of Defense in the national capital region,
on the World Trade Center in New York, and on civilian aircraft such as
in Pennsylvania, I proclaimed a national emergency on September 14,
2001 (Proc. 7463, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Cer-
tain Terrorist Attacks).
(c) Individuals acting alone and in concert involved in international
terrorism possess both the capability and the intention to undertake fur-
ther terrorist attacks against the United States that, if not detected and
prevented, will cause mass deaths, mass injuries, and massive destruction
of property, and may place at risk the continuity of the operations of the
United States government.
(d) The ability of the United States to protect the United States and
its citizens, and to help its allies and other cooperating nations protect
their nations and their citizens, from such further terrorist attacks de-
pends in significant part upon using the United States Armed Forces to
identify terrorists and those who support them, to disrupt their activities,
and to eliminate their ability to conduct or support such attacks.
457 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
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(e) To protect the United States and its citizens, and for the effective
conduct of military operations and prevention of terrorist attacks, it is
necessary for individuals subject to this order pursuant to section 2
hereof to be detained, and, when tried, to be tried for violations of the
laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.
(f) Given the danger to the safety of the United States and the nature
of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under this
order, I find consistent with section 836 of Title 10, United States Code,
that it is not practicable to apply in military commissions under this or-
der the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized
in the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.
(g) Having fully considered the magnitude of the potential deaths,
injuries, and property destruction that would result from potential acts
of terrorism against the United States, and the probability that such acts
will occur, I have determined that an extraordinary emergency exists for
national defense purposes, that this emergency constitutes an urgent
and compelling government interest, and that issuance of this order is
necessary to meet the emergency.
SEC. 2. DEFINITION AND POLICY.
(a) The term "individual subject to this order" shall mean any indi-
vidual who is not a United States citizen with respect to whom I deter-
mine from time to time in writing that:
(1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant
times,
(i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida;
(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have
caused, threaten to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or ad-
verse effects on the United States, its citizens, national security, foreign
policy, or economy; or
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a) (1) of this order; and
(2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be
subject to this order.
(b) It is the policy of the United States that the Secretary of Defense
shall take all necessary measures to ensure that any individual subject to
this order is detained in accordance with section 3, and, if the individual
is to be tried, that such individual is tried only in accordance with section
4.
(c) It is further the policy of the United States that any individual
subject to this order who is not already under the control of the Secre-
tary of Defense but who is under the control of any other officer or agent
of the United States or any State shall, upon delivery of a copy of such
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written determination to such officer or agent, forthwith be placed un-
der the control of the Secretary of Defense.
SEC. 3. DETENTION AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
Any individual subject to this order shall be-
(a) detained at an appropriate location designated by the Secretary
of Defense outside or within the United States;
(b) treated humanely, without any adverse distinction based on race,
color, religion, gender, birth, wealth, or any similar criteria;
(c) afforded adequate food, drinking water, shelter, clothing, and
medical treatment;
(d) allowed the free exercise of religion consistent with the require-
ments of such detention; and
(e) detained in accordance with such other conditions as the Secre-
tary of Defense may prescribe.
SEC. 4. AUTHORrY OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE REGARDING TRIALS OF
INDIVIDUALS SUBJECT TO THIS ORDER
(a) Any individual subject to this order shall, when tried, be tried by
military commission for any and all offenses triable by military commis-
sion that such individual is alleged to have committed, and may be pun-
ished in accordance with the penalties provided under applicable law,
including life imprisonment or death.
(b) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, in-
cluding subsection (f) thereof, the Secretary of Defense shall issue such
orders and regulations, including orders for the appointment of one or
more military commissions, as may be necessary to carry out subsection
(a) of this section.
(c) Orders and regulations issued under subsection (b) of this sec-
tion shall include, but not be limited to, rules for the conduct of the
proceedings of military commissions, including pretrial, trial, and post-
trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of process, and qualifications
of attomeys, which shall at a minimum provide for-
(1) military commissions to sit at any time and any place, consistent
with such guidance regarding time and place as the Secretary of Defense
may provide;
(2) a full and fair trial, with the military commission sitting as the tri-
ers of both fact and law;
(3) admission of such evidence as would, in the opinion of the pre-
siding officer of the military commission (or instead, if any other mem-
ber of the commission so requests at the time the presiding officer ren-
ders that opinion, the opinion of the commission rendered at that time
by a majority of the commission), have probative value to a reasonable
person;
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(4) in a manner consistent with the protection of information classi-
fied or classifiable under Executive Order 12958 of April 17, 1995, as
amended, or any successor Executive Order, protected by statute or rule
from unauthorized disclosure, or otherwise protected by law, (A) the
handling of, admission into evidence of, and access to materials and in-
formation, and (B) the conduct, closure of, and access to proceedings;
(5) conduct of the prosecution by one or more attorneys designated
by the Secretary of Defense and conduct of the defense by attorneys for
the individual subject to this order,
(6) conviction only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being
present;
(7) sentencing only upon the concurrence of two-thirds of the mem-
bers of the commission present at the time of the vote, a majority being
present; and
(8) submission of the record of the trial, including any conviction or
sentence, for review and final decision by me or by the Secretary of De-
fense if so designated by me for that purpose.
SEC. 5. OBLIGATION OF OTHER AGENCIEs TO ASsT TBE SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE.
Departments, agencies, entities, and officers of the United States
shall, to the maximum extent permitted by law, provide to the Secretary
of Defense such assistance as he may request to implement this order.
SEC. 6. ADDmONAL AUTHORITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE.
(a) As a military function and in light of the findings in section 1, the
Secretary of Defense shall issue such orders and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out any of the provisions of this order.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may perform any of his functions or du-
ties, and may exercise any of the powers provided to him under this or-
der (other than under section 4(c) (8) hereof) in accordance with sec-
tion 113(d) of Title 10, United States Code.
SEC. 7. RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER LAWAND FORUMS.
(a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to-
(1) authorize the disclosure of state secrets to any person not other-
wise authorized to have access to them;
(2) limit the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of the
Armed Forces or the power of the President to grant reprieves and par-
dons; or
(3) limit the lawful authority of the Secretary of Defense, any military
commander, or any other officer or agent of the United States or of any
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State to detain or try any person who is not an individual subject to this
order.
(b) With respect to any individual subject to this order-
(1) military tribunals shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
offenses by the individual; and
(2) the individual shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or main-
tain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or
proceeding sought on the individual's behalf, in (i) any court of the
United States, or any State thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation,
or (iii) any international tribunal.
(c) This order is not intended to and does not create any right, bene-
fit, or privilege, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or equity by
any party, against the United States, its departments, agencies, or other
entities, its officers or employees, or any other person.
(d) For purposes of this order, the term "State" includes any State,
district, territory, or possession of the United States.
(e) I reserve the authority to direct the Secretary of Defense, at any
time hereafter, to transfer to a governmental authority control of any in-
dividual subject to this order. Nothing in this order shall be construed
to limit the authority of any such governmental authority to prosecute
any individual for whom control is transferred.
SEC. 8. PUBLICATION.
This order shall be published in the Federal Register.
GEORGE W. BUSH
THE WHITE HOUSE,
November 13, 2001.
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